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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 Introduction to Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
After negotiations since September 2002,1 35 African Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries, out of 79 initialled new trading arrangements with the 
European Community (EC) in November and December 2007. For these ACP 
countries, the new trading arrangements replaced the 25 year Lomé 
Convention regime, first put in place in 1975 and extended up to December 
2007 by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) concluded on 23 June 
2000.2 
 
The CPA is not a trade agreement but a ‘commitment to agree’ at a later date 
on new reciprocal trade agreements, called Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). EPAs are different in nature from the Lomé Convention 
trade arrangements under which the trade relations of the EC and ACP were 
governed. Whereas the Lomé Convention arrangements were non-reciprocal, 
and focused on preferential access of ACP exports to the EC market, EPAs 
are reciprocal Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) covering both trade in goods 
and trade in services.3 
 
The non-reciprocal preferential market access treatment (that is charging less, 
no import taxes on similar products imported from elsewhere) under the CPA 
was scheduled to expire on 31 December 2007, the same time the waiver 
                                                 
1 The first phase of Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations was at the all ACP-EU level, 
and took place in Brussels from September 2002 to October 2003, with 18 main meetings. The second 
phase of the negotiations took place between the EC on the one hand and groups of ACP countries on 
the other hand up to November and December 2007 when the new trading arrangements were initialed.  
2 Least Developed Countries (LDC) which did not initial EPAs could export to the EC under the Every 
thing But Arms (EBA) initiative, and non-LDCs under the Generalised System of Preference (GSP) or 
if admitted the GSP+. 
3 The CPA was initially signed between 77 ACP states and 15 member states of the EC on 23 June 
2000 (there are currently 79 ACP states and 25 member states of the EC). The CPA envisaged that 
EPAs would be negotiated between ACP countries and the EC to replace the trade provisions that 
expired on 31 December 2007. Article 2 of the CPA provides that the CPA is based on four main 
principles of partnership, participation, dialogue, mutual obligations, differentiation and regionalism. 
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extended to the EC by World Trade Organisation (WTO) members was to 
expire.4  
 
The EC had been asked by the WTO to bring her trading relationship with the 
ACP countries into conformity with WTO rules of non-discrimination among 
countries trading partners unless the discrimination is under the auspices of a 
customs union or a FTA.5  
 
The emphasis given to the WTO compatibility of future trading arrangements 
between the EC and the ACP states derives from various factors. First, as 
WTO members the concerned majority of ACP states and the EC are under 
an obligation to ensure the conformity of their trade policies with WTO 
obligations.6 
 
Secondly, WTO compliance is necessary to avoid the past difficulties 
experienced by the EC and ACP states in securing GATT/WTO approval of 
the compatibility of the Lomé Conventions. The same rationale arises from the 
successive legal challenges made by some GATT/WTO Members to the EC’s 
regime for the importation, distribution and sales of bananas.7  
 
As such, ACP countries and the EC agreed to negotiate WTO compatible 
EPAs to enter into force by January 2008, unless earlier dates were agreed. 
This was way back in 2000 under the CPA.8 EPAs are FTAs9 between the EC 
on the one hand and regional groupings of the ACP countries on the other. 
The EPAs cover a wide scope of issues, including market access, 
                                                 
4 Nahamya S., ‘An overview of the EAC-EU framework EPA; what is in it for Uganda’, (2008) at 1, 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry. Also accessible at: http://www.mtti.go.ug. 
5 (n 4 above) at 1 
6 Onguglo B. and Ito T., ‘How to make EPA's WTO compatible?, Reforming the rules on regional trade 
agreements’, (2003)40 European Centre for Development Policy Management at 10 http:// 
www.ecdpm.org [accessed on 14 August 2008] 
7 (n 6 above) at 10 
8 (n 4 above) at 1 
9 Article XXIV (8)(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides that a free 
trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties 
and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all trade between the 
constituent territories on products originating in such territories. The level of “substantially all trade” 
referred to in Article XXIV of GATT is often interpreted by the EU as covering an average of 90% of 
trade between the parties.The schedule for the formation of an FTA should be completed within a 
“reasonable length of time” which should “exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases”.  
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development cooperation, agriculture, fisheries, services and trade related 
issues.10  
 
The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental 
organisation comprised of the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda. The EAC aims at promoting closer economic 
cooperation among its members as well as enhancing regional stability.11 
 
Four of the five EAC countries are also members of the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and they were part of the negotiating 
process between the EC and COMESA until mid 2007 when EAC decided as 
a region to negotiate a separate EPA. The fifth EAC member, Tanzania, also 
belongs to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This 
overlapping membership is due to various economic and political reasons.12 
 
On the other hand the European Community (EC) is one of the three pillars of 
the European Union (EU)13 created under the Maastricht Treaty (1992). It is 
based upon the principle of supranationalism14 and has its origins in the 
                                                 
10 SEATINI, ‘The implications and challenges of implementing an Economic Partnership Agreement 
for Uganda with particular reference to the market access cluster’ (2008) at 10. EPAs are a trade 
regime meant to ensure the continued trade preferences by those countries that sign them on EC market 
beyond the expiry of the Cotonou trade regime. 
11 Sands P. and Klein p., Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 5th ed (2001) at 254. East Africa is 
a geographically and economically homogeneous region committed to regional integration. Burundi, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda are all Least Developed Countries or (LDCs) while Kenya is non-LDC. 
12 The EAC, SADC and COMESA have also formed a tripartite forum with a view to negotiating an 
FTA between the three organizations. Thus the situation in the EAC region remains relatively complex 
and the EAC is embedded in the wider region with strong links to COMESA, and in the case of 
Tanzania to SADC. 
13 The EU is an economic and political union of 27 member states primarily located in Europe. The 
main difference between the EU and EC is that, technically speaking; only the EC has legal personality 
and, therefore can conclude international agreements, buy or sell property, sue and be sued in court. All 
these are competences which the EC has, but the EU does not. The EU comprises the EC and its 
Member States. The EU is the political and institutional framework in which the EC's and certain 
Member States competences are exercised. 
14 Supranationalism is a method of decision making in multi-national political communities, wherein 
power is transferred to an authority broader than governments of member states. Because decisions in 
supranational super structures are taken by majority votes, it is possible for a member-state in those 
unions to be forced by the other member-states to implement a decision. Unlike in a federal supra-state, 
member states retain nominal sovereignty, although some sovereignty is shared with, or ceded to, the 
supranational body. Full sovereignty can be reclaimed by withdrawing from the supranational 
arrangements. A supranational authority by definition can have some independence from member state 
governments although not as much independence as with federal governments. Supranational 
institutions, like federal governments, imply the possibility of pursuing agendas in ways that the 
delegating states did not initially envision. 
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European Economic Community, the predecessor of the EU. This community 
pillar covers trade policy among others and the Commissioner of Trade has 
been responsible for negotiating the EPA on behalf of all EU member states.15 
 
In order to avoid trade disruption on the expiry of the Cotonou trade regime all 
the five EAC partner states and the EC initialled a framework EPA on 27 
November 2007. The framework agreement covers market access offers by 
the parties (EAC and EC) to each other, Rules of Origin (RoO), fisheries, 
development cooperation clauses and a provision for continuation of 
negotiations beyond the original deadline of 31 December 2007.16 
 
The parties undertook to continue negotiations with a view to concluding a 
comprehensive EPA, which shall comprise the subject matters listed under 
chapter V, no later than 31 July 2009.17  
 
The EAC Customs Union commenced on 1 January 2005, following 
successful negotiations from 2000-2004. This economic union with its 
Common External Tariff (CET) strengthened the reasons for the EAC group to 
negotiate with the EC. However, persuading partner states to abandon their 
other configurations was initially difficult.18 
 
 
                                                 
15 The politics and government of the European Union at 2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/index_en.htm 
[accessed on 28 January 2009] 
16 Mutahunga E., ‘Negotiations of the EAC-EC Economic Partnership Agreement; where we are and 
where are going’ (2008)2 at 21 The Uganda Trade Review; In addition to the market access offers, the 
text on trade in goods addresses issues of non-tariff barriers and trade defence instruments. The text 
also has provisions on customs co-operation between the EAC and EC customs authorities, Most 
Favoured Nation treatment, circulation of goods and export taxes. In effect interim EPAs are FTAs 
between (the groupings of ACP countries or) ACP countries and the EC member states as part of the 
ACP – EC co-operation. In short, the EPAs are a trade regime meant to ensure the continued enjoyment 
of trade preferences by those countries that sign them on the EC market beyond the expiry of the 
Cotonou trade regime. The EPAs would be compatible with WTO rules in that an element of 
reciprocity would be introduced. 
17 Article 3 (2) of the EPA 
18 Kiguta P., ‘The EAC interim agreement an overview’,(2008)7(2), Trade Negotiation Insights at 6 
http:// www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 14 August 2008] 
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But by early 2007 the danger of concluding EPAs under different groupings 
not only for the Customs Union but also for regional integration was clear.19 
However on 27 November 2007 the East African Community (EAC) and the 
EC initialled a framework for an EPA, in Kampala Uganda.20 
 
Under the deal the EC granted the EAC a market access offer consisting of 
duty free and quota free, with transitional arrangements for rice and sugar. 
There is also asymmetric and gradual opening of the EAC to EC goods, 
taking full account of the differences in levels of development between them 
and the EC. On its part the EAC agreed to gradually open its market for goods 
from the EC over 25 years, with a two year moratorium.21  
 
This suspension is to enable the EAC integration process to take root. The 
transition period for the Customs Union will expire at the end of 2009, and the 
two new partner states Burundi and Rwanda will begin implementing the 
Customs Union from January 2010. Therefore, tariff phase-out by the EAC 
shall commence from 1 January 2010, with full liberalisation for trade in goods 
to be achieved in 2033.22 
 
In my view trade between the EAC partner states and the EC is a vital aspect 
to the former as a development tool. The key question therefore is whether 
given the meagre benefits attained by the EAC partner states under the non 
                                                 
19 (n 18 above) at 6. Initially Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were negotiating under the Eastern 
and Southern Africa (ESA) group, a configuration of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) member states while Tanzania was negotiating under the Southern Africa 
Development Community. 
20 SEATINI, ‘The EAC-EU EPA key improvements for promoting social economic development and 
regional integration’, (2008) at 1. The trade ministers of the five EAC partner states and the Secretary 
General initialled on the part of the EAC, while the EU ambassador to Uganda initialled on the part of 
the EC. The decision for the EAC to negotiate an EPA with EC goes back to April 11 2002, when a 
regional Summit directed that the EAC should negotiate as a bloc for all cooperation between ACP 
countries and Europe. However, in March 2003, Kenya and Uganda configured under Eastern and 
Southern Africa (ESA) while in August that year, Tanzania joined the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
21 Kazooba C., ‘East Africa: Region, EU Sign Tentative Trade Deal’, 28 November 2007,The New 
Times (Kigali) http: // allafrica.com/stories/2007.html at 1 [accessed on 8 October 2008] 
22 (n 21 above) at 1: According to Article 26, 11 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties parties 
to an agreement are only under an obligation to implement its terms once it has entered into force, 
which takes place upon ratification or after ratification if this is specified in the treaty (This is provided 
under Article 45 EPA). Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties is to the effect that 
on signature, a country enters into an obligation not to defeat its object and purpose prior to its entry 
into force. 
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reciprocal trade relationship that is the Lomè Convention and Cotonou trade 
regime, this time round will EAC partner states significantly benefit from the 
reciprocal EAC EC EPA. 
 
It is worth noting that the CPA set out five important principles which 
constitute the building blocks for EPAs. The first and overreaching principle of 
EPAs is sustainable development and poverty reduction.23 The second and 
perhaps most revolutionary principle of EPAs is reciprocity, for the first time 
ACP countries were required to open their economies to a much more trading 
developed partner the EC.24 
 
The third principle is regionalism; EPAs are intended to become FTAs 
between two regions.25 The reasoning behind this principle is that regional 
integration is seen as a major stepping stone towards further integration into 
the the world economy and an instrument for stimulating investment.26 
 
The fourth principle is Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). The CPA 
attaches great importance to SDT in EPAs, by stating that EPAs will take into 
account the different levels of development of the contracting parties.27 
Consistent with this, EPAs as of necessity must provide sufficient scope for 
SDT and asymmetry.28 
 
The fifth principle is WTO compatibility, the CPA states in various articles that 
EPAs should be compatible with WTO rules. This principle was intended to 
prevent the new arrangements from being challenged by other WTO 
members.29  
 
                                                 
23 Article 34 of the CPA 
24 (n 10 above) at 10. EPAs are FTAs which were established between the EC and the regions of the 
ACP countries. 
25 EPAs were built on the basis of regional integration blocks and must support them. In spite of this 
the EC has not ruled out conclusion of agreements with individual countries. 
26 (n 10 above) at 11 
27 Article 35 (3) of the CPA 
28 In this practice this means that certain ACP countries would have to be allowed longer transitional 
periods before their markets are fully liberalised or that certain sectors of their economies are entirely 
excluded from liberalization.  
29 Articles 34 (4) and 36 (1) of the CPA 
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CPA is also based on five interdependent pillars with the underlying objective 
of the fight against poverty: an enhanced political dimension, increased 
participation, a more strategic approach to co-operation focusing on poverty 
reduction, new economic and trade partnerships, and improved financial co-
operation.30 
 
In conclusion the CPA is a global and exemplary agreement that introduced 
radical changes and ambitious objectives while preserving the ‘acquis’ of 25 
years of ACP-EC co-operation.31   
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
There is little dispute that the Lome´ Convention, with a few notable 
exceptions, had failed either to promote ACP integration into the world 
economy or enable ACP states to maintain their market share in the EC.32 
According to Eurostat data the share of ACP exports in the EC market has 
fallen from 6.7% in 1976 to just 3.4% in 1994. The ACP countries also 
experienced a declining share of world trade, dropping from 3% in 1976 to just 
over 1% in 1997.33  
 
At the same time ACP, and particularly sub-Saharan Africa, remain 
dependent on EC trade. In ACP Africa, dependency on trade with the EU is 
higher (46.21%) than for the ACP Caribbean (18.18%) and ACP Pacific 
(23.27%) The ACP economies have also failed to diversify their exports, with 
                                                 
30 Article 1 of the CPA: Also see: Venter D. and Neuland., E Regional Integration–Economic 
Partnership Agreements for Eastern and Southern Africa (2007) at 89. 
31 A non reciprocal duty-free trade arrangement constituted the cornerstone of the conventions between 
the ACP countries and the EC. Another privilege of the pacts was the provision of economic assistance 
to the ACP countries via the European Development Fund (EDF). The EDFs also financed two 
commodity insurance schemes viz STABEX (from French Système de Stabilisation des Recettes 
d'Exportation and stabilisation of export earning in English) and SYSMIN, respectively for countries 
that were dependent on agricultural exports and on the exports of mineral products. Purposely, 
STABEX and SYSMIN were mitigating insurance schemes intended to maintain export capacity by 
compensating ACP exporters of agricultural and mineral products for short-term losses suffered in 
export earnings. 
32 Despite the range, value and longevity of trade preferences, ACP countries failed to increase or even 
maintain their market share in Europe, where less preferred exporters have been able to raise their 
market share at the expense of ACP countries. 
33 Gibb R., ‘Post-Lomé: the European Union and the South’ (2000)3(21) Third World Quarterly, 457 - 
481 at 463 
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most states, again with a few notable exceptions, still relying on a few primary 
products.34 
It is not surprising today that four of the five EAC partner states are least 
developed countries (all the EAC partner states are members of the ACP 
group of countries) and were described by the EC as ‘only marginally involved 
in international trade and where the bleak outlook for tackling poverty is 
worrying’35 
 
The EC is still Africa’s largest trading partner providing a market for 51% of 
Africa’s non-oil merchandise exports and supplying 34% of its merchandise 
imports in 2006. The trade relationship between Africa and the EC is thus 
important for the continent’s development.36  
 
Whereas under the on going WTO talks the majority of the EAC partner states 
do not have to open their economies as part of the talks, however EAC 
partner  states were required  to open 80% to 90% of their economies to EC 
goods and services.37 This is cardinal requirement of Article XXIV of the 
GATT which regulates Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)38. 
 
The EAC partner states and the EC were divided over the desirability and 
applicability of reciprocity in the EPA as provided for under Article XXIV of the 
                                                 
34 According to Eurostat data (1998), primary products dominate ACP exports to the EU, accounting 
for over 60% of all ACP exports. The principal products being exported are oil (25%), diamonds, 
cocoa, coffee, sugar and beef (all 10% or less). Not surprisingly, EC exports to the ACP largely 
comprise manufactured goods (84%). Clearly, EU–ACP cooperation did not promoted trade expansion 
in ACP countries. 
35 Thirty-nine of the world’s 48 least developed countries (LDCs) are ACP member countries. 
36 World Bank, ‘Africa-Economic Partnership Agreements between Africa and the European Union: 
what to do now’? (2008) at1 (summary report No. 45945-AFR); The EC’s tariff preferences granted to 
ACP countries relative importance has declined over the last two decades, but the EC is still by far the 
largest single market for Africa’s non-oil exports, absorbing 51% ($ 24 billion) of the total share in 
2006, a share that is six times the 8% share of Africa’s second largest market (the US) for its non-oil 
exports 
37 Bartels L., ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’, (2007)18(4) European 
Journal of International Law, 715-756 at 753 
38 In the WTO context, RTAs may be agreements concluded between countries not necessarily 
belonging to the same geographical region. However RTAs are understood as establishing an element 
of preference in trade between parties to the agreement. Parties to RTAs offer each other more 
favourable treatment in trade matters than the rest of the world including WTO members. 
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GATT, because they at different levels of development.39 The EC’s answer to 
this, in the case of EPA, has been that Article XXIV has sufficient inherent 
flexibility to accommodate the development needs of developing countries.40 
 
Yet Article XXIV of the GATT has been a subject of contradiction since its 
inception in 1947. There are those, like the EC, who find it ‘extremely elastic’; 
those, like the ACP group of countries, who find it ‘complex’, ‘ambiguous’ and 
‘vague’;41and those who want it written differently.42  
 
Scholars and WTO member states cannot bring themselves to agree on its 
exact specifications, let alone its origins, object, and purpose.43 Therefore in a 
way negotiating the EPA as required by Article XXIV of the GATT EAC 
partner states where put between a ‘rock and a hard place’ since the only 
alternative they saw was worse.44       
 
That said RTAs are a major and perhaps irreversible feature of today’s 
multilateral trading system. The number of preferential agreements as well as 
the world share of preferential trade has been steadily increasing over the last 
ten years.45  
 
The total number of notified preferential agreements in force is currently 17046 
approximately 20 RTAs are due to enter into force upon completion of their 
                                                 
39 Ochieng C.M.O., ‘The EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and the Development Question: 
Constraints and Opportunities posed by Article XXIV and Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions of the WTO’, (2007)10(2)  Journal of International Economic Law, 363-395 at 371: Many 
scholars argue that reciprocity in trade agreements only makes sense among partners with at least 
similar economic power 
40 (n 39 above) at 371 
41 (n 39 above) at 371 
42Ongulo B. and Ito T., ‘In Defence of the ACP Submission on Special and Differential Treatment in 
GATT Article XXIV’, (2005)67 European Centre for Development Policy Management at 10 
43 (n 39 above) at 372: A historical analysis of the origins of Article XXIV and permissive past 
practises within the GATT/WTO does not suggest that it was designed for North – South FTAs.  
44 Bloomer P., ‘EU put Africa between a rock and a hard place’, 7 December 2007, The New Vision 
News Paper at 9 
45 Crawford J. and Fiorentino R.V., ‘The changing landscape of Regional Trade Agreements’, (2005)8 
World Trade Organisation at 16 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers8_e.pdf 
 [accessed on 10 August 2008] 
46 This number totals notifications made under GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V, and the 
Enabling Clause as well as accessions to existing RTAs; for a complete list of RTAs notified to the 
GATT/WTO (see also:  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm 
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respective ratification procedures and a further 70 RTAs are under 
negotiations or proposal stage.47 
 
It is not surprising today that most of the multilateral trade engagements are 
carried out in RTAs. The delayed conclusion of the Doha Development 
Agenda has not helped matters. Therefore this study will examine whether the 
flexibilities of Article XXIV of the GATT as exercised in the EAC EC EPA will 
enhance development of the EAC partner states.  
 
Since the commencement of the EAC EC EPA negotiation process it was 
asserted by the EC that the EPA is a development tool. However, in light of 
the above background this study will examine whether after the deteriorated 
performance arising out of the non reciprocal trade preference (Lomè 
Convention), the reciprocal EAC EC EPA will enhance development within 
EAC partner states. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
This study is based on the investigative assumption that if the non-reciprocal 
trade arrangement between EAC partner states and EC did not lead to 
substantive social and economic development in the EAC partner states. 
There is a likelihood that having signed a new reciprocal WTO compatible 
EAC EC EPA may not necessarily result into substantial development within 
the EAC partner states.  
 
Whereas under the Lomè Convention and the Cotonou trade regime trade 
regime were non reciprocal preferences, the EAC EC EPA is a reciprocal 
WTO compatible agreement which requires EAC partner states to 
progressively remove barriers to trade and also enhance co-operation in trade 
related areas with the EC. 
 
                                                 
47 (n 45 above) at 1. The sluggish progress in multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha 
Development Round appears to have accelerated further the rush to forge RTAs. Between January 
2004 and February 2005 alone, 43 RTAs have been notified to the WTO, making this the most prolific 
RTA period in recorded history. 
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This study therefore seeks to investigate whether the development 
benchmarks included in EAC EC EPA will enhance the development 
prospects of the EAC partner states. This is on the premise that the EAC 
partner states and the EC overhauled their trade relations in a bid to boost 
development of the EAC partner states.  
 
1.4 Objectives of the study     
The main objective of this study is to examine whether as a result signing the 
EAC EC EPA economic development will be substantially enhanced within the 
EAC partner states. As a result this study will examine requirements of the 
notion of reciprocity in an FTA as specified under Article XXIV of the GATT 
and how it was applied in the EAC EC EPA. 
 
The study will also analyse the sectors that were included, the liberalisation 
schedules of the EAC EC EPA and how this likely to impact on the EAC 
partner states development agenda. 
 
The study will also examine the MFN clause that was included in the EAC EC 
EPA. In this regard the study will examine the meaning, application, 
exceptions, the economic relevancy and the likely impact of the MFN clause 
on trade between the EAC partner states and other southern countries. 
 
This study will conclude by making observations, conclusions from the 
discussions and recommendations on how the EAC partner states can best 
benefit from the EAC EC EPA.  
 
1.5 Significance of the research 
The value of total trade flows between the EAC and the EC is about €4.3bn 
(or 0.12% of EC imports), exports to the EC being dominated by a few 
products such as plants, flowers, coffee, vegetables, fish and tobacco. The 
EC mainly exports machinery, chemicals and vehicles to the EAC.48 
 
                                                 
48 Fact sheet on the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement: the East African Community (2009) at 2 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/index_en.htm [accessed on 10 April 2009] 
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The statistics above illustrate the fact that EAC partner states largely depend 
on agriculture in their trade relations with the EC. In many sub Saharan 
African countries the agricultural sector continues to employ 70% of the 
workforce, as compared to between 2-5% in EC countries, and local 
production is largely at subsistence level and is closely linked with people’s 
access to food as well as ensuring food security. In Kenya, for instance, 3 
million small scale farms (on less than 20 hectares), account for over 75% of 
the total agricultural production.49  
 
Despite of agriculture being the main economic activity in the EAC partner 
states, agriculture, fish and fishery products are the most distorted in EC. For 
example there are particularly high restrictions on exports of value added food 
products that are in competition with the products covered by various aspects 
of the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP).50  
 
In light of the agricultural trade distortion it is not surprising that in many sub-
Saharan African countries the percentage of population earning below US$ 1 
per day in 1990 was 46.8%, in 1999 it was 45.9% and 2004 it was 41.1%.51 
As a result of the increase in poverty levels of sub Saharan African countries, 
this paper will examine whether the EAC EC EPA addresses the constraints 
faced by EAC partner states in their quest for development.  
 
It would have sufficed if the EAC EC EPA covered goods only as per the 
requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT. However the EC insisted on the 
inclusion of ‘singapore issues’, trade related issues, services and so forth. As 
an illustration the services sector has high potential for growth in the EAC 
region. The major service sub sectors are tourism and related services, 
                                                 
49 Ogalo V., ‘Beyond the rhetoric ensuring EPAs deliver on development’,(2007) at 37 
50 (n 49 above) at 37 
51 World Trade Organisation, ‘Trade in a Globalizing World’(2008) World Trade Report at 139  http:// 
www.wto.org / world_trade_report08_e.pdf [accessed on 9 October 2008]. See also the Millennium 
Development Goals Report 2007, United Nations. 
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education, information and telecommunication, financial services, health, 
energy, and construction.52 
 
In Uganda, the services sector makes up just over 42% of the GDP and has 
been growing at an estimated rate of 6.8% ahead of the agricultural sector, 
which still employs 80% of the population.53 Tourism is not only a leading 
destination of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but also as the largest sub 
sector, it contributes over 60% annually to services. Estimates are that about 
90% of the jobs advertised are in the services sector.54   
 
However the EAC partner states cannot compete with the multinational 
services giants of the EC. In fact today, developing countries control up to 
70% of world trade in services, the top ten developed countries exporters 
control 65% of world trade in services and the share is over 90% for some 
sectors.55  
 
Much as it is widely acknowledged that trade liberalisation has the potential to 
help the poor increase their income and expenditure; it is also known that 
trade liberalisation tends to create some losers.56 Therefore in a bid to 
alleviate poverty in EAC partner states the issue is whether EAC partner 
states should rely on trade as an engine of development.  
 
It will also be recalled that one of the basic consideration for the introduction 
of EAC EC EPA relates to the poor results of the preferential and non-
reciprocal trade agreements in the past. A few countries, such as Mauritius, 
clearly used these preferences in this case for sugar very effectively and 
based a successful mid-term economic strategy on them. However, generally 
                                                 
52 Mangeni F., ‘Building bridges: supporting services negotiations in the East African EPA’ 
(2009)02(8) Trade Negotiation Insight at 10 [accessed on 13 March 2009]: see also paragraph 24 of 
WTO document WT/TPR/S/171 dated 20 September 2006. Article 37 of the EAC EC EPA provides 
that parties will continue negotiations in the area of trade in services among others 
53 (n 52 above) at 10 
54 (n 52 above) at 10 
55 (n 49 above) at 27: The services sectors are financial services, computer and information services, 
royalties and license fees, and construction services. 
56 (n 51 above) at 139   
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economic performance in most ACP countries has not improved and in many 
cases has become worse during the decades of non-reciprocal preferences.57  
 
To enable trade liberalization act as an engine of growth at least three 
conditions must exist in addition to reductions in tariffs and trade barriers. 
First, there must be favourable market access. Secondly, a balance between 
the need to maintain important flexibilities needed by states in trade policies 
and need for a rule-based system from which all countries stand to benefit 
and lastly countries that face severe challenges like the EAC partner states 
assistance to increase trade growth and integration into the global economy.58 
 
As a consequence this paper will endeavour to examine the implication of the 
goods plus EAC EC EPA on the EAC regional development initiatives. In 
addition the study will analyse whether the EAC EC EPA contains the 
prerequisites to development as discussed above.  
 
The EAC EC EPA was touted as a development tool yet it contains contains 
the controversial Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause therefore this study will 
examine its likely impact on EAC development initiatives. 
 
1.6 Scope of the study 
EPAs are FTAs that were negotiated and initialled between the EC on one 
hand and regional groupings of ACP countries and in some instances 
individual ACP countries on the other hand. This study is limited to the EAC 
EC EPA. 
 
It was the original intention of the CPA that EPAs should contribute primarily 
to the process of economic development and regional integration within ACP 
countries.59 However, this study is limited to examining how the application of 
                                                 
57 Hoestenberghe V. K. and Roelfsema H., ‘Economic Partnership Agreements between the European 
Union and groups of Africa Caribbean Pacific Countries: Will they promote development?’ (2006) 27 
United Nations University, Comparative Regional Integration Studies Occasional Paper at 7  http:// 
www.cris.unu.edu [Accessed on  25 August 2008] 
58 (n 49 above) at 16: The challenges include lack of human, institutional and production capacities, 
provision of adequate and well targeted Aid for Trade as assist them in their plight.  
59 Article 1 of the CPA (see also Articles 2 (a) and (b) of the EPA) 
 
 
 
 
 15
the notion of reciprocity and the MFN clause in the EAC EC EPA is likely to 
impact on the development prospects of the EAC partner states. 
 
It is prudent to point out that the EAC is the only region that initialled an EPA 
with the same liberation schedule applying to all the partner states as result 
regional integration will be strengthened. This study was commenced in July 
2008 and it will be finalised by May 2009. 
 
1.7 Methodology 
This is study is mainly literature based as a result the sources of data will be 
primary and secondary sources relating to trade, investment and economic 
development. These include policies, treaties, declarations, books, 
newspapers and articles.  
 
The paper will also make use of data and statistics complied by the WTO, the 
World Bank Group, other international institutions and advocacy 
organisations. Some of these will be found in various libraries, on the Internet, 
as well as in the personal collections of individuals.  
 
1.8 Key words and phrases 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement - East African Community - Economic 
Development - Economic Partnership Agreement - European Community - 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Most Favoured Nation - Reciprocity 
- Regional Trade Agreements -World Trade Organisation. 
 
1.9 Chapter outline 
 
Chapter one is an introduction to the research. It defines and gives a brief 
background to, the trading relationship between the EC and EAC countries 
which led to initialling of an EPA between the two parties. Further, the aims 
and objectives of the study are outlined, and the chapter advances the 
hypothesis, gives a synopsis of the literature review, presents the 
methodology to be used, and outlines the out lay of the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 16
Chapter two gives a brief history of the evolution of the trade relationship 
between the EAC and the EC because it is pertinent to show why the EAC EC 
EPA has been initialled. 
 
Chapter three examines the notion of reciprocity as provided for under Article 
XXIV of the GATT, what it is, how it arose, how it is applied in the EAC EC 
EPA, and whether as a result development will be enhanced within the EAC 
partner states. 
 
Chapter four will define the principle of MFN, the application of the MFN 
principle, and its likely impact on south – south trade. 
 
Chapter five will finally, summarise the issues discussed and the conclusions 
drawn there from, and also make recommendations on how best the EAC 
partner states can benefit from the EPA. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Historical Background to ACP- EC Economic Relationship 
 
‘With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the 
achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of 
the African continent.’60 
 
2.1 Introduction to the history of ACP-EC economic relationship 
The EC is currently the world’s largest trading region.61 Europe’s formal 
relations with the developing world are older than the EC itself. However, the 
shape and the content of those relations have altered significantly since the 
signing of the 1957 Treaty of Rome which established the EEC.62  
 
It is of course impossible to gain an understanding of the evolution of the 
partnership between Europe and the ACP countries without taking into 
account the context of decolonization (Association of Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs) and Yaoundé Convention)63, that of the new international 
economic order (Lomé model), the end of the cold war (updated Lomé IV) and 
finally the effects of globalization (Green paper and Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement).64 
 
The current relations between the EC and the ACP group of countries are the 
continuation of pre-existing relations between certain member states of the 
                                                 
60 Frisch D., ‘The European Union’s development policy, A personal view of 50 years of Development 
Policy’, (2008)15 European Centre for Development Policy Management at 2 http:// 
www.ecdpm.org/pmr15. A declaration made by Robert Schuman, Former French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs on 9 May 1950) [accessed on 20 October 2008] 
61 Lestrade E., ‘The impact of the EU’s development aid policies’, (2007)13(4) International Trade 
Law and Regulation  61-66 at 61 
62 Signed on 25 March 1957, in Part four of the Treaty of Rome and the Implementing Convention, the 
conditions of Association of the OCT and of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, West 
Germany and Belgium (founding members of EEC) were laid down for a five year period. 
63 David D., ‘Forty years of Europe-ACP Relationship from economic and commercial relationship to 
political co-operation’, (2000) September, The Courier Special Issue-Cotonou Agreement at 
11http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier_acp/en/en_011.pdf [accessed on 
20 October 2008]. See also Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome which provided that one of the activities of 
the EEC was the association with the OCTs. 
64 (n 63 above) at 11 
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EEC and the territories that were under the jurisdiction of these states at the 
beginning of the European economic integration process.65  
 
Initially the basic purpose of the association with these territories was to 
promote their 'economic and social development' and to 'establish close 
relations' between these territories and the EEC as a whole.66 The association 
agreement was characterized by two main elements, first the progressive 
establishment of a FTA between the EEC and the OCT, the reciprocal 
reduction of tariffs and quantitative restrictions.67 Secondly, establishment of 
the EDF for the purpose of granting community financial aid to the OCT to 
promote their social and economic development.68  
 
The EDF was the exclusive mechanism chosen for the task of providing aid to 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).69 The role of the EDF has grown 
significantly and it still remains one of the key instruments of Europe’s policy 
with the developing world.70 Trade preferences for ACP countries as well 
originated with the Treaty of Rome71  
 
2.2 The Yaoundé Convention I 
In the early 1960s the majority of OCTs gained their independence and new 
arrangements were necessary, consequently, by the mid-1960s the vast 
majority of African states found their relations with the EC structured through 
a completely new and separate treaty: the first Yaoundé Convention.72 
                                                 
65 Abass A., ‘The Cotonou Trade Regime and the WTO Law’, (2004)10(4) European Law Journal 
440-462 at 439 
66 Matthews E.D., ‘Lome IV and ACP/EEC Relations, Surviving the lost Decade’, (1991/2)22 
California Western International Law Journal 1-58 at 13 
67 Alting von Geusau A.M.F., (ed.) The Lomé Convention and a new international economic order, 
Publication of the John F. Kennedy Institute Center for International Studies (1997) at 19 
68 Holland M., The European Union and the Third World (2002) at 19 
69 Part IV of the Treaty of Rome: A contractual treaty-based relationship was created that established 
both the basis and rationale for subsequent arrangements such as the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. 
Art. 132 (3) the contractual nature of the relationship was important as a legal obligation was 
established on member states to contribute to the investments required for the progressive development 
of OCTs 
70 (n 68 above) at 27 
71 Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome provided that the purpose of association shall be to promote the 
economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic 
relations between them and the Community as a whole  
72 (n 68 above) at 27 
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One of the most important problems treated during those negotiations 
concerned the relations with the Commonwealth countries.73 In January 1963, 
the negotiations with the United Kingdom (UK) broke off after initialing of the 
Yaoundé Convention but before signing of the Convention.74 However, this 
did not have any effect on the possibility of admitting developing 
Commonwealth countries to the group of OCT.75 On this basis Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanzania appealed to be opted on the basis of the treaty of Rome. 
 
The Yaoundé I Convention was signed on 20 July 1963 between the EEC and 
its member states on one hand, and the Associated African and Madagascan 
States (AASM)76 on the other hand; the agreement transformed the EU – ACP 
relationship from a ‘licensed’ one to a ‘negotiated’ one.77 The foundation of the 
convention was the recognition of the national sovereignty of the participating 
countries.78 
 
EEC Council issued a Declaration of Intent in 1963, at the time of the signing 
of the Yaoundé Convention, which foresaw either accession to this agreement 
or independent association to any country ‘which had an economic structure 
and production comparable to those of the Associated states’79, which 
ensured an additional expansion of the EECs with the accession of the United 
                                                 
73 (n 67 above ) at 24. The commonwealth is an association of countries comprising the United 
Kingdom, its dependencies, and many former British colonies that are now sovereign states with a 
common allegiance to the British crown, including Australia, Canada, India, many countries in the 
West Indies and Africa. It was formally established by the statute of Westminster in 1931. 
74 (n 67 above) at 25 
75 This guarantee had been given by a declaration of intent issued by the six founding members of the 
EEC on April 1 February 1963, which came simultaneously into force with the signing of the first 
Yaoundé Convention and which was repeated at the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention.  
76 Signed in the capital of Cameroon in 1963 between the six EEC member states and eighteen African 
States, principally francophone countries, known as the “Associated African States and Madagascar” 
77 (n 65 above) at 440. This transformation was endorsed by the signature of the Yaoundé I Convention 
in 1963 between the EEC and its member states on the one hand and the Associated African and 
Madagascan States on the other hand and then Yaoundé II, was signed in 1969, which continued to be 
in effect till it was superseded by the Lomé I Convention signed between the ACP states and the EEC 
in 1975. 
78 (n 68 above) at 27 
79 Council Declaration of Intent issued by the six founding member states of the EEC on 1 / 2, 1963, 
which came simultaneously into force with the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention and which was 
repeated at the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention. 
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Kingdom to the EC80. Pursuant to this Declaration, association agreements 
were concluded over the next decade with the East African Community 
(EAC), comprising Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.81  
 
The main difference between EAC association agreement of 1969 (Arusha 
agreement) and the Yaoundé Convention lay in the fact that no provision was 
made for any financial or technical aid in the Arusha agreement. The 
association agreement was largely a preferential trading agreement based on 
the principle of free trade and including institutional elements. 
 
Interestingly, Yaoundé I created an aid and trade regime and was 
characterized by free access to the European market, based on the principles 
of reciprocity and non-discrimination. However, the GATT Working Party 
criticized the requirement of reciprocal advantages from less developed 
partners82  
 
There three distinct and original features of the convention: first, uniquely for 
the first time, the convention linked a range of separate development policies 
under a single integrated approach.83 Secondly, the convention was the first 
example of a common contractual basis for the relations between the 
industrialized and the developing world. Third, the three joint institutions of the 
Association were created.84 The first Yaoundé convention expired in 1969, 
although its provisions were renewed for a further five-year period ending in 
1975.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 (n 37 above) at 727 
81 The association agreement with Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya established on 6 June 1967 never came 
into effect because it was impossible to ratify it before its expiry date on 31 May 1969. However a 
second Arusha Treaty was concluded between the EEC and the East African countries which existed 
during the same period as the Second Yaoundé Convention.   
82 (n 37 above) at 726 
83 (n 68 above) at 28. Also Financial aid, technical assistance and training, trade preferences and 
investment and capital movements were all covered. 
84 The Council, the Parliamentary Conference and the Court of Arbitration 
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2.3 The Yaoundé Convention II 
The negotiations on the renewal of the Yaoundé 1 Convention resulted into 
signing of the Yaoundé II convention in July 1969. There were only a few 
small differences between the conventions.85 The Yaoundé II Convention 
continued to be in effect till it was superseded by the first Lomé Convention 
(Lomé I) signed between the ACP states and the EEC in 1975. On 1 January 
1973 UK, Denmark and Ireland became full members of the EC with the same 
rights and Obligations as the original six members.86 The accession of the 
United Kingdom to EEC raised the question of Commonwealth relations which 
necessitated a major review of EEC external relations.87  
 
One of the striking features of these trade arrangements was their reciprocity 
in trade liberalization. At the time of the Yaoundé Conventions, however, the 
main reasons given for reciprocity were ideological.88 First, it was said that 
only with mutual obligations could Africa negotiate as an ‘ equal ’ with Europe; 
second, that these obligations went ‘ beyond ’mere contractual relations; and 
third, that these obligations were essential to ensure that Africa did not fall 
under the sway of a (non-French) economic power89.  
 
Overall, the economic benefits provided by the Yaoundé conventions 
appeared marginal and were openly criticized by the eighteen signatories and 
two member states, Germany and the Netherlands.90 The Yaoundé 
Convention only linked Europe to a small segment of the developing world 
and in it the seeds of Europe’s piecemeal approach to First-Third World 
relations can be traced.91  
 
                                                 
85 (n 67 above) at 21. Also in order to promote the mutual trade relations, the association treaty 
provided for a free trade area between the community on the one hand and each of the OCT on the 
other hand by the gradual elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions that had been completed in 
principle on 1 July 1968.  
86 (n 67 above) at 27 
87 (n 68 above) at 28 
88 (n 37 above) at 724 
89 (n 37 above) at 724 
90 (n 68 above) at 29 
91 (n 68 above) at 30 
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Whilst the free trade principle was seen as assisting development, in practice 
the limited concessions tended to maintain, even strengthen the dependency 
relationship. Without the principle of non-reciprocity, the charge of economic 
neo-colonialism was hard to refute.92 
 
Although the provisions of the Yaoundé Conventions aimed at improving trade 
relations between the EEC and the AASM, especially in favour of the AASM, 
the results of the Yaoundé Conventions, did not entirely meet expectations.93 
Negotiations on a successor agreement to Yaoundé II began in 1973. These 
negotiations were strongly influenced by the addition of twenty one 
Commonwealth countries and six other African countries to the nineteen 
Yaoundé associates94. 
 
The main flash point was the principle of reciprocity, which was initially 
defended by the EEC and a hard core of Yaoundé associates especially 
Senegal but strongly opposed by those joining the system95. The opposition 
was successful: the EEC soon abandoned the principle, and the 1975 Lomé 
Convention enshrined the principle of non-reciprocal trade preferences96. 
 
In summary, many of the issues pertinent to Europe-Third World relations 
under the subsequent Lomé conventions, as well as to the future, can be 
traced to the earlier Yaoundé agreements.97 From a political point of view, 
there was growing criticism of Yaoundé, except in the associated States: ‘neo-
colonialist approach’, ‘discrimination against those not belonging to the club’.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 (n 68 above) at 31 
93 (n 67 above) at 22 
94 Article 1 of Protocol 22 of the UK Act of Accession (signed 22 Jan. 1972) [1972] OJ L73/177 
95 Gruhn, J., ‘the Lomé Convention: Inching Towards Interdependence? ’, 30 International 
Organisation (1976) 241, at 251 
96 (n 95 above) at 253 
97 (n 68 above) at 33 
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2.4 The Lomé Conventions: I and II (1976-85) 
In the mid-seventies international attention was focused on the need to 
develop an economic relationship between first- and third-world countries. 
The accession of the UK to the EEC in January 1973 made it necessary to 
consider how to establish relations with Commonwealth countries.98 
 
The Lomé Conventions were intended to promote the development of the 
signatory ACP states primarily via trade, economic assistance, and technical 
cooperation.99  Among the other factors that helped shape the character of the 
original Lome´ Convention, three are of particular importance to this paper. 
First, Lome´ grew out of the need for the EC, following its first enlargement, to 
make provision for Britain’s former colonies.100 Most importantly, Lome´ 
continued the principle of positive discrimination in favour of European ex-
colonies. The roots of Lome´ therefore lie in the special trading relationship 
established to manage the post-colonial era.101 
 
As a result of the EEC expanded membership to former African and 
Caribbean, British colonies the EEC entered into a co-operation agreement 
with these states in 1975, under the first so-called Lomé Convention signed 
on 28 February 1975.102  The Lomé convention replaced the earlier Yaoundé 
Conventions of Association between the EEC, African and Malagasy 
associated states, the Arusha Convention between EEC and Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda, as well as special relationships between Britain and a number of 
Commonwealth countries.103 
                                                 
98 Lenaghan M.P., ‘Trade Negotiations or Trade Capitulations: An African Experience’, (2006)17 
Berkeley La Raza Law Journal  117-137 at 129 
99 Babarinde O. and Faber G., ‘From Lomé to Cotonou: Business as Usual?’, (2004)9 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 27-47 at 3 
100 (n 33 above) at 461 
101 (n 33 above) at 461 
102 The ACP group of states was created by the Georgetown Agreement of 6th June 1975. The first 
Lomé Convention was signed by representatives from some fifty three countries in Lomé, the capital of 
Togo, on 28 February 1975. It entered into effect on 1 April 1976 and expired on 1 March 1980 (46 
states on behalf of the ACP group consisting of the 18 AASM, Mauritius (which has already joined 
Yaoundé II in 1972), 21 Commonwealth LCD's (Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Trinidad, Tobago, Tonga, Uganda, Western Samoa, Zambia) and six further African states (Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sudan) and the nine Member States on behalf of the EEC 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, UK, West Germany). 
103 (n 67 above) at 15 
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The most distinctive feature of the Lomé Convention was a commitment to an 
equal partnership between Europe and the ACP.104 In part, this change in 
approach was a response to the perception that the Yaoundé arrangements 
had perpetuated dependency rather than promoted development.105 
 
At the policy level, Lomé I was much more than just an extension of the 
preceding convention. The shortcomings of Yaoundé had been rightly 
criticized and Lomé sought to address these in two specific ways: first, by 
dropping reciprocity;106 and second by introduction of an export stabilization 
scheme.107  
 
The Lomé II Convention was negotiated in the period 1973–75 during which a 
number of developments in the world economy had a profound impact on the 
character of the agreement. The early 1970s witnessed not only a quadrupling 
of OPEC oil prices but also the rapid increase in the price of many Third 
World commodities, including coffee, sugar, tea, phosphates and food grains. 
All these products were available, in potentially abundant quantities, in 
Europe’s ex-colonies.108  
 
                                                 
104 The Lomé I Convention preamble committed the signatory states to establish, on the basis of 
complete equality between partners, close and continuing cooperation in a spirit of international 
solidarity and to seek a more balanced economic order. 
105 (n 68 above) at 35 
106 Article 7 of Lomé I Convention provided that, ‘In view of their present development needs, the ACP 
states shall not be required, for the duration of this Convention, to assume, in respect of imports of 
products originating in the Community, obligations corresponding to the commitments entered into by 
the Community in respect of imports of the products originating in the ACP states, under this Chapter’. 
This provision thus introduced the principle of non-reciprocity, which was a fundamental principle of 
the Lomé trade regime and it was included in all its successor agreements. The decision to relinquish 
reverse preferences and embrace non-reciprocity was of greater psychological than economic 
importance. The ACP states were now required to treat EC exports at least as favourably as exports 
from other developed nations.  
107 STABEX – the system for the stabilization of export earnings from agricultural commodities - was 
the major innovation of Lomé I. Its objective was to provide funds to ACP countries to cover 
production shortfalls or price fluctuations for specific agricultural products exported to Europe. 
STABEX can be equated with an insurance policy for the ACP: the EC guaranteed a minimum earning 
threshold for these specified exports and compensated for any loss of revenue caused by lower prices 
or loss of production. Twenty –nine products were covered under the first Convention, rising to Forty-
four in Lomé II. 
108 (n 33 above) at 461 
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As a consequence, the EU was encouraged by developments taking place in 
the world economy to make important trade concessions to ACP demands. As 
well as the principle of non-reciprocity being firmly embodied in the Lomé 
trading agreement, a number of commodity trading regimes were established 
that, on the one hand, helped stabilise commodity prices for Third Word 
producers while, on the other hand, locking those producers into servicing the 
European market.109 
 
Third, in order for the EC to establish a single agreement with its former 
colonies, the Lomé negotiations brought together a diverse group of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific states for the first time.110 Lomé also established a 
political infrastructure to support and legitimise the ACP group, including an 
ACP secretariat, and joint ministerial and ambassadorial committees.111 
 
The Lomé II convention varied little from the Lomé I convention framework 
institutionally and in basic approach: two developments were: however, 
introduced – a greater emphasis on the LDC and the introduction of 
SYSMIN.112 An assessment of the impact of the first decade of the Lomé 
Convention has to begin by acknowledging its foresight in its commitment to 
partnership and desire to help integrate the economies of the developing 
countries into the global market.113  
 
In my view the first decade of the Lomé Convention did not help ACP 
countries to integrate in the global market. The EC introduced a price 
stabilisation fund (STABEX and SYSMIN) for ACP countries which in effect 
increased their dependence on the EC rather than integrating ACP countries 
into the global market. 
 
                                                 
109 (n 68 above) at 38 
110 Article 4 of the 1975 Georgetown Agreement institutionalized the ACP group and gave it a 
permanent structure; the General Secretariat located in Brussels, Belgium headed by a Secretary 
General who is vested with executive powers.  
111 (n 100 above) at 462 
112Under Lomé II convention SYSMIN was introduced, for mineral exports based on similar principles 
as STABEX.   
113 (n 68 above) at 39 
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2.5 The Lomé Conventions: III and IV (1986 – 2000) 
 
The Lomé III Convention sought to ‘promote and expedite the economic, 
cultural and social development of the ACP states and consolidate and 
diversify relations in the spirit of solidarity and mutual trust’.114 In concrete 
terms, however, there were comparatively few innovations to the Lomé 
framework and as such it failed to address adequately the development crisis 
that engulfed the Third World during the 1980s.115 
 
Unlike previous conventions, Lomé IV was a ten-year agreement (with a mid-
term financial review) expiring in the year 2000. 116Once again, changes in the 
international environment were to dictate the content and direction of policy. 
The collapse of communism compounded the plight of ACP countries as the 
EC’s more immediate development priority shifted to the former communist 
states in Eastern and Central Europe.117 Indeed there is a strong case that 
rather than heralding a new interdependence, after fifteen years Lomé had 
merely re-established North-South dependency118 
 
A key element in the Lomé IV was the renewed emphasis on conditionality – 
economic and political. For the first time, aid was explicitly earmarked for 
Structural Adjustment Support with financial resources coming from the 
existing EDF budget. 119   
 
Only minor modifications were made to the trade preferences of Lomé IV – 
despite the erosion of the so-called pyramid of privilege for ACP states-
although some relaxation in the ‘rules of origin’ for manufactured products 
were gained. The only significant EU concession was to extend the basis of 
STABEX and SYSMIN, although this fell far short of ACP expectations.120 By 
                                                 
114 Article 1 of the Lomé Convention 
115 (n 68 above ) at 41  
116 After fourteen months of negotiations the new Convention between Twelve EC member states and 
Sixty-eight ACP states was signed on 15 December 1989 once again in the Togolese Capital of Lomé.   
117 (n 68 above) at 41 
118 (n 68 above) at 41. Also the more significant change was the application of conditionality, 
something that the ACP had previously resisted. 
119 (n 68 above) at 44  
120 (n 68 above) at 45 
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the time of the scheduled 1995 mid-term review, the global development 
context had significantly shifted from the parameters that had set the 1989 
agreement – and the shift further disadvantaged developing countries.121 
By the mid-1990 the old uncertainties pertaining to development policy were 
under threat and a new global agenda began to shape the EC’s policy 
towards the third world. The EC and ACP states subsequently resorted to a 
GATT waiver to allow the EC to maintain the Lomé trade arrangements.122 
The GATT waiver from the obligation under Article I:I of the GATT was 
granted to the EC to apply the Fourth Lomé Convention from 9 December 
1994 until 20 February 2000.123 
The Mid-term review took place in 1994-1995, in the context of major 
economic and political changes in ACP countries (democratization process, 
structural adjustment), in Europe (enlargement, increasing attention to East 
European and Mediterranean partners), and in the international environment 
(Uruguay Round Agreement).  
In response the EC issued its discussion Green paper in November 1996 on 
the future of Lomé, the implications were to prove far reaching to Europe and 
the developing world.124  
Although technically the EC Green Paper was just a consultative document, 
four options were outlined which suggested that a substantive, perhaps 
paradigmatic, change was anticipated. In the course of ACP-EC negotiations 
on the successor agreement to the Fourth Lomé convention, attempts were 
                                                 
121 Only the mid-term renewal of the financial protocol of Lomé IV Convention was mandatory, 
however, largely on the EC insistence, the review process was extended beyond funding issues in 
response to the changing global context for example the effect of liberation on the erosion of 
preferences and problems associated with the actual implementation of the Lomé system. 
122 Onguglo B. and Ito T., ‘How to make EPAs WTO compatible?, Reforming the rules on regional 
trade agreements’, (2003)40 European Centre for Development Policy Management at 15 
http://www.ecdpm.org [accessed on 17 November 2008]  
123 WTO Decision of 9 December 1994 (L/7604) 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_e.htm [accessed on 17 
November 2008] 
124 (n 68 above) at 170 
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made to find solutions that were WTO compatible and sufficiently flexible for 
ACP states.125 
The main amendments introduced were respect for human rights; democratic 
principles and the rule of law become essential elements of the Convention. 
This means that ACP countries that did not fulfill these criteria risked the 
retrieval of allocated funds.126  
 The Lomé Conventions, which provide a legal framework for the ACP-EU 
partnership, are reputed to be ‘the largest, the most comprehensive, and the 
most enduring North-South multilateral accords in the world to date.’127 Under 
the Lomé Conventions, which have been revised on many occasions, ACP 
countries were generally entitled to non-reciprocal duty-free access to EC 
markets, technical and industrial cooperation, economic assistance under the 
EDF scheme128 and insurance schemes to compensate Lomé states for 
fluctuations in earnings from primary commodity exports to the EU.129 
The Lomé convention was traditionally the major development framework: the 
rationale was largely historical rather than rational. What become clear 
increasing clear during the last five years of Lomé IV was that the ACP 
countries could no longer rely upon either privileged access or continued 
financial aid from this special relationship. 130  
 
                                                 
125 European Commission, Green Paper on relations between the European Commission and the ACP 
countries on the eve of the 21st century – challenges and options for a new 
partnership(COM(96)570final), Brussels, 20 November 1996. The first option was the continuation of 
the Lomé trade arrangement with variations that would allow for improvements in market access 
together with a relaxation of rules or agreements in a number of trade-related areas, the second option 
was the integration of the Lomé trade arrangement into the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
thereby reducing the convention to an aid package, the third option required all ACP countries to 
extend reciprocal trade treatment to the EC, thereby promoting the integration of the ACP into the 
international economic system and fourth option allowed for the conclusion of agreements in various 
trade related areas and an agreement on services. 
126 (n 37 above) at 738 
127 Udombana J.N., ‘Back to Basics: The ACP-EU Cotonou Trade Agreement and Challenges for the 
African Union’, (2004)40 Texas International Law Journal 60-109 at 65  
128 The EDF is made up of voluntary contributions from the EU member states and which is the 
financial envelope traditionally covering each five-year Lomé Convention 
129 (n 107and n 112 above) 
130 (n 68 above) at 51 
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Despite this resilience Lomé IV provoked concern about the longer-term 
viability of its preferential philosophy. The Uruguay round of GATT drew 
attention to Lomé inconsistencies with the broad principles of trade 
liberalization. By the year 2000 the incremental policy-making style of the 
Lomé convention was forced to address a globally more contemporary 
approach to relations with the developing world. 131 
 
In conclusion, the Lomé convention was traditionally the major development 
framework: the rationale was historical rather than rational. What become 
increasing clear during the last five years of Lomé IV was that the ACP 
countries could no longer rely upon either privileged access or continued 
financial aid from this special relationship.  
 
2.6 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
 
On 23 June 2000, in Cotonou Benin, months of intensive negotiations 
culminated in signing of a new partnership agreement between the EC and its 
associated states from ACP132 for a period of 20 years commencing on 1 
March 2001.133  
 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was intended to serve as a 
transitional arrangement along the journey from Lomé-type134 arrangements 
to a more reciprocal arrangement underpinning the integration of ACP 
economies into the global economy.135 Thus the continuation of non-
                                                 
131 (n 68 above) at 51 
132 Matambalya A.S.T.F. and Wolf S., ‘The Cotonou Agreement and the Challenges of Making the 
New EU – ACP Trade Regime WTO Compatible’, (2001)35(1) Journal of World Trade 123-144, at 
123 
133 Art. 95 (1) CPA 
134 Mutahunga E., ‘The ACP-EU partnership Agreement and current Negotiations of EPAs. A 
presentation to the fifth course on introduction to Trade and Trade Policy Analysis organised by the 
Ministry of Tourism , Trade and Insustry and the Uganda Programme for Trade Opportunities and 
Policy 2006 at 10. Art.36 (3) of the CPA provides that in order to facilitate the transition to the new 
trading arrangements, the non-reciprocal trade arrangements applied under the Fourth ACP-EC 
Convention shall be maintained during the preparatory period for all ACP countries, under the 
conditions defined in Annex V. 
135 Hylton G.A., ‘Beyond Lomé; Challenges and Prospects for ACP countries’, (2003)2(1) Trade 
Negotiation Insight at 1 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 August 2008] 
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reciprocal trade preferences constituted one transition pillar of the economic 
and trade cooperation under the CPA.  
 
Therefore to continue the Lomé-type non-reciprocal tariff preferences, the EC, 
with the support of Tanzania and Jamaica acting on behalf of ACP states, 
submitted a new waiver request to the WTO in March 2000.136 The Waiver 
was granted by the Fourth WTO ministerial Conference on 14 November 
2001.137  
 
The CPA sets out five important principles which constitute the building blocks 
of the EPAs. First, article 34 of the CPA provides for sustainable development 
and poverty reduction, the second and perhaps most revolutionary principle of 
EPAs is reciprocity, for the first time would be required to open their 
economies to a much more developed partner the EU.138  
 
Thirdly, EPAs were intended to become FTAs between the two regions. The 
fourth principle of S&DT treatment is that international trade rules should be 
adapted to the particular economic situation of developing countries (article 
35: 3 of the CPA).139  
 
                                                 
136 Art. IX (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing WTO Agreement provides that the ministerial 
conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a member by the WTO agreement or any of 
the multilateral trade agreements provided that any such decision shall be taken by three fourths of the 
members. The waiver was initially requested only from the GATT Article I:I derogation, as was done 
for the Fourth Lomé Convention. However, in June 2001the EC also requested for another waiver for 
its preferential treatment in quota allocation under the banana import regime given the ambiguity as to 
whether it was covered by GATT Art. I:I. 
137  WTO Decision of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN (01)/15) the waiver in effect exempted the EC 
from its obligations under paragraph 1 of GATT 1994 until 31 December 2007. The Decision of 14 
November 2001 (WT/MIN (01)/16) a Waiver granted for EC –transitional regime for the EC 
Autonomous Tariff rate quotas on imports of Bananas. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_e.htm [accessed on 20 
November 2008] 
138 (n 10 above) at 10 
139 Within the WTO S&DT has taken two forms: first, with respect to market access commitments, 
S&DT has been implemented through non-reciprocal trade preferences intended to provide preferential 
access for developing countries for developing country exports to developed country markets. 
Secondly, with respect to rules and disciplines, S&DT treatment developing countries can be exempted 
from the need to implement multilaterally agreed rules or might be asked to accept less onerous 
obligations. In the Uruguay Round S&DT treatment also meant offering developing countries longer 
implementation periods and possibly technical assistance to meet multilaterally agreed commitments.  
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The fifth principle is WTO compatibility, the CPA stresses in the various 
articles of the agreement that EPAs should be compatible with WTO rules. 
This principle was intended to prevent the new arrangements being 
challenged by other members of the WTO.140   
 
The CPA also provides for the differentiation of LDCs and non-LDCs.141 
Article 85 (1) of the CPA specifically provides that least developed ACP states 
shall be accorded special treatment in order to enable them overcome the 
serious economic and social difficulties hindering their development so as to 
set up their respective rates of development. In 2002, the EU unilaterally 
began providing complete tariff-free, quota-free market access for all imports, 
except arms and ammunition from 49 LDCs the so called ‘Everything But 
Arms (EBA) initiative.142  
 
The rules of origin (RoO) under both the CPA and EC’s GSP (for example 
EBA) are very restrictive.143 The EC has long argued that the objective of 
such demanding RoO is industrial development and integration of the 
developing countries. However, after two decades of restrictive RoOs have 
not induced integrated industrial development in ACP countries or contributed 
to more dynamic performance.144 
 
Uganda chose to purse an EPA with the EC as opposed to EBA initiative for 
two main reasons: first, the EBA is unilateral because it was not negotiated, 
but simply given under terms and conditions decided by the EC thus it can be 
withdrawn or modified anytime. Secondly, an assessment of Uganda’s export 
                                                 
140 (n 134 above) at 11 
141 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) refers to a category of countries officially defined as such by the 
United Nations. It is important to stress that ‘Least Developed’ is an official classification, not a neutral 
measure of poverty. Within the EAC Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi are listed among the 
LDCs well as Kenya is listed as a Developing Country. 
142 Article 37 (9) of the CPA provided that the EC had to start by the year 2000, a process which by the 
end of multilateral trade negotiations and at the latest 2005, would allow duty free access for essentially 
all products from all LDCS. This was building on the existing trade provisions of the 4th ACP-EC 
convention. 
143 The Generalised System of Preferences is an arrangement that formally allows developed countries 
to offer non-reciprocal preferential access to their markets for goods from qualifying developing 
countries. For example under the EBA initiative LDCs were granted DFQF market access to the EC, 
except for armaments and munitions (subject to rules of origin) 
144 (n 134 above) at 27 
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trade figures to the EC indicate that about 99% of Uganda exports preferred 
the Cotonou arrangement over the EBA initiative mainly because of the 
stringent RoO under the EBA initiative (see annex I for a comparison of the 
RoOs under the EBA initiative) 145  
 
The stringency arises because under the EBA, cumulation146 is only between 
the beneficiaries that is LDCs and with the EC. For example, if a Burundian 
exporter uses inputs sourced from Kenya which is not a LDC that go beyond a 
certain threshold, the Burundian exporter loses preferential treatment under 
the EBA. The exporter will have to pay the normal taxes levied on similar 
products from other countries such as Brazil, Australia and so on.147 
 
It will be recalled that in the period 1996 – 2000, the EC imposed three bans 
on all fish imports from Uganda (Tanzania and Kenya were also affected) 
because of what it considered poor sanitation facilities, inadequate health and 
environmental conditions, and a lack of basic infrastructure for processing 
fish. Indeed as investigations later revealed, the technology used by the 
fishermen in Uganda were rudimentary and did not meet international 
standards.148  
 
Fish-landing sites lacked elementary infrastructure for example ice, portable 
water, adequate shelter to protect fish from contamination, electricity to run 
sanitation equipment, and lavatories. At factories where fish were cleaned and 
filtered, sanitary, health, and environmental conditions were inadequate and 
layouts and structural designs were unsatisfactory.149 The above scenario 
shows how Non-tariff barriers aggravate market access difficulties and reduce 
EAC partner states market opening opportunities. 
 
                                                 
145 (n 4 above) at 1 
146 Cumulation means that a preference receiving country is permitted to use materials from other 
specified countries, which will then be considered as locally sourced when establishing the 
‘originating’ status of final product so as to qualify for preferential treatment. 
147 (n 4 above) at 1 
148 (n 134 above) at 28 
149 (n 134 above) at 29 
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The CPA also included a limited MFN Declaration carried over from previous 
Lomé Conventions. This MFN provision only kicked-in if the ACP countries 
granted more favourable treatment to other developed States, which the EC 
would have typically perceived as its competitors.150 Declaration XXXI of the 
CPA stated that: 
‘...the ACP States shall grant the Community treatment no less 
favourable than that which they grant to developed States under trade 
agreements where those States do not grant the ACP States greater 
preferences than those granted by the Community.’ 
Though the CPA was built on the ‘acquis’ of twenty-five years experience;151 
however, its text differs substantially from the Lomé Conventions in a number 
of ways.152 These differences are reviewed below.  
 
The CPA is explicit as to its objectives: the reduction and eventual eradication 
of poverty is the prime goal of the cooperation, ‘consistent with the objectives 
of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries 
in the world economy’, which shall be in conformity with the provisions of the 
WTO, this is more precise and different from the Lomé IV convention.153 
 
For three decades, Lomé conventions granted the ACP group non-reciprocal 
preferences that were more generous than the other preferential systems the 
EU operated.154 There were two options for ACP countries to replace this after 
2007. Regional groups of ACP countries could negotiate EPAs with the EC 
                                                 
150 Baugh K., ‘The EPA and the Most Favoured Nation clause’ The Jamaica Observer 27 July 2008 at 3 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/html [accessed on 17 January 2009] 
151 The CPA is based on a corpus of shared objectives and principles, as well as the trade and financial 
benefits, which have expanded overtime to become the Lomé ‘acquis’. Yet, the partnership has kept 
apace with an ever changing international environment to best respond to ACP needs. 
152 (n 68 above) at 197 
153 Art. 167 (1) of Lomé IV provided that the main objective of the convention was to promote trade 
between the ACP states and the EC, taking into account their respective levels of development, while, 
Art. 1 of the CPA well as Article 1 of Lomé IV provided that the parties central objective was ‘to 
promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States and to 
consolidate and diversify their relations . . .’ It was only in Article 15 (a) of the Lomé IV-bis that 
improving international competitiveness was included as an objective of trade development, but it was 
not an overall objective as in the Cotonou Agreement. Well as Article 34 (1) and (4) CPA provides for 
the smooth and gradual integration of ACP states into the world economy.  
154 Desta M.G., ‘EU – ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and WTO; An experiment in North – 
South inter – regional agreements?’, (2006) 43(5) Common Market Law Review 1343-1380 at 1344 
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that liberalize trade in a reciprocal way during a ten to twelve year period.155 
Least developed ACP countries could opt for the continuation of non-
reciprocal preferences under the EU’s preferences for the LDCs that cover 
almost all products.156  
 
Non-LDC ACP countries that were not in a position to conclude an EPA could 
try to export under the EC’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) after 
2007, which is also non-reciprocal in nature.157 These options are WTO-
compatible, and do away with the discrimination based on history and 
geography, that favoured the ACP group.  
 
The CPA was regarded as a significant departure from the Lomé method in 
three ways, the nature of the partnership; the objectives to be focused on; and 
the ways of achieving these.158 The actual innovations, however, were not 
quite as novel as suggested by the ECs rhetoric only the further application of 
good governance as a ‘fundamental element’ of the relation and the 
responsibility and accountability of ACP in this respect was new. Importantly, 
in contrast to Lomés’ uniformity, the CPA differentiates between the levels of 
development of ACP states.159 
 
In my view though the CPA differed from the Lomé Conventions in that it 
provided for the integration of the EAC ACP countries into the global economy 
as opposed to mere development, it did not achieve either of the objectives. 
This is because EAC ACP countries did not substantially benefited from ECs 
preferential trading system. However it is worth pointing out that a handful of 
                                                 
155 (n 100 above) at 472 
156 The aim of GSP was to remove selective trade preferences (like Lomé) while at the same time 
giving developing countries better access to industrialised markets. This system is indicated as the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative with the exceptions are arms, and, temporarily, some temperate 
zone agricultural products. The EBA is unilateral, that is, it was not negotiated but simply given under 
terms and conditions decided by the EC-thus, it can be withdrawn or modified any time. 
157 (n 65 above) at 458  
158 (n 68 above) at 208 
159 The concept of partnership was as much the defining characteristic of Lomé conventions as it is of 
Cotonou Agreement. The LDCs remain principally governed by the traditional Lomé Convention 
approach, whilst the more economically able ACP states have the new conditions for liberalised 
economic partnerships applied to them.  
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countries like Nigeria and South Africa benefited from the ECs preferential 
trading system mainly due to their mineral exports. 
 
In conclusion the CPA extended the lifetime of the non-reciprical preferential 
trade arrangements of Lomé IV convention and also set an agenda for the 
negotiation of new trading arrangements called EPAs that replaced the CPA 
trade provisions as from 1 January 2008. 
 
2.7 Comparison between the CPA and the Lomé Conventions 
 
The CPA is different from the Lomé Conventions in four major areas. Firstly, 
while the Lomé Conventions aimed at promoting trade between the EC and 
ACP states, CPA aims at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of EAC 
ACP states into the global economy. The CPA is therefore not just about 
providing preferential trade regimes for EAC ACP countries, but also 
promoting their sustainable development and making substantial contribution 
to poverty eradication.160 
 
Secondly, the Lomé Conventions aimed at improving EAC ACP countries 
access to EC markets. The CPA goes further and aims at assisting EAC ACP 
states to enhance their production, supply and trading capacities, and helping 
them increase access to foreign direct investment (FDI).161 
 
The CPA recognizes the important role that non-state actors play in an 
economy. The CPA defines non-state actors to include the private sector, civil 
society, local authorities and trade unions. The CPA also makes provision for 
their involvement in EAC ACP-EC relations through consultations and 
implementing programmes in their areas of concern162 well as this was not the 
case under the Lomé conventions. 
 
                                                 
160 Mutahunga E., ‘The multilateral trading system; a focus on the ACP-EU trade relations’ (2006) at 6, 
A paper presented at the fifth course on introduction to trade and trade policy analysis, organized by 
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry and the Uganda Programme for Trade Opportunities and 
Policy(Unpublished) 
161 (n 160 above) at 6 
162 Articles 6 and 7 of the CPA 
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Lastly, the CPA provides the option of broadening the scope of trade co-
operation with EAC ACP states through Regional Economic Partnership 
Agreements. The CPA also provided for continued preferential access to the 
EC market for an eight year transitional period (which expired on 31 
December 2007), and the framework for the negotiation of new arrangements 
(EPAs) that were meant to be compatible with WTO agreements.163   
 
2.8 From Lomé to Cotonou  
The successive Lomé Conventions were a unique model in the North-South 
relations, combining a negotiated system of trade preferences and 
considerable amounts of aid.164 A non-reciprocal duty-free trade arrangement 
constituted the cornerstone of the conventions. However the factors 
discussed below contributed to the abandonment of the Lomé Convention 
framework. 
 
One of the distinguishing features of Lomé Conventions was the 
discriminatory character of its trade agreement. Thus, the Lomé Conventions 
discriminated positively in favour of Europe’s ex-colonies at the expense of 
other developing countries excluded from the convention but at a similar level 
of development, such as Guatemala and Honduras.165   
 
Therefore, more than 90 percent of ACP exports, predominantly primary 
commodities, qualified to enter the EC duty free. On the one hand, the 
developing countries that did not enjoy the special preferences regime wanted 
such benefits to be extended to them. Those already benefiting from them 
(ACP countries), on the other hand, demanded assurances that their acquired 
rights would be respected, and asked the EC to support their claims.166 
 
                                                 
163 (n 160 above) at 6 
164 Moreau F., ‘The Cotonou Agreement – new orientations’, (2000) The ACP-EU Courier Special 
Issue Cotonou Agreement at 6 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier_acp/en/en_020.pdf [accessed on 23 
October 2008] 
165 (n 33 above ) at 457  
166 (n 65 above) at 442 
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However, between the inception of Lomé Convention in 1975 and its 
expiration in 2000, we should have seen evidence of improvement in, say, 
economic growth, and capacity development and so on.167 The evidence, 
however, is that the share of ACP products in total EC imports from third 
countries precipitously declined from roughly 8 per cent in 1980 to about 3 per 
cent in 2001.168 Not only did the Lomé framework fail fundamentally to 
improve the economic positions of the vast majority of ACP states, some 
critics suggested that the historic pattern of first-third-world dependency had 
even become more deeply embedded.169 
 
The poor outcome of the Lomé system had also underlined the need for 
reform. The funding under the successive EDFs, STABEX scheme, SYSMIN 
scheme and the trade preferences did not prove to be sufficient to promote 
development in the ACP countries. These unsatisfactory results had 
contributed to the creation of a crisis of legitimacy amongst the donors and 
‘aid fatigue’170  
 
Another compelling argument for not renewing the Lomé Convention was the 
recognition that any new EAC ACP–EU arrangement had to be fully 
compatible with GATT/WTO rules. The preferential trade regime of the Lomé 
accord, particularly the non-reciprocal duty free entry of EAC ACP products 
into the EC market was a violation of the MFN principle of the GATT/WTO 
that aspires to establish and advance Non-discrimination among its member 
states.171  
 
The changing of parameters of the global environment presented new 
opportunities and dangers based around technology and the globalisation of 
trading and financial systems. Crucially, the pervasive trend towards trade 
                                                 
167 (n 65 above) at 442 
168 (n 99 above) at 34 
169 (n 68 above) at 169 
170 Salama C.M. and Dearden S.,‘The Cotonou Agreement, A paper reviewing the negotiation process 
that led to the signing of the Cotonou Agreement’, at 3 http://www.e-space.mmu.ac.uk/e-
space/bitstream/2173/1872/2/Dearden%20dp20.pdf [accessed on 20 October 2008] 
171 (n 99 above) at 28 
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liberalisation and the WTO orthodoxy were at odds with the traditional 
preferential aspects of Lomé.172 
 
In addition to the multilateral pressures outlined above, the debate was 
launched by the publication in November 1996 of the EC Green Paper on 
relations between the EC and ACP countries, setting out various options for 
the future of EC-ACP relations.173 The fundamental questions at the heart of 
the debate were the geographical coverage of the new agreement and its 
trade arrangement.174  
 
The EC’s Green paper on the future of Lomé also blamed supply-side 
inadequacies within ACP countries for the failure of the Lomé Conventions to 
promote ACP integration into the world economy. In particular, the absence of 
sound micro- and macro-economic policies, good governance, secure and 
stable investment and taxation regimes and a political economy open to 
foreign direct investment are all considered by the EC to be key factors 
behind the lack of development.175 
 
The collapse in 1989-1990 of the communist regimes of the erstwhile Soviet 
block and the resultant end of the cold war was an impetus for transforming 
ACP-EC relations.  On the one hand, it broadened the horizon and scope of 
the external economic relations of the EC, that is, the Union had to re-define 
its relationship with its Central and Eastern Europe neighbours, but in the 
broader context of its overall external economic relations.176 In other words, 
ACP countries would now have to compete for the attention (and resources) 
of the EC, because of a more immediate and urgent need in the backyard of 
the EC. 
 
                                                 
172 (n 68 above ) at 169 
173 Forwood G., ‘The Road to Cotonou: Negotiating a successor Agreement to Lomé’, (2001)39(3) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 423-442 at 427  
174 The differences between members of the ACP were at the root of Lomé Convention incompatibility 
with the GATT. While the 1979 enabling clause allows for preferential trade regimes for developing 
countries where all developing countries are treated equally, the Lomé Conventions favoured only 
those in the ACP group. 
175 (n 33 above) at 468 
176 (n 49 above) at 31 
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In conclusion, despite the generous preferences, the potential of EAC ACP 
countries to expand, diversify and fully take advantage of the EC preferences 
were seriously constrained by four main factors; first, the persistence of 
barriers to market access such as highly restrictive rules of origin (RoO) 
applied to preferences and problems of tariff escalation. Secondly, the 
persistence of barriers to market entry such as non-tariff barriers related to 
health and safety regulations. Thirdly, severe domestic competitiveness 
problems and supply side constraints such as lack of infrastructure, 
investment and skilled labour and lastly177 preference erosion associated with 
zero MFN rates178  
 
In my view, the above global economic conditions and factors within the EAC 
ACP countries combined to hinder substantial economic development 
resulting from the preferential trade opportunities  offered by the EC. 
Therefore in light of the above, it was inevitable to renegotiate the EAC ACP – 
EC trade regime.  
 
2.9 The New ACP-EC Economic Relationship 
The main challenge for the EC was how to achieve a trade and development 
policy that met three conditions: it must be justified in terms of economic 
needs, it must be WTO compatible, and it must be sensitive to the needs of 
those countries which have become dependent on historical preferences.179 
 
The CPA preferences, like those under the preceding Lomé Conventions, did 
not comply with the WTO’s ‘enabling clause’.180 This clause permits 
developed WTO member countries to give unilateral preferential treatment to 
                                                 
177 (n 49 above) at 17  
178 Preference erosion occurs when the difference between the tariffs applied to non-preference 
receiving countries (MFN applied rate) and that applied to preference recipients continuously narrows. 
As this margin approaches zero, the value of being a preference holder is eroded and at zero, the 
reference recipient country is said to face zero MFN. The erosion of EU preferences has been caused 
by continued negotiation in market access for other developing countries through bilateral and regional 
FTAs and multilateral trade agreements progressively lowering tariffs of all countries.  
179 (n 37 above) at 716 
180 Paragraph 1 and 2 of the WTO decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) on differential and more 
favorable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of developing countries enable GATT/WTO 
members to accord preferences to developing countries without necessarily extending such preferences 
to other GATT/WTO members http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_enabling_e.pdf 
[accessed on 30 December 2008] 
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imports from only two groups of developing countries: either all LDCs or all 
developing countries. The CPA trade preferences were inconsistent with the 
enabling clause because they, like the earlier Lomé preferences, were not 
extended to all developing countries and because some EAC ACP countries 
were not LDCs.181 
 
The primary driver of the interim EPAs has been the incompatibility of the 
CPA unilateral trade preferences for the EAC ACP countries with WTO rules. 
182 Although CPA does not specifically define EPAs, it gave quite a few 
important clues about them. 183 
 
The option of EPAs under the CPA presented a key challenge for ACP 
states.184 The challenge was particularly significant with regard to the design 
of the adequate terms of reciprocity and flexibility185 vis-à-vis the EC, while 
ensuring compliance with prevailing WTO disciplines.186 The EPAs are the 
new framework for trade cooperation between member countries of the ACP 
and the EC.187 This co-operation is built around trade liberalisation. It involves 
                                                 
181 ‘Africa: Economic Partnership Agreements between Africa and European Union; What to do now?’, 
(2008)45945-AFR World Bank Report at 3 http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/WB_EN_1008_WB_Africa-EPAs-What-to-do-Now.pdf [accessed on 30 
November 2008] 
182 (n 181 above) at 3 
183 Article 34 (4) of CPA provides that EPAs are to be implemented in full conformity with WTO law 
and article 36 (1) CPA provides that the parties agree to conclude new WTO compatible trading 
arrangements. 
184 Articles 36 and 37 of the CPA provide for EPAs as the major instrument of economic and trade co-
operation between ACP and EC. Therefore, EPAs are the instruments for one of the three interlinked 
pillars of the Cotonou Agreement. These other pillars are the Political Dialogue and Development 
Cooperation. 
185 Flexibility refers to a degree of policy discretion entitled to parties to a trade agreement with regard 
to its provisions and does not presume asymmetrical treatment between parties to the agreement. 
However, when applied to the modality of trade negotiations, where reciprocity is the norm, it may 
amount to Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) as the deviation from reciprocity would lead to 
certain asymmetry between the negotiating parties in the level of rights and obligations.  
186 Onguglo B. and Ito T., ‘How to make EPAs WTO compatible?, Reforming the rules on regional 
trade agreements’, (2003)40 European Centre for Development Policy Management at 31, 
http://www.ecdpm.org [accessed on 7 December 2008] 
187 An EPA is a FTA between regions in the ACP (for example EAC) and the EC. The EAC EPA come 
into force in January 2008 after the expiry of the waiver by the WTO (in December 2007) on the 
preferential market access of the ACP countries into the EC as provided under the CPA. Art. 95 (1) of 
the CPA provided that the CPA would expire after twenty years commencing on 1 March 2000 (that is 
in year 2020) therefore the EPA will be implemented simultaneously with other pillars of the CPA. 
However, it should be noted while the CPA has an expiry date, the EPA once signed has no expiry 
date. The EPA negotiations at all ACP level are in six clusters which include; market access issues, 
agriculture and fisheries; development issues; trade in services; trade related areas and legal issues. 
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among others asymmetry, in favour of the EAC party, in liberalisation of trade, 
in the application of trade related measures and trade defence instruments.188 
 
In conclusion, the CPA is now quickly approaching its second revision, due to 
take place in 2010. This time round there multiple pressures on the existing 
ACP-EC partnership many of which are discussed above. With the economic 
and political changes in the world it is increasing becoming apparent that the 
CPA is no longer taken seriously as it was in the past. It is worth noting that 
the main strength of the group is its collective bargaining and political power, 
gained by individual members negotiating as a bloc at the international fora. 
Therefore the revision in 2010 provides a good opportunity to anticipate, 
prepare and redefine the future of the ACP-EC relations taking into account 
key areas of shared interests. 
 
 
Annex I illustrating a comparison of key RoO elements in the EBA 
initiative and CPA 
 
RoO Aspects EBA initiative CPA 
Cumulation  • Bilateral 
cumulation 
• Diagonal 
cumulation  (within 
four regions 
• Bilateral 
cumulation 
• Diagonal 
cumulation with 
SA 
• Full intra-ACP 
cumulation 
• Cumulation with 
certain 
‘neighbouring 
developing 
countries’ 
Tolerance/de minimis 10% of ex-works price 15% of ex-works price 
Costs of documentation  Prohibitive (particularly 
transit)  
Prohibitive (particularly 
transit) 
Level of 
processing/value 
addition 
Similar Similar 
Complexity to of general Lower Lower 
                                                 
188 Article 4 (3) of the EPA 
 
 
 
 
 42
and product-specific 
rules 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The notion of reciprocity  
 
3.1 Introduction and Background to the notion of reciprocity 
For the past two hundred years, trade liberalization has been gradually 
promoted upon the principle of reciprocity. Before World War II, reciprocal 
trade agreements were commonly used for tariff reduction between two 
states. During the post war period, how to apply reciprocal relationships 
among the member states had been the centrepiece of discussion on the 
table of the GATT.189 
 
Reciprocity originated in the equality of sovereignty. However, it is established 
neither as a legal system nor as a substantial regulation of international law. It 
can be considered merely as a basis for negotiation.190 In the early history of 
the GATT, it could be described as a guiding beacon for nations to begin the 
process of dismantling trade protectionism. The principle of reciprocity, 
however, faced serious challenges as the GATT process developed.191  
 
Reciprocity is defined as a fundamental rule by which plural parties maintain 
the balance of treatment by means of granting the same or equivalent rights 
and benefits and, or undertaking obligations to each other.192 Reciprocity is 
the give-to-get rule, typified by ‘If I give you a break on a trade barrier on this 
good, then you must give me an equivalent break on the same or different 
good’. Reciprocity embodies the principle that altruism, giving a trade break, is 
practiced for selfish reasons, to get a break in return.193 Reciprocity is that 
                                                 
189 Yanai A., ‘Reciprocity in Trade Liberalisation’, (2001)1(2) Institute of Developing Economies 
APEC study centre at 1 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Apec/pdf/apec12_trade_02.pdf [accessed 
on 18 November 2008]. Though the GATT was not an institution established under a treaty-based 
instrument like the United Nations but merely a general agreement, it has had an actual secretariat and 
has functioned as a de facto international institution. In this paper, therefore, the term ‘the GATT’ will 
be used as an institution and ‘the GATT agreement’ as an international agreement. 
190 (n 189 above) at 7 
191 (n 189 above) at 7 
192 (n 189 above) at 1 
193 Smith L.F., ‘The GATT and International Trade’, 39 (1991) Buffalo Law Review 919-990 at 919 
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ideal which promotes exchanges of trade concessions. If one member lowers 
a trade barrier, a country that benefits is expected to lower its own barriers in 
an equivalent, if not identical, way.194 
 
Under the principle of reciprocity negotiations result in tariff adjustments that 
generate for each participant an equal change in the volume of its imports and 
exports.195 This principle is often denounced as reflecting unsound 
mercantilist reasoning. But in fact it can promote efficient trade agreements, 
as it serves to fix the world price between negotiating partners, so that neither 
partner experiences a terms-of-trade loss when tariffs are reciprocally 
liberalized.196 
 
3.1.2 Reciprocity in the process of drafting the ITO charter 
 
In applying the reciprocity principle, it became questionable whether equal 
treatment of unequal partners in trade negotiations could ever be considered 
reciprocal. The first draft of the International Trade Organisation (ITO) charter 
in December 1945 incorporated the idea of one set of rules applying to all 
countries, and it contained no special provisions for developing countries.197 
  
Therefore, when the United States presented the proposed ITO charter, 
developing countries, such as India, China, and Latin-American countries, 
raised objections and demanded to insert special rules or exceptions for 
developing countries. After repeated negotiations and compromises between 
developing countries and the United States, the ITO charter contained 
provisions for developing countries in the third chapter of Economic 
Development and Reconstruction.198 
 
 
                                                 
194 (n 193 above) at 936 
195 The principle of reciprocity is represented in GATT/WTO practice in two ways. First, it is often 
associated with the broad manner in which government negotiators approach trade-policy negotiations. 
Second, it appears in GATT articles (e.g., GATT Article XXVIII) as a means of determining the 
compensation that may be sought when a trading partner modifies or withdraws a previous concession. 
196 Bagwell K. and Staiger W.R., ‘Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of 
GATT/WTO’, (2004)63 Journal of International Economics 1-29 at 2 
197 (n 189 above) at 9 
198 (n 189 above) at 10 
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 Though the ITO Charter never came into force, some provisions of the draft 
ITO Charter survived in the GATT.199  
 
At first, the GATT was regarded as a provisional agreement until the ITO was 
formally established. However, it subsisted as a permanent agreement ruling 
the world trade system in place of the ITO Charter.200 The GATT did not take 
into consideration differing levels of economic development among 
participants, and it had started as an institution based on liberalism, 
reciprocity and formal equality.201 
 
3.1.3 Treatment of Developing Countries 
 
For almost fifty years, GATT and the GATT Secretariat were at the core of the 
international trade system. GATT's central tenet is the promotion of free 
trade202, and it accomplished this goal through a system that laid the 
foundation for an open and level playing field liberated from non-economic 
barriers.203 Underlying the premise of a market driven trade regime is the 
theory of comparative advantage according to which each nation concentrates 
on producing what it makes most efficiently and trades to obtain the products 
it makes less efficiently.204 
 
                                                 
199 In March 1948, the ITO Charter was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment in Havana. Since only two countries ratified the Charter, the plan to establish the ITO lost 
momentum. However, in order to enforce the results of the round, parts of the ITO Charter were 
selected to form the core of the General Agreement 
200 (n 189 above) at 7 
201 (n 189 above) at 10 
202 Free trade is an economic theory that contends that everyone in the world will be better off if each 
nation eliminates tariffs and other barriers to the flow of products across borders. The practice of ‘free 
trade’ departs from theory by including the export of money either for investment purposes or 
speculation. With firms able to move both money and products around the world, the benefits of lower 
prices and higher wages have not been enjoyed by most people. In addition, under recent FTA, the 
concept of barriers to trade has been expanded to include domestic regulations, public health and 
human rights measures, and environmental protection laws which inhibit business activity. 
203 GATT employed four fundamental legal principles to achieve its goal of free trade. First, tariffs 
were declared the only acceptable trade barrier, and they were progressively reduced through a series 
of multilateral trade rounds. Secondly, under the MFN principle, GATT generalized tariff concessions 
by requiring that any tariff concessions granted to one party apply to all parties. Thirdly, the national 
treatment obligation sought to level the playing field between imported and domestic products. 
Fourthly, GATT regulated the use of quantitative restrictions (quotas) and other non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), and barred subsidies, dumping, and other acts considered unfair trade practices. Of course, 
GATT did incorporate exceptions allowing parties to deviate from obligations when necessary. 
204 Gordon R., ‘Sub-Saharan Africa and the Brave new world of the WTO Multilateral Trade Regime’, 
(2006)8 Berkeley Journal of African-American Law and Policy 79-124 at 82 
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Third World countries have had an uneven relationship with the world trade 
system. They were largely absent at the birth of GATT and through most of its 
evolution and growth. For African and other Third World nations, the concern 
during the GATT period was development, and they considered GATT to be a 
rich nation club rather than an ally in their development.205 
 
In the preamble to GATT, the governments of the original contracting parties 
to the agreement state their specific objectives and the arrangement under 
GATT that are expected to contribute to these objectives. The preamble 
states: 
 
‘Recognising that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view of raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of 
the resources of the world and expanding production and exchange of 
goods…’. ‘Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by 
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements 
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and to elimination of discriminative treatment in international 
commerce…’.206  
 
It is notable that governments don’t set forth the goal of free trade, instead, 
governments advocate for the less ambitious goals of reciprocity and non 
discrimination.207 
 
The principle of reciprocity, however, faced serious challenges as the GATT 
process developed. First, there was a problem with free riding,208 which 
originated from the contradiction between two core principles of the GATT: 
                                                 
205 (n 204 above) at 82 
206 The GATT preamble, a similar preamble is included in the agreement establishing the WTO, the 
successor organisation to GATT. 
207 Bagwell K. and Staiger W.R., ‘Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the 
Multilateral Trading System’, (2001)17 European Journal of Political Economy 281-325 at 282 
208 Free rider is a casual term used to imply that a country, which does not make any trade concessions, 
profits from tariff cuts and concessions made by other countries in negotiations under the most-
favoured-nation principle 
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non-discrimination and reciprocity. Concessions such as reducing tariffs and 
elimination of non-tariff measures given by unconditional MFN are not 
reciprocal but unilateral. One side that gives concessions can not expect 
returns from the other side.209 
 
In this point, the principle of non-discrimination embodied in the unconditional 
MFN clause contradicts the principle of reciprocity, which is explained as one 
side giving to the other and the other returning with equivalency. The notion of 
diffuse reciprocity was able to resolve this contradiction because it regards as 
enough equivalents that one side gives unconditional MFN treatment and the 
other side gives in return commitment of unconditional MFN treatment.210 
 
3.1.4 The GATT Review Session (1954-55) 
 
The GATT review session (1954-55) made no major changes in legal 
relations between developed and developing countries because the former 
still had the majority at the time and the latter had neither negotiating power 
nor theoretical force to cause the basis of the GATT system to be 
reconsidered.211 
 
3.1.5 The late 1950s 
 
In the late 1950s, questions arose whether the liberalism on which the GATT 
system was based was appropriate as a guiding principle. The primary reason 
was that the export performance of developing countries never improved. 
Most of them changed their industrial policies from import substituting 
industrialization to export orientation. In order to secure markets for exports, 
developing countries begun to demand that developed countries opened their 
markets unilaterally. They insisted on exceptions for reciprocity and that they 
be treated specially and differentially as well; they criticized strict application 
of reciprocity because it is extremely difficult to require the same level of 
concessions between states at different levels of economic development.212 
                                                 
209 (n 189 above) at 8 
210 (n 189 above) at 8 
211 (n 189 above) at 10 
212 (n 189 above) at 11 
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In 1957, the GATT established an experts group to study the issue of trade 
and development. The experts group submitted the Haberlar report in October 
1958, which recognized the necessity to expand market access for economic 
development and insisted that developed countries should liberalize and 
reduce tariffs, especially those on primary commodities from developing 
countries.213  
 
Based on the report an action programme to the GATT ministerial meeting 
was adopted with two goals. One was to persuade developed countries to 
negotiate at the round without insisting on too much reciprocity from 
developing countries. The other was to appeal directly for unilateral trade 
liberalization by developed countries). Both of these demands implied 
changing the concept of traditional reciprocity or permitting exceptions to 
reciprocity.214 
 
3.1.6 In the early 1960s 
 
At the Ministerial Meeting in November 1961, the contracting parties agreed 
that a more flexible attitude should be taken with respect to the degree of 
reciprocity to be expected from developing countries, and adopted the 
Declaration on Promoting the Trade of Least Developed Countries, which 
asserted the need for unilateral concessions by developed countries.215 
 
One of the reasons for the concessive attitude of developed countries was 
that they became aware of the risk of applying strict reciprocity to developing 
countries. In the Cold War period, the western industrialized countries, 
especially the United States, came to recognize the need for unilateral 
                                                 
213 The Haberlar report was worthy of note in that it treated the issue on trade expansion of developing 
countries, while Article XVIII of the GATT aimed only at restriction of imports. However, there was 
criticism that it took the view of establishing developing countries as suppliers of primary commodities 
based on the theory of comparative costs. 
214 (n 189 above) at 12 
215 The Declaration proclaimed that governments of the major industrialized areas, on whose markets 
the LDCs must necessarily largely depend, recognize a particular responsibility in this respect of 
adopting a sympathetic attitude on the question of reciprocity and also taking into account the special 
needs of LDC. Furthermore, at the Trade Ministerial Meeting in May 1963, the ministers accepted the 
objective of duty free access for tropical products with no expectation of reciprocity. 
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concessions as aid to developing countries which they wanted to co-opt to 
their camp.216 
 
3.1.7 Reciprocity at the Kennedy Round (1964-65) and Tokyo Rounds 
(1973-79) Negotiations 
 
The most successful result of the Kennedy Round for developing countries 
was the special and differential treatment (SDT) embodied in the additional 
Part IV of the GATT. Part IV described the significance and necessity of 
taking into account economic differences in development. Article XXXVI (8) of 
the GATT 1947 setting forth exceptions to reciprocity said: 
 
‘The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove 
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting 
parties’.  
 
This clause originated from the fundamental principle of the international law 
of development, which claimed that every country should gain the same 
profits in substance. 
 
After long negotiation, numerous exceptions to reciprocity were granted by the 
industrialized GATT signatories in favour of developing countries at the 
Kennedy Round and the subsequent Tokyo Rounds (1973-79) as well. On 
June 25, 1971, the GATT granted a ‘waiver’ for a ten-year period to 
developed, preference-giving countries which could justify their deviation from 
the MFN clause on the basis of having to implement a GSP.217 It was not until 
the adoption of the Enabling Clause in 1979 that developed countries could 
                                                 
216 (n 189 above) at 13 
217 The incorporation of a GSP into the GATT system was strongly attributed to the UNCTAD 
elaboration of the ‘Agreed Conclusion of the Special Committee on Preferences’, which initiated the 
establishment of GSPs in the global trading system. 
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avoid criticism that they were deviating from their obligations under the MFN 
clause in giving SDT to developing countries.218 
 
These exceptions are referred as SDTs. It was remarkable that the GATT 
accepted such provisions as dividing the contracting parties into the 
categories of developed and developing countries, because the GATT had 
declared respect for the sovereign equality principle.219 
 
However SDTs had no effect at the tariff negotiation for the following reasons. 
First, Part IV of the GATT is set merely as a suggested target, and it does not 
prescribe any right of developing countries or any duty of developed ones. 
Developed countries were not obliged to give any preference to developing 
countries. Second, developing countries had no chance to participate in the 
negotiation because the Kennedy Round was conducted only by reciprocal 
negotiations among developed countries.220 
 
The language on reciprocity in the body of the GATT is clear: governments 
seek a balance of concessions and when presented with the withdrawal of a 
trade concession, its trade partner is permitted to withdraw a substantially 
equivalent concession.221 Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 also includes 
language that could be interpreted as pertaining to reciprocity, in that it calls 
for trade barriers to be eliminated with respect to substantially all trade 
between the constituent territories.222 Thus, by definition, preferential trade 
agreements involve some degree of reciprocity because both sides are 
expected to make full trade concessions.223 
 
                                                 
218 Yanai A., ‘Legal Frameworks for North – South RTAs under the WTO system’, (2004)3/4(6) APEC 
Study Centre Institute of Developing Economies JETRO at 10 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Apec/pdf/apec15_wp6.pdf [accessed on 17 August 2008] 
219 (n 189 above) at 14 
220 (n 189 above) at 14 
221 Freund C., ‘ Reciprocity in Free Trade Agreements’  World Bank Trade Development Research 
Group at 1 http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/07/22/000094946_03070804204789/R
endered/PDF/multi0page.pdf [accessed on 31 August 2008]  
222 Article XXIV (8) (b) of the GATT 1994 
223 (n 221 above) at 2 
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It is notable that the member governments do not set forth the goal of free 
trade; instead, they advocate the less ambitious goals of reciprocity that is 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and non-
discrimination that is the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce.224 It is also argued that reciprocity in trade 
agreements only makes sense among partners with at least similar economic 
power.225 
 
3.2 Reciprocity in the EAC EC Economic Partnership Agreement 
 
After thirty years, the Cotonou Preferences did not deliver a growing share of 
ACP exports to Europe. The ACP share of the EC market fell drastically in 
comparison to other developing countries over this period and the majority of 
exports come from comparatively prosperous South Africa and mineral rich 
Nigeria.226 
 
The broad stages of the gradual and deeper integration of the EAC are the 
formation of a customs union (formed on 1 January 1995), a common market 
(to be formed on 1 January 2010), a monetary union (to be formed by 2012), 
and political federation (proposed shortly thereafter). Negotiations for the 
common market have commenced in earnest on the basis of a draft protocol 
commissioned by the EAC secretariat, which is expected to be completed by 
June 2009. According to the Treaty and the draft protocol, the common 
market will be characterised by free movement of goods, services, labour, and 
capital, and the recognition of the right of establishment and residence.227 
 
                                                 
224 (n 207 above) at 282 
225 Markov H., Changing the system: a review of trade preferences, 7(2008)6  Trade Negotiation 
Insight at 4, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 18 October 2008] 
226 Kabuleta P. and Hanson V., ‘Good from far but far from Good’,(2007/8)8(6) Trade Negotiation 
Insight at 1, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 18 October 2008] 
227 Mangeni F., ‘Investing in East Africa: The role of negotiations in the EAC-EU EPA’, (2008/9)7(10) 
Trade Negotiation Insight at 10 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 30 December 2008]. See 
also Article 104 of the Treaty establishing the EAC. 
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The EAC configuration is an EPA negotiating region that emerged only in the 
final months of the five year process.228 The overall objective of the EPA is to 
achieve sustainable development of EAC, promoting the smooth integration 
and gradual integration of the EAC into the global economy and eradication of 
poverty.229  
 
EPAs are intended to consolidate regional integration initiatives within the 
EAC ACP countries, and to provide an open, transparent and predictable 
framework for goods and services to circulate freely, thus increasing 
competitiveness of the EAC ACP countries and ultimately facilitating the 
transition toward their full participation in a liberalised world economy230.  
 
There are four foundations to the EPAs which include: the fact that the EPAs 
serve as partnerships, that imply rights and obligations for both sides; 
secondly EPAs serve to foster regional integration into the world economy; 
thirdly EPAs foster development for these poverty stricken countries; and 
EPAs provide a link to the WTO, facilitating integration of the ACP countries 
into the world economy, thereby building on the WTO rules and defining the 
framework for the rules so that closer integration between the EC and ACP 
results.231 
 
On the one hand there are those who hold the opinion that EPAs will, in 
principle, be detrimental to the economies of EAC ACP states while, on the 
other hand, there are those who hold the opinion that EPAs could be a useful 
mechanism for accelerating the economic development and regional 
integration of the EAC ACP regions.232  
 
                                                 
228 Stevens C. Meyn M. Kennan J. and Others., ‘The new EPAs: comparative analysis of their content 
and the challenges for 2008’,(2008) European Centre for Development Policy Management at 4 http:// 
www.ecdpm.org/pmr14 [accessed on 7 December 2008] 
229 Article 2 of the EPA 
230 Justice E., ‘The African Union: Building a dream to facilitate trade, development and debt relief’, 
(2003) 12 International Trade Law Journal 127 -  151 at 133 
231 (n 230 above) at 133 
232 Pearson M., Perspectives for the EPA negotiations – challenges for the Eastern and Southern Africa 
Region’, (2004)3(2) Trade Negotiation Insight at 1 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 
August 2008] 
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The EC advanced two main arguments in support of its demand for the 
creation of FTAs between itself and regional groupings of ACP countries. The 
first is legal, that this is the only arrangement acceptable to the WTO. The 
second is economic, that such FTAs will stimulate economic development in 
EAC ACP countries.233 In EC eyes, the EPAs would provide a means to 
harness trade without affronting other developing countries at the WTO.234 
 
There are a number of problems with the EC’s conception of reciprocity in 
EPAs. Firstly, the principle of reciprocity as intended in the GATT/WTO does 
not necessarily carry over to North-South trade agreements, since small 
countries have not been required to offer reciprocal concessions to industrial 
countries in multilateral negotiations.235 The 1979 ‘Enabling Clause’ also calls 
upon industrialised countries not to seek reciprocal concessions inconsistent 
with the development, financial and trade needs of individual developing 
countries.236 
 
Secondly, reciprocity between developing and developed countries can be 
very damaging to the former because the asymmetries in economic size 
mean that developing countries have to make relatively larger concessions 
and bear disproportionately high costs of adjustment than the developed 
countries.237 
 
Premature trade liberalisation can also contribute to deindustrialisation in 
developing countries, characterised by a decline in manufacturing, the 
collapse of industries, and a loss of jobs and ‘tacit knowledge’. The 
proposition that the gap in development between EC and EAC ACP countries 
                                                 
233 Ochieng C. and Sharman T., ‘Trade traps: Why EC – ACP Economic Partnership Agreements pose 
a threat to Africa’s development’,(2007) Action aid International at 6 http://www.actionaid.org 
[accessed on 24 September 2008]. See also: Lamy P., ‘Opening of the negotiations for the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the Caribbean Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM) and the 
European Union’,(2004) statement by Pascal Lamy, Kingston, Jamaica, 16 April 2004, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla220_en.htm. 
234 (n 226 above) at 1 
235 (n 233 above) at 6 
236 Paragraph 5 Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_enabling_e.pdf [accessed on 29 January 2009] 
237 (n 233 above) at 7 
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can be addressed through ‘asymmetrical reciprocity or liberalisation’ may not 
be convincing.238 
 
Therefore in a more fundamental way EPAs go beyond what has been agreed 
at the WTO. By demanding reciprocal liberalisation, they contravene the long-
fought for concepts of S&DT and non reciprocity, which have been embedded 
at the WTO since the Punta del Este ministerial declaration.239 
 
It is also important to look at what is required for the agreements to be WTO 
compatible. WTO law sets minimum requirements covering free trade in 
goods. It does not require the inclusion of liberalisation ‘multiplier’ clauses, 
such as MFN or standstill clauses. It also does not require progression to full 
EPAs or the inclusion of other trade related issues, such as services or 
investment.240 
 
The pillars of the GATT are nondiscrimination and reciprocity. Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994 allows for the formation of trade blocks, has been derided as 
antithetical to the GATT because it permits members of a trade block to 
discriminate against nonmembers.241  It is also notable that the governments 
agree through GATT Article XXIV to grant an important exception to MFN. 
This article provides conditions under which countries may form preferential 
agreements, which can be established as free trade areas. 242 
 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 contains the most important rules of the WTO 
system on RTAs. Article XXIV authorizes derogation from the MFN principle 
for two types of RTAs that is FTAs and customs unions or interim agreements 
                                                 
238 (n 233 above) at 7. The principle of asymmetry posits that EPAs entail asymmetric and sequenced 
liberalisation between both parties. Asymmetry will take into account the specific economic, social, 
environmental and structural constraints of the EAC ACP countries including their development policy 
objectives and capacity to adapt to the EPA process. This implies that an EPA should be economically, 
socially and environmentally acceptable with regards to the development needs of EAC ACP countries. 
239 Stuart L., ‘Why the European Commission is wrong about EPAs’, (2005)4(2) Trade Negotiation 
Insight at 3 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 August 2008] 
240 Bartels L., ‘The legal status of the initialled EPAs’, (2008)7(3) Trade Negotiation Insight at 4 
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 August 2008] 
241 (n 221 above) at 1 
242 (n 207 above) at 282 
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leading to the formation of either of these two.243 The main difference between 
these two forms of RTAs relates essentially to the level of integration attained 
or envisaged by their respective members.244 Article XXIV of the GATT is 
supplemented by the understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV 
which lists several conditions, including notification to the GATT contracting 
parties and what is referred to as the internal trade requirement and the 
external trade requirement.245 
 
The internal trade requirement is that ‘duties and other restrictive regulations 
of commerce’, with some exceptions, must be eliminated on substantially all 
the trade within the FTA.246 The external trade requirement is that duties and 
other regulations of commerce imposed on non-FTA members may not be 
higher or more restrictive than they were before integration, or the interim 
agreement.247 
 
The key provision of Article XXIV is the principle of reciprocity that all parties 
to a regional trade agreement must liberalise trade between them248. In effect, 
they must enter a FTA. The two main aspects to gauge reciprocity in an RTA 
                                                 
243 (n 154 above)  at 1350 
244 Art. XXIV 8 (a) of GATT provides that a customs union is defined as the substitution of a single 
customs territory for two or more customs territories with free movement of goods across borders 
within the customs union and a common external trade regime towards third parties. Art. XXIV 8 (b) of 
the GATT provides that a free trade area, on the other hand is an arrangement between countries which 
seeks to create conditions for the free flow of trade amongst themselves while preserving the 
independent customs territories of the constituent parties and with no need for harmonizing their 
respective foreign trade regimes vis-à-vis non-FTA countries. Art. XXIV 5 (C) of the GATT and the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, paragraph 3 provides that 
Interim agreements in case of a customs union and a FTA are required to include "a plan and schedule" 
for the formation of the intended customs union or FTA within a reasonable length of time, which has 
later been defined to mean a period not exceeding 10 years unless justified by exceptional 
circumstances. 
245 Trebilcock J.M., Regulation of international Trade,3edn (2005) at 199 
246 Art. XXIV 8 (b) of the GATT (The expression ‘other restrictive regulations of commerce’ has been 
unclear since the GATT 1947 and in the WTO, however, going by views of WTO members over the 
years it can be extended to cover measures referred to in Articles 1 and 3 of the GATT and national 
treatment – charges of any kind, method of levying duties, importation rules and formalities, internal 
taxes, laws and regulations affecting sale, charges on imports other than customs duties, quantitative 
restrictions and rules of origin) 
247 Art. XXIV5 (b) of the GATT 
248 Trade liberalisation entails the elimination of ‘cross border policy barriers’ between countries such 
as tariffs, quotas and other restrictions on trade. Trade liberalisation can impact a country’s 
development prospects through various channels which may include government revenue and 
spending, food security, policy space, households and markets, and economic growth. 
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are liberalisation of ‘substantially all trade’ and implementation of concessions 
over a reasonable length of time.249 
 
As ‘substantially all trade’ has not been defined anywhere in the WTO, the 
only source of interpretation is the Appellate Body report in Turkey – Textile250 
(DS34). Paragraph - 48 of the report states that: 
 
‘…neither the GATT contracting parties nor the WTO Members have 
ever reached an agreement on the interpretation of the term 
‘substantially’ in this provision. It is clear, though, that ‘substantially all 
trade’ is not the same as all the trade, and also that ‘substantially all 
trade’ is something considerably more than merely some of the 
trade.… Thus we agree with the Panel that the terms of sub-paragraph 
8(a)(i) offers ‘some flexibility’ to the constituent members of a customs 
union when liberalizing their internal trade in accordance with this 
subparagraph’. 
 
 It should be stated here that the above ruling clarifies Art. XXIV (8)(i)(a), 
which covers Custom Unions and not FTAs which are covered by Art 
XXIV(8)(b) of the GATT. However, since the terms ‘substantially all trade’ 
have a similar function in both subparagraphs and that the relevant difference 
between a Custom Union and a FTA in this connection is only on the origin of 
covered goods, it can be assumed that Appellate Body’s interpretation of Art. 
XXIV (8) (a) (i) can also be applied to Art. XXIV (8) (b)251 in this connection, 
EU understands ‘substantially all trade’ to cover almost 90% of total volume of 
trade.252 
 
                                                 
249 South Centre, ‘Understanding the Economic Partnership Agreement’, (2007) SC/AN/TDP/EPA/1 at 
8 http://www.southcentre.org [accessed on 31 August 2008] 
250 Paragraph 48 of the Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products, (‘Turkey – Textile), WT/DS 34/AB/R, adopted on 19 November 1999 DSR 1999: VI, 2345 
251 Alavi A. Gibbon P. and Mortensen N.J., ‘EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Institutional 
and Substantive Issues’, (2007) Danish Institute for International Studies at 17 http://www.diis.dk 
[accessed 24 September 2008] 
252 Within the on-going WTO negotiations on Article XXIV, EC has argued that 90% of volume of 
trade corresponds to ‘substantially all trade’. According to the EC some products would be excluded 
from the list however since the Doha negotiations are not concluded, there is no consensus on this 
issue. 
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In my view, many ACP countries were hesitant to sign EPA with EC because 
they are used to receiving non reciprocal trade preferences yet under EPAs 
EAC ACP countries are required to reciprocate. A number of ACP countries 
are LDCs which an option to use the Every But Arms initiative well as the 
other developing countries would have used the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) certifying the WTO compatibility requirements however 
the EC was not willing to consider these options.    
 
3.3 Trade and Tariff liberalisation in EAC EC EPA 
 
The framework agreement (EAC EC EPA) covers primarily trade co-operation 
between the parties focusing on market access as the main area of contention 
and to some extent the fisheries cluster. The agreement is by its nature 
interim pending the conclusion of a comprehensive EPA in 2009. 
 
According to Peter Kiguta (the EAC Director General of Customs and Trade), 
under the EAC EC EPA framework agreement, the EC granted the EAC 
partner states duty and quota-free (DFQF) market access253 with transitional 
arrangements for rice and sugar from 1 January 2008.254 On their part, the 
EAC partner states agreed to gradually open their markets for goods from the 
EC over 25 years (It covers 100% of EC tariff lines and 74% of EAC tariff 
lines), with a 2 year moratorium.  
 
This suspension is to enable the EAC integration process to take root. The 
transition period for the Customs Union will expire at the end of 2009, and the 
two new partner states Burundi and Rwanda will begin implementing the 
Customs Union from January 2010. Therefore, tariff phase-out by the EAC 
partner states shall commence from 1 January 2010 with full liberalisation for 
                                                 
253 Market access was initially the only subject of an FTA. Services and Intellectual Property Rights 
were introduced to the multilateral trading system through the Uruguay Round that concluded in 1994. 
Investment, Government Procurement and Competition Policy known as Trade Related Issues or 
Singapore Issues were first introduced into the WTO through its ministerial conference in 1996 held in 
Singapore. 
254 (n 18 above) at 6.  In order to prevent any trade disruption the framework agreement maintains the 
same Rules of Origin, Fisheries, Development Co-operation clauses of the Cotonou trade regime 
during the period of the negotiation for the comprehensive EPA. 
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trade in goods to be achieved in 2033.255 The EAC EPA configuration is also 
the only African region in which all signatories have identical schedules.256 
 
The EPA promises to provide greater certainty of market access than can 
voluntary preferences. Under the GSP (for example the EBA) is subject to 
periodic review and withdrawal, creating uncertainty that deters private sector 
investment needed to diversify export production in EAC ACP countries.257 
The analysis below further discusses the potential benefits and constraints 
that are likely arise as a result of the initialed EAC EC EPA.  
 
Table 1: summary of the schedule for liberalization by EAC (source)258 
 
GOODS/PRODUCTS 
TO BE LIBERALISED 
 
EAC CET 
 
PERIOD OF 
LIBERALISATION 
 
VALUE, US $, 
LIBERALISED  
 
% OF TRADE 
LIBERALISED 
  2008-2009 
(Transition Period) 
  
Raw materials and 
Capital goods 
0 % By 2010 1,725,753,302 64% 
Intermediate 
Products 
10% 2015-2022 416,830,776 16% 
Finished Products 25% 2020-2032 65,507,218 2% 
Total trade to be 
liberalised by EAC 
  2,208,091,296 82% 
Total trade not to be 
liberalised by EAC 
  469,750,967 18% 
Total EAC Imports 
from EC 
  2,677,842,263 100% 
 
In light of the above EAC EC EPA liberalisation schedule, one can note that 
liberalization will occur in three tranches. In the first phase by 2010, the EAC 
partner states will liberalise 64% of imports from the EC. The products 
covered at this phase are already zero-rated under the EAC customs unions 
common external tariff (CET). This covers mainly industrial inputs or raw 
                                                 
255 (n 18 above) at 6. The year 2010 was chosen because of the need to allow new members of the EAC 
customs union that is Burundi and Rwanda to fully implement instruments of the customs union. 
256 (n 228 above) at 23 
257 (n 10 above) at 27  
258 (n 18 above) at 6 
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materials and capital goods (for example machinery and pharmaceuticals 
etc).259  
 
In the second phase (2015-2023) the EAC partner states will liberalise 16% of 
imports from the EC so that after so that after 15 years from January 2008, 
80% of the exports from the EC will enter the EAC market duty free. The 
products covered at this phase will include intermediate good used in the 
production process as well as goods whose availability at lower costs would 
enhance competitiveness for example spare parts, instruments for use by 
small scale enterprises, data transmission apparatus such as telephone sets 
for the telephony; videophones(excluding line telephone sets with codeless 
handsets and entry-phone systems).260 
 
Finally in 2020-2033, the EAC partner states will liberalise 2% of imports from 
the EC. These will include finished products whose availability at lower costs 
is deemed to have consumer welfare-enhancing effects or products that are 
deemed to have a potential to contribute to exploitation of the EPA. Thus after 
25 years from the date the EPA enters into force 82% of imports from the EC 
will be liberalized.261   
 
This makes the EAC EC EPA the one with the longest transition period.262 
These are all based on reductions from the EAC CET and none requires a 
country to start removing any positive tariffs until 2015. Any liberalisation 
before that date, therefore, needs to be judged as a customs union effect 
rather than an EPA effect.263  
 
It can be noted that EAC partner states will not be subjected to substantial 
revenue losses in the first phase of liberalization since the liberalized products 
                                                 
259 SEATINI ‘Implication of the EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement for Uganda’s fisheries 
sector’, (2008) SEATINI at 33 (A study commissioned by SEATINI also available at www.seatini.org) 
260 (n 259 above) at 33 
261 (n 259 above) at 33 
262 (n 228 above) at 23 
263 (n 228 above) at 23. The CET effect is defined in the case of the EAC, liberalisation commitments 
are expressed not in relation to the current applied tariff but in relation to the agreed CET of the 
customs union until 2010, any changes from the status quo needed to reach the agreed levels after 2010 
is the EPA effect).   
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are zero-rated. In the second phase though the EAC partners states will suffer 
revenue losses this will be balanced by the fact that the products will be used 
in the production processes therefore enhancing competitiveness of the local 
industries, small and medium enterprises. In the last phase the EAC partner 
states will face substantial revenue losses because of the nature of the 
liberalized goods and in addition, locally produced goods will face stiff 
competition from European goods. 
 
The EAC offer has an exclusion list of 18% of substantially all trade with EC. 
The proportion of imports (in 2004 – 2006) that are being excluded from 
liberalisation for the region as a whole is 18%, but this varies between 
countries (because they import different things) from a low for Uganda (of 
17.3) to a high for Burundi (of 23%).264 The exclusions of the EAC EPA 
include: agricultural products, wines and spirits, chemicals, plastics, wood 
based paper, textiles and clothing, footwear, glassware.265  
 
The criteria for including products on the exclusion list included contribution to 
rural development, employment, livelihood sustainability, promotion of food 
security, fostering infant industry and contribution to government revenues. 
Care was also taken to include products subsidised by the EC on the 
sensitive products list. Products which were deemed to contribute or to have a 
potential to contribute to increased production and trade competitiveness 
were excluded from the list.266 
 
Therefore, liberalising the remaining 82% is based on the CET which has 
three tariff bands, namely: 0% (raw materials, capital goods and essential 
imports such as medicines); 10% (intermediate goods); and 25% (finished 
goods). The EAC also has a sensitive list of 59 items that attract additional 
protection above the maximum tariff rate of 25% (see table).  
 
                                                 
264 (n 228 above) at 26 
265 European Centre for Development Policy Management ‘EPA negotiations: where do we stand?’ 
(2008) ECDPM at 6 http://www.ecdpm.org/epa [accessed on 9 August 2008] 
266 (n 4 above) at 3 
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There is a de facto seven year moratorium on this liberalisation (as it does not 
begin until 2015) and it occurs over 18 years. The lock-in of raw materials and 
capital goods at 0% in 2010, which represented 64% of EAC-EU trade, was 
consistent with the Ugandan national trade policy’s view of competitiveness 
enhancing measures for local enterprises.267  
 
For these categories of goods, the private sector saw ‘policy space’ as policy 
uncertainty. It was thus deemed more beneficial to leverage this category to 
get a moratorium period in line with national competitiveness strategies. A 
mechanism to assure asymmetry between LDCs and non-LDCs was built into 
the EAC’s list of sensitive products.268 
 
In my view under the first and second tranche of EAC EC EPA liberalisation, 
the goods are zero rated for example medicines and subjected to 10% CET 
(that is intermediary goods) respectively so as to encourage the long 
development and competitiveness of the local industries. However the 
concern is whether with such liberalisation and after the establishment of local 
industries within the EAC, the local industries will be position to favourably 
compete with goods from the EC in the long run. In case the local produce 
can not compete with goods from the EC, this will hinder manufacturing 
activities within the EAC consequently increasing unemployment in the region 
and economic dependence on the EC. 
 
The EC also insisted on the inclusion of a standstill clause,269  which is not 
required under WTO rules. This freezes tariffs on all trade between parties, 
regardless of whether these products are subject to liberalisation. As a result, 
even if a product is on the ‘exclusion list’ and therefore privy to liberalisation, 
the tariff cannot be raised after entry into force of the agreement.270  
 
                                                 
267 Haywood K., ‘Uganda’s EPA: getting the process right’, (2008)7(2) Trade Negotiation Insight at 7 
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 18 October 2008] 
268 (n 4 above) at 7 
269 Article 13 of the EPA provides that except for measures adopted according to Articles 19 and 21, 
the parties agree not to increase their applied customs duties in their mutual trade. 
270 Ong’wen O., ‘Understanding Kenya: post election crisis, land and the interim EPA’, (2008)7(5) 
Trade Negotiation Insight at 10 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 August 2008] 
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The removal of export taxes was another request made by the EC. Export 
taxes have been used for raising revenue in some developing countries, 
accounting for more than 20% of government income in Burundi. Yet, the EPA 
forbids the introduction of new taxes including export taxes with only limited 
carve outs.271 In agricultural value chains, the use of export taxes can prove 
particularly worthwhile in maintaining supplies to processing industries during 
times of periodic drought. Failure to ensure the flow of raw materials to 
processing industries could discourage investment and limit ‘value added’ 
processing activities.272 
 
On export taxes, the agreement preserves EAC’s right to continue to levy 
existing export-related taxes (for example on hides and skins), while allowing 
the introduction of new export-related taxes in order to foster the development 
of domestic industry (that is value addition) or for foreign exchange stability. 
(In this respect, the EAC EPA is different from other regional EPAs where the 
practise is prohibited altogether) 273 
 
3.3.2 Revenue Loss 
The EC argues that revenue losses from tariff elimination constitute ‘short-
term adjustment costs’ which would be overcome quickly through, for 
instance, re-structuring African tax systems, which have long been viewed as 
inefficient. This argument is fundamentally flawed. Admittedly, shifting taxation 
away from tariffs has proved extremely difficult for many African governments 
tariffs accounted for 31% of total tax revenue in Africa in 1975, yet by 1995 
had declined by only 4% to 27%.274  
 
While some African countries have inefficient tax systems, many have 
undergone significant restructuring since 1995, through a range of tax 
measures aimed at expanding the tax base and making them more efficient. 
                                                 
271 (n 267 above) at 10 
272 Rumpf H., ‘Accommodating regional realities and challenges for the SADC EPA 
configuration’(2008)7(3) Trade Negotiation Insight at 6 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 
August 2008] 
273 Article 15 of the EPA 
274 (n 233 above) at 20. See also Keen M., and Ligthart J.E., ‘Coordinating Tariff Reduction and 
Domestic Tax Reform’, (1999) International Monetary Fund  at 3. 
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These include for example the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT), 
taxes directed at farmers and other low-income groups, as well as local state 
or council taxes.275 
 
One of the best known types of costs that the entry into force and 
implementation of EPAs that will generate concern is the loss of customs 
revenue due to the elimination of import tariffs.276 The reduction and eventual 
elimination of tariffs collected on EC imports is indeed likely to result in 
significant losses in government revenue. The extent of the impact of tariff 
reduction on government revenue is difficult to quantify as it depends on 
several variables.277  
 
However, two of the most significant elements determining which countries 
will be most affected include the relative weight of tariffs within a country's 
fiscal revenues, that is, the more a government relies on customs revenue, 
the greater the impact is likely to be; and, the relative importance of the EC as 
a trading partner for a specific EAC ACP country. Since tariffs will be 
eliminated only on EC imports (not imports from other countries), the impact 
will be greater where the EC is a country’s main source of imports.278 
 
Hypothetical revenue loss is obtained by applying the base applied tariff 
(where known) to the value of imports in the reference year in order to 
produce the hypothetical revenue currently being collected. In other words, if 
imports are € 100 and the tariff is 15%, the hypothetical revenue is €15. This 
assumes that collection is 100% efficient and that there are no rebates, which 
is unrealistic. It also assumes that all tariffs are known, which the case is not 
always.279 
 
                                                 
275 (n 233 above) at 20 
276 Article 6 of the EPA defines a customs duty to include any duty or charge of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with the importation of goods, including any form of surtax or surcharge in connection 
with such importation. 
277 South Centre ‘EPAs and development assistance: Rebalancing rights and obligations’, (2008)12 
SC/AN/TDP/EPA/19 at 9 http://www.southcentre.org [accessed on 30 December 2008] 
278 (n 277 above) at 9 
279 (n 228 above) at 15 
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Table 2: Hypothetical revenue loss in EAC partner states (source) 280 
 
Country 
Hypothetical revenue 
($000) on all items being 
liberalised 
 
Hypothetical revenue 
($000) on 2nd tranche 
items 
 
2nd tranche share 
Burundi 4,827 4,368 91% 
Kenya 39,515 26,884 68% 
Rwanda 3,019 2,144 71% 
Tanzania 16,718 12,906 77% 
Uganda 8,746 6,721 77% 
 
In the EAC none of the countries will liberalise any positive duty tariff during 
the first tranche the table indicates the proportion of hypothetical revenue that 
will be lost by the end of the second tranche. In other words, the impact 
indicated in the table will not be felt until 2023, giving countries a relatively 
long time to adjust. But by that time all countries will have had to put in place 
alternative revenue sources since they will have lost the greater part of their 
tariffs on imports from the EC.281 
 
In the case of Rwanda it is noted that the possible tariff revenue losses would 
not be too significant given that a majority of goods from the EC market 
already enter Rwandan markets either duty-free or with relatively low tariffs. 
At the same time, some of the goods with the highest tariff revenue 
generation will be excluded from liberalisation according to the tariff 
schedule.282 
 
However, Rwanda far from diversifying its production or markets, country will 
become further entrenched in its dependence upon EC markets and 
agricultural commodities and its potential to industrialise undermined. 
Moreover, other countries in the region will also suffer as a result of increased 
EC imports of industrial goods into the region. Kenya, for example, is 
attempting to diversify and has been developing light industries producing 
                                                 
280 (n 228 above) at 23 
281 (n 228 above) at 23  
282 Sodipo B., ‘The EAC interim EPA and Rwanda’, (2008)7(2) Trade Negotiation Insight at 10 
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 August 2008] 
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small electrical equipment as well as car spare parts, but this diversification 
strategy could be hampered by the EPAs reform.283 
 
Although the liberalisation schedules are the same, their impact is determined 
by the level and distribution of imports from the EC in the recent past. 
Countries that import from the EC large quantities of items that will be 
liberalised earlier in the EPA process will face a more rapid adjustment shock 
than those that do not.284  
 
Given the prominence of the EU imports into these countries and the reliance 
of majority of African countries on tariff revenues, the tariff dismantlement will 
result in all cases in significant revenue shortfalls.285 The EPAs, if no 
appropriate measures are put in place to forestall the macroeconomic 
imbalances that are likely to result from the falling revenues, will have the 
possibility of undermining the developmental objectives of the EAC ACP 
countries. 
 
In my view the EC is the largest trading partner with EAC ACP countries in 
terms of volume of trade, the elimination of tariffs only relates to imports from 
the EC and not third countries. Therefore EAC partner states will continue to 
obtain revenue from imports originating in China, USA, Japan and several 
other countries that export to the EAC. 
 
The EC was not prepared to grant full DFQF market access to EAC partner 
states in 2008. Exports of rice will continue to attract a tariff until 1 January 
2010 at which point it will become duty free while exports of sugar will 
continue to attract a tariff until 1 October 2009. Between 2008 and 2009, EAC 
partner states will be granted a quota of 15,000 tonnes of white sugar which is 
additional to the current quotas under the sugar protocol. Products where the 
                                                 
283 Weller C., ‘The real cost and benefits of Economic Partnership Agreements’ (2007) at 3 
http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/OneStopCMS/Core/CrawlerResourceServer.aspx?resource [accessed on 31 
August 2007] 
284 (n 228 above) at 23 
285 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘The economic and welfare impacts of the EU-
Africa Economic Partnership Agreements’, (2005) Trade Negotiation Insights at 5 http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org [accessed on 18 October 2008] 
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EC has previously levied taxes on EAC imports now do not attract ant taxes 
when exported to the EC.286 
 
In conclusion, therefore, the initial impression of the EAC liberalisation 
schedule is that the approach and provisions of the EPA support EAC 
regional integration, the EPA effect will not start until 2015 and will be 
completed over 26 years from now, giving the region a good period of time 
within which to adjust, the effects of the EPA induced liberalisation on 
producers and consumers will be end loaded because the cuts will be from 
the CET, with most of the highest tariff items being reserved for the final 
tranche. However, the revenue impact will be faced in the middle of the 
implementation period and will be severe. Therefore there is a need to 
restructure and diversify the revenue sources of EAC partner states in order 
to adjust under the new reciprocal trade system.  
 
3.4 Fisheries 
There are a number of factors that compelled the EC to push for an 
agreement in the fisheries sector which has a bearing on EAC ACP countries 
as well. First, it is common knowledge that the commercial fish stocks (mainly 
the demersal species) in the EC waters have significantly declined over the 
last 25 years due to over fishing. Another factor behind the EC interest in 
fisheries negotiations is the increasing fish-supply deficit in the EC market 
(due to over-fishing and the closure of some fisheries for purposes of stock 
recovery). 287 
 
The fisheries sector is very important for the economies of EAC partner 
states, fish and fishery products have increasingly become a major source of 
foreign exchange in the region. This makes fisheries a critical part of the 
economic development prospects of the region. At the same time the sector 
                                                 
286 (n 4 above) at 2 
287 (n 259 above) at 25. It is also estimated that the annual fish production in the EC in recent years is at 
6.9 – 8 million tonnes. Over the last few years an additional 9 million tonnes of fish were needed to 
meet the demands of the fish processing industry and domestic consumer demand. Consequently, the 
EC has been compelled to import 60% of its fish requirements.  
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provides employment and food for the respective countries. The EC provides 
a lucrative market for fish from the EAC partner states.288  
 
Fish exports and fisheries products have therefore become one of the few 
areas in which EAC partner states have seen their participation in world trade 
growing. For example in 2006 the value of fish exports from Uganda to the EC 
stood at US$ 146 million. 289 In this respect, the parties will cooperate for the 
sustainable development and management of the fisheries sector while taking 
into account the economic, environmental and social impacts.  
 
All products of fish and fish products to the EC will not attract any import duty, 
whereas imports of similar products from countries having no preferential 
trade agreements with the EC would be subjected to import taxes. For 
example, live fish imported into the EC from Uganda would be rated at 0% 
while a similar product from another country not having a preferential trade 
agreement with the EC would attract an import tax of 16%. This rate rises to 
18% for fish fillets, while Uganda’s fish fillets attract a 0% duty.290  
 
In my view the status quo in the EC fisheries sector have important 
consequences for the development of the EAC partner states fisheries sector. 
In the area of resource management the EAC partner states should ensure 
sustainable exploitation of the fish resources. This will ensure food security 
within the EAC partner states and renewable commercial exploitation of the 
fisheries products.   
 
3.4.2 Policy Space 
When today’s developed countries were still developing, they had the benefit 
of virtually unlimited policy space unbound by the wide-ranging set of 
multilateral rules and obligations that currently characterize the global 
economic order. This wide open policy space allowed today’s developed 
countries to adopt trade and economic development policies that would be 
                                                 
288 (n 259 above) at 28 
289 (n 259 above) at 28 
290 (n 4 above) at 4  
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contrary to today’s prevailing trade and economic orthodoxy (such as 
disregarding intellectual property rights, discriminatory trade treatment, 
provision of subsidies to domestic industries, high tariff walls, strict rules on 
foreign investments, and so forth).291  
 
To now require developing countries to adopt harmonized rules and economic 
approaches that would limit their policy space292 would be hypocrisy applied 
on a global historical scale. This will simply lock weaker countries into existing 
unsatisfactory and unfavourable relationships that fail to address their 
developmental problems in view of the unequal economic and political power 
relations currently prevailing between the North and the South.293 
 
While it may be argued that committing to the EPAs reduces policy flexibility 
for governments, the reality is that policy making and negotiating in trade is 
often about trade-offs and compromises and the choice has to be made 
between policy flexibility and policy certainty.294 Therefore ideally, a balance 
between the need for retaining strategic flexibilities and the need for 
maintaining the inherent value of a rules-based system would be very 
beneficial to all countries.295  
 
In my view, much as the availability of policy will allow some freedom of 
choice for EAC partner states to promote policy objectives such as economic 
diversification, promotion of new industries and food security among others for 
achieving sustainable and equitable development. The EAC partner states will 
have to bear in mind that any benefits obtained out of trade negotiations they 
have to give concessions in return.   
                                                 
291 South Centre, ‘Policy space for the development of the South’, (2005)1 T.R.A.D.E Policy Brief at 3 
http://www.southcentre.org [accessed 31 August 2008]. See also Ha Joon Chang, ‘Kicking Away the 
Ladder: How the economic and intellectual histories of capitalism have been re-written to justify neo-
liberal capitalism’, (2002) 15 Post-Autistic Economics Review at 3 http://www.paecon.net/PAEtexts. 
292 Policy Space refers to the scope for domestic policies, especially in the areas for trade, investment 
and industrial development and reflects the idea that governments should have the leeway to evaluate 
the trade-off between the benefits of accepting international rules and the constraints posed by the loss 
of policy space. Policy Space therefore is essentially a fusion of three key principles in international 
law and policy. These are: the principle of the sovereign equality of states, the right to development and 
the principle of special treatment for developing countries. 
293 (n 291 above) at 3 
294 ( n 283 above) at 10 
295 (n 49 above) at 19 
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3.4.3 Rules of Origin 
 
Rules of Origin (RoO) define the economic as opposed to the geographical 
origin of products. That is, they define what an importing country considers 
the amount of value added in a good or service in a given exporting country 
sufficient for it to be counted as an export from that country.296  
 
RoO have one essential task to avoid ‘trade deflection’ by ensuring that the 
goods on which import taxes are reduced or eliminated are the ones intended 
by the lawmakers. They should prevent firms from a non preferred state 
establishing shell companies in a preference receiving state to import almost 
fully finished goods and re-export them with minimal processing solely in 
order to obtain the tax break. This task can be achieved by RoO set at a level 
normal for firms in commercial situations.297 
 
In addition, RoO can restrict the number of countries from which an exporting 
country may source its non-originating raw materials or components (if 
permitted to use these), while still having its products defined as originating.298   
 
Countries (or Customs Unions) normally have two distinct sets of RoO, one 
applied to MFN trade, and one applied to Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs). Individual preference-granting countries’ PTA RoO tend to have a 
high level of similarity across agreements. Theoretically, the reason for this is 
to prevent ‘trade (and, in some versions of the argument, investment) 
deflection.299  
 
RoO are the ‘small print’ of trade preference and regional trade agreements 
any favourable treatment that they promise applies only to goods that meet 
                                                 
296 ( n 251 above) at 39 
297 ( n 228 above) at 2 
298 ( n 251 above) at 39 
299 Trade deflection involves transhipment of a good or service via a preference-holding country in 
order for it to obtain the margin of preference available under the PTA.  
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the rules.300 Therefore in instances where raw materials are wholly obtained in 
the EAC partner states RoO would not be a major issue. However in 
instances where production requires global sourcing of inputs then RoO play 
a major role.  
 
The EPA provides that the parties shall continue negotiations in outstanding 
trade and market access issues including RoO.301 In order to prevent any 
trade disruption, the Framework Agreement maintains the same Rules of 
Origin during the period of the negotiations for the comprehensive EPA. One 
significant exception to this is in the area of Apparels and Textiles – EAC and 
EC agreed on a simplification of the rules of origin to allow EAC companies to 
source fabric from anywhere in the world and still be able to export the 
garments made into the EU free of duties or quotas.302 
 
In order to make the EC’s rules of origin more flexible and transparent, 
simplification of the system is needed. The EC has proposed replacing its 
various requirements for formulating rules of origin such as maximum foreign 
content, change of tariff classification, and technical requirements with a 
single criterion: maximum foreign content (MFC). This rule defines the degree 
of transformation required to confer origin to a product in terms of the 
maximum amount of value that can come from the use of imported parts or 
materials.303 
 
In principle, the MFC rule is more transparent and logical, even though 
applying a set level involves restrictions for certain sectors. But the heart of 
the problem lies in the official accounting requirements for recording local or 
foreign content. This, combined with full cumulation and the traceability of 
manufactured goods, can be a burden for small businesses in LDCs. Yet it 
                                                 
300 Stevens C., ‘Creating development friendly Rules of Origin in the EU’, (2006)12 Overseas 
Development Institute at 1 www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/bp_ROO_nov06_refs.pdf [10 August 
2008] 
301 Article 37 (b), Article 12 and Protocol 1 of the EPA 
302 Mutahunga E., ‘An overview of African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states – European Union 
Agreements’ (2008), A presentation delivered at a training workshop of lawyers on Regional Trade 
Agreements organised by the Uganda Law Society (unpublished) at 12 
303 Cadot O. and Melo D.J., ‘Rules of origin: The case for a single set of criteria’, (2007)6(7) Trade 
Negotiation Insights at 11 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 18 October 2008] 
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should be possible to solve this problem with suitable programmes to help 
build local capacity, possibly in cooperation with the private sector. For a 
number of reasons, including the security of importing countries, traceability is 
likely to be a growing requirement in international trade.304 
 
Introducing a variation in MFC levels according to product should be avoided 
as far as possible. Indeed, this would allow manipulation based on personal 
interests, and lead to discrimination among countries, owing to the different 
export structures in place (countries exporting goods which have restrictive 
levels should be penalised more than others, even when the same rules 
apply).305 
 
Therefore, I am of the opinion that EAC and EC should negotiate and agree 
on RoO that promote cumulation by permitting use of production inputs (and 
raw materials for that matter) from within ACP countries. In this regard value 
addition of raw materials produced in ACP countries will promoted as 
opposed to trans-shipment.  
 
3.4.5 Technical barriers to trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
standards 
 
Non-Tariff Barriers are regarded as ‘any device or practice other than a tariff 
which directly impedes the entry of imports into a country and which 
discriminates against imports, but does not apply with equal force on domestic 
production or distribution’ The term, therefore, denotes a residual category 
that is all trade obstacles which are not due to import or export duties (see 
annex I for an attempted classification)306. 
 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) are regarded by many as the 
number one non-tariff barrier (protection) in international trade today. The rise 
                                                 
304 (n 303 above) at 11 
305 (n 303 above) at 11 
306 Werth A. Bakunda G. Twineyo R.E and Owomugasho D., ‘Sectoral and analytical studies to guide 
Uganda in the EPA negotiations’ (2005) Uganda Programme for Trade Opportunities and Policy 
(services contract SX 93/06/04/01) at 52. (Like its definition, there is no universally accepted 
classification of NTBs). 
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in the prominence of SPS issues has been driven by an increasing level of 
concern regarding food safety among European and other consumers about 
the presence of chemicals and various additives in their food (exacerbated by 
the mad cow disease and avian flu among others).307 
 
At the fourth ordinary session of the African Union ministers of trade, it was 
noted that market access openings have been significantly undermined by 
health, SPS, technical and market standards maintained by the EC partners. 
It was further noted that many of the EC standards go beyond what would 
legitimately be appropriate.308 
 
Of particular relevance is the requirement that all trade between the EPA 
partners is ‘reciprocal’ and that consequently, EAC ACP countries will lose the 
ability to protect their markets through tariff levels. Unless ACP sectors are 
able to deliver a level of food safety equivalent to their EC competitors then 
they will inevitably lose market share and potentially ownership of their 
domestic markets.309 
 
The EAC EC EPA provides that parties agree to continue negotiations in the 
area of Technical barriers to trade (TBT) and SPS.310 SPS provisions of the 
CPA (Articles 47 and 48) are based in essence on the WTO SPS Agreement, 
and it also seems very likely that the SPS provisions of EAC EC EPAs will 
also be largely based on WTO SPS Agreement.311 However, the WTO SPS 
Agreement contains areas of ambiguity that allow the EC to introduce 
measures that, whilst not at variance with the wording of the Agreement, can 
have a result that may arguably be viewed as contrary to the underlying 
intention that is not to interfere unnecessarily with international trade.312 
                                                 
307 Doherty M., ‘Is SPS the silver lining?’ Economic Partnership Agreements,(2008/9)7(10) Trade 
Negotiation Insight at 6 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 30 December 2008] 
308 Paragraph 4 of the Nairobi Declaration on Economic Partnership Agreements (TI//TMIN/Decl.2(IV) 
African Union conference of ministers of trade 4th ordinary session (2006) http://www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/Conferences/Past/2006/April/TI/Nairobi%20Declaration%20on%20EPAs.pdf 
[accessed on 30 December 2008] 
309 (n 307 above) at 6 
310 Article 37 (c) of the EPA 
311 (n 251 above) at 52 
312 (n 307 above) at 6 
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According to article 5 (7) of the SPS Agreement, members may adopt 
temporary, precautionary bans to prevent the introduction of risks when 
sufficient scientific evidence is absent. The problem here does not lie with this 
provision, but rather with how to remove the provision once it is triggered. The 
SPS Agreement is silent on the steps that a member country, which has lost 
international market access because trading partners have invoked this 
provision, must take. Greater clarification is required in the SPS Agreement 
on how long is ‘temporary’ and on the quantity and type of scientific evidence 
that is deemed sufficient.313  
 
The SPS Agreement also sets a regulatory floor but not a ceiling. Members 
are committed to both the international harmonisation of SPS measures and 
the mutual recognition of measures employed by other members. With 
respect to mutual recognition, a member is committed, in principle, to granting 
equivalence to the SPS measures adopted by an exporting country if the 
exporting member objectively demonstrates to the importing member that its 
measure achieve the importing member’s appropriate level of SPS 
protection.314 
 
The problem is provided that the national treatment provision is met the SPS 
agreement is silent on limits for country regulations that are substantially 
above those of other member states. Therefore, while there is a minimum 
level of SPS measures that must be met, is there a maximum defining the 
point that importing member countries cannot legitimately expect potential 
exporting members to achieve? It is arguable that in exercising their right to 
require higher than international norms importing countries also incur an 
associated obligation to provide a higher than normal level of scientific 
evidence.315  
 
                                                 
313 (n 307 above) at 6 
314 Article 4 (1)of the  Agreement on  Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards 
315 (n 307 above) at 7 
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Three current areas of discussion concerning EC SPS measures and 
developing countries can further be identified. Firstly, the EPA negotiations 
have coincided with the adoption and the first stages of implementation of 
what is widely acknowledged to be a new EC Food (and animal feed) Safety 
regime. The central elements of this regime are six new regulations covering 
traceability, 316food and feed hygiene, special rules for food of animal origin, 
and controls for verification of compliance with food and feed law.317  
 
Secondly, the EPA negotiations also coincide with two further EC legislative 
processes that impact directly on developing country producers.318 A third 
area of concern raised in relation to EC SPS measures is the proliferation and 
widespread adoption within the EC of private standards for food production, 
which are used prescriptively to fill the gaps within the legislative 
framework.319 
 
SPS measures, covering food safety and animal and plant health standards, 
affects the EAC ACP countries’ ability to export these products to the EC, 
whose standards are significantly higher than the minimum standards set by 
the WTO. Compliance with SPS measures may cost exporters between 2-
10% of their turnover.320 The much-vaunted Kenyan cut flower export industry 
is reportedly at risk from a change in regulation regarding the use of 
                                                 
316 Traceability refers to the ability to trace, follow and identify uniquely a product unit or batch 
through all stages of production, processing and distribution. 
317 The regulations in question are EC 178/2002 (traceability), 852/2004 (food hygiene), 853/2004 
(food of animal origin), 854/2004 (controls for food of animal origin), 882/2004 (controls for 
verification of compliance with food and feed law) and 183/2005 (feed hygiene) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_031/l_03120020201en00010024.pdf [accessed on 30 December 
2008] 
318 These are the Minimum Residue Level (MRL) Harmonization Programme for pesticides and the 
Pesticide Approvals Review Programme. The former is aimed at establishing common and mandatory 
MRLs across the EU for all active ingredients introduced after 1993, while the latter is aimed at 
reviewing the registration of the 823 active ingredients approved within the EU prior to 1993. There is 
particular concern that key post harvest fungicides commonly used in developing countries will not be 
registered, and therefore that products using them will be excluded at EU borders. 
319 These standards tend to be designed by major retail chains or consortia of them for example 
proprietary standards of the UK supermarket Tesco’s ‘Nature’s Choice’ and conformity to them 
becomes a de facto entry requirement to the more remunerative parts of the EU market. 
320 (n 283 above) at 3 
 
 
 
 
 74
pesticides. Moreover, there is little predictability in these issues: EC standards 
and import rules are often changed during the course of a few months.321 
 
The EC can not be challenged on its right to protect its citizens from 
potentially harmful food. This is irrespective of whether countries that supply 
the food lack the capacity to meet the standard being established.322 Even 
with an EPA, it is likely that EAC ACP exporters will continue to face stringent 
rules-of-origin, which limit the number of exports that can receive preferential 
treatment ever increasing SPS, which make it very hard for their exporters to 
break into European markets.323 
 
In light of the above, the failure to comply with SPS has a direct impact on the 
economy for example people employed in the fish industry will lose their jobs 
due to lack of market for their products and also this will cause revenue short 
falls for the country. A number of factors have contributed to the failure to 
implement TBT and SPS measures in the EAC partner states which include 
resources constraints, lack of expertise and limited notifications being made 
and so forth. 
 
3.5 Development Co-operation 
The development component of the EPAs is  fiercely contested, while ACP 
countries would like to see a binding commitment to additional funding for the 
planned reforms, the EC would like to keep additional funding voluntary but 
make binding regulations that address ‘behind the border’ issues such as 
competition, investment and government procurement324. 
 
                                                 
321 Mold A., ‘Trade Preferences and Africa: The State of Play and the issues at Stake’, (2005)12 Africa 
Trade Policy Centre at 30 http://www.uneca.org/atpc/theme_month.asp [19 December 2008] 
322 (n 119 above) at 6 
323 Oxfam International, ‘Unequal partners: How EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements could 
harm the development prospects of many of the world’s poorest countries’ (2006) Oxfam International 
Briefing Note at 5 http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/bn0609_unequal_partners_EPAs[accessed on 8 
August 2008] 
324 Meyn, M ‘Economic Partnership Agreements: A historic step towards a partnership of equals?’, 
(2008)288 at 8 Overseas Development Institute 
http://www.fes.de/cotonou/OTHER_BACKGROUND_TRADE/ODI_EPA_PAPER_2APRIL2008.PD
F [accessed on 31 August 2008] 
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It is argued that EPAs do not offer any significant new money for infrastructure 
development nor do they compensate the tariff revenue losses and the 
additional compliance costs. On the contrary, the deals repackage existing aid 
promises and impose further costs.325 
 
Yet an example within the EAC partner states the infrastructure is in a 
dilapidated state. Most upcountry airports if not in a state of despair are 
completely dysfunctional. The road, railway and water transport are hardly 
modern which hinders the movement of goods and service delivery.  
 
Therefore at the national level, the manufacturing sector has to contend with 
constraints such as poor infrastructure, poor institutional infrastructure 
(institutions that stimulate and support industrial development), and poor 
access to credit and so on.326 This illustrates the importance the EPA should 
play as a tool of development. 
 
In my view much as EAC partner states (and ACP countries in general) are 
faced with corruption, one of the major causes of underdevelopment is the 
lack of basic infrastructure and services. Most of the infrastructure in EAC 
ACP countries is in a dilapidated state; there is no electricity in most areas, 
there few doctors and nurses in health facilities, no fertilizers or high yield 
seeds and other things that constitute the first step out of extreme poverty are 
also lacking.  
 
At the fourth ordinary session of ministers responsible for trade, of the 
member states of the African Union, held in Nairobi Kenya the ministers re-
                                                 
325 Jones E and Perez J., ‘Partnership or power play? EPAs fail the development test’, (2008)7(4) Trade 
Negotiation Insight at 3 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 August 2008]. The adequacy of 
the development cooperation provisions was and remains a highly debatable question, in particular the 
volume of the financial assistance, which was only marginally increased and remains inadequate. The 
EU, with its longstanding European Development Fund (EDF) aid programme towards the ACP region, 
could not agree to increasing funds to deal with implementation and adjustment costs. The main 
concerns under the development dimension of EPAs include securing additional funding (a separate 
EPA facility), avoidance of diverting the EDF resources away from pre-existing legitimate priorities, 
addressing the effectiveness of use of EC’s aid instruments, support to fiscal and economic 
restructuring to address the cost of adjustments.  
326 SEATINI ‘A critical analysis of the study of the impact and sustainability of Economic Partnership 
Agreement for the economy of Uganda’ SEATINI (2005) at 13   
 
 
 
 
 76
iterated that EPAs with the EC should be tools for the economic development 
of Africa. They also expressed their profound disappointment at the stance 
taken by negotiators of the EC in so far as it does not adequately address the 
development concerns that must be the basis of relations with Africa.327 
 
Article 37 (h) of the EAC EC EPA provides that the parties agree to continue 
negotiations in the area of economic and development co-operation leading to 
a comprehensive EPA text. Both parties also affirmed their recognition of EAC 
development needs and the commitment to ensure that the EPA is an 
appendage for development that will promote and consolidate regional and 
global integration. The EC also confirmed that it will contribute to the 
resources required for development under the 10th EDF Regional Indicative 
Programme, Aid for Trade and the EU budget 328 
 
In my view market entry requirements rather market access is the main 
reason why EAC partner states have not benefited from prior trade 
preferences. Market entry is hindered mainly by supply side constraints 
leading to fluctuation in production and production of poor quality products, 
infrastructure bottlenecks implying that a big percentage of agricultural 
produce can not expeditiously reach the lucrative European market and so 
forth. Therefore trade liberalisation alone will not lead to economic 
development of the EAC partner states.  
 
Therefore there is an urgent need to enhance EAC partner states production 
capacities by mainly addressing the supply side constraints faced in the 
region. I think that EAC ACP countries ought to ensure quality and 
sustainable production, and then will they be in position to benefit from the 
market access opportunities granted by the EC. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
327 (n 308 above) paragraph 2 
328 (n 18 above) at 6 
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3.6 Agriculture 
Two factors combine to make agricultural trade liberalisation a critical concern 
of African countries. Firstly, agriculture is the mainstay of many African 
economies, accounting for the bulk of national income, providing livelihoods 
for 80-90% of the population, and supplying about 20% of Africa’s 
merchandise exports. Secondly, the agricultural sector is the most distorted 
market in world trade, partly as a result of the protectionist policies of 
developed countries.329 
 
Agriculture is one of the most complex multilateral negotiating areas within the 
WTO. This complexity is due, firstly, to the specific role played by this sector, 
and, secondly, to the refusal of the richer countries to give up some of their 
policy space and reduce the distortions they have introduced in the trade  of 
agricultural products.330 
 
EC provides agricultural subsidies to the tune of between €50 billion to over 
€70 billion a year. Studies have already shown that by their sheer volume, 
these supports do distort trade. The World Bank has also noted that the 
decoupling of farm payments which is what the last Common Agricultural 
Policy reforms did is only effective if these payments are one-time buyout 
programmes to compensate farmers for the transition.331  
 
If there are no time limits, decoupled payments will have the same detrimental 
and distorting effects as other subsidy programmes. Also investment aids are 
part of the ‘Green Box’, yet they are first and foremost used to increase 
international competitiveness to unwanted and subsidized import surges, by 
forcing tariffs down or by only affording a weak safeguard, they will remain a 
major challenge for the development of African countries.332 
                                                 
329 (n 233 above) at 11. Women are the back borne of agriculture in Africa. In sub Saharan Africa, 70% 
- 80% of household food production is attributed to women and they constitute about 60% of 
agricultural labour generally. 
330 Kotcho J., and Abega M., EPAs: ‘what is at stake for agriculture and development in Central 
Africa?’, 7(2008)6 Trade Negotiation Insight at 7 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 18 
October 2008] 
331 Kwa A., ‘African countries and EPAs: Do agricultural safeguards afford adequate protection?, 
(2008)25 South Centre at 3 http://www.southcentre.org [accessed on 30 December 2008] 
332 (n 331 above) at 3 
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Dumping of cheap EU agricultural surpluses (diary products, cereals, beef 
etc) will threaten the viability of agriculture and agro-processing industries, 
particularly for small scale farming sector which does not receive state 
support. Rural economies will collapse hence increased impoverishment and 
food insecurity. Women will be mostly affected.333 
 
This is more explained by the complex EC mechanism of agricultural support 
to its farmers which will expose Tanzania and EAC agricultural markets to the 
intense competition of subsidized EC exports. Considering the limited 
resource capacity of countries in East Africa, it is unlikely that they will be able 
to balance this 'unfair' competition by providing additional support to their own 
agriculture, and this would be costly.334 
 
Trade liberalisation under EPAs would pose two main problems to African 
agriculture. Firstly, African producers would find it hard to compete with 
European products benefiting from EC subsidies and other forms of support. 
More importantly, as Africa largely remains an agrarian economy, agricultural 
trade liberalisation would affect household welfare in more ways than one.335  
 
As households are both producers and consumers, welfare gains on the 
consumption side could easily be offset by losses in production if the 
household is a net producer of non-tradables. Similarly, poor infrastructure 
might leave African countries unable to realise new market opportunities, 
even in commodities where the continent has a competitive edge. There 
would therefore be minimal gains for producers.336 
 
In my view the EAC partner states agricultural sector is not ready to compete 
with EC agricultural sector. The major obstacle faced by farmers in the EAC 
partner states are the supply side constraints, poor technological innovations 
                                                 
333 Kabwe Na Z.Z., ‘The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA): Challenges for Tanzania’, at 5 
http://www.chadema.net/makala/kabwe/zitto_4.html [accessed on 30 December 2008] 
334 (n 333 above) at 5 
335 (n 233 above) at 11 
336 (n 233 above) at 12 
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in areas such as land preparation, post harvest management and poor 
storage facilities. This has lead to a decline in agricultural production in many 
regions of the EAC partner states as compared to the highly mechanised and 
productive farms of the EC. 
 
It is argued by many that for African countries generally to benefit from the 
multilateral trading system, they should stop exporting products in their 
primary form but add value to products before exporting the products. For 
example instead exporting 1 kilogramme of coffee beans to Europe at $ 3 (US 
dollars), 1 kilogramme of instant coffee exported to Europe may 
approximately earn $ 15 (US dollars). However the EAC EC EPA does not 
address the issue of tariff escalation. 
 
Therefore it is my opinion that the reciprocal trade regime between EAC 
partner states and the EC (EPA) may cause devastating effects on agriculture 
in the EAC partner states. Further dumping of cheap subsidised agricultural 
imports from the EC will undermine agricultural efforts like the government’s 
Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture in Uganda. This may lead to increased 
food insecurity and revenue loss suffered by the EAC partner states. 
  
3.6.2 Trade Defence Instruments 
Trade defence measures provide for circumstances appropriate for either 
EAC partner states or EC to impose temporary barriers to trade, including 
tariffs. The barriers would be triggered if an increase in imports from the 
trading partner causes serious harm to certain industries or to the economy. 
However it is argued that the safeguards included in the EPAs are too weak to 
be effective, unnecessarily exposing small farmers to sudden surges of 
competition from imports. Women farmers will bear the brunt.337 
 
The practice of dumping can involve deliberately exporting a product at a 
price below the cost of production in order to destroy the industry in the 
importing country. Controversially, it can also involve exporting products 
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which have low export prices because they are exported from a country where 
the wages are extremely low or the level of working conditions is very poor.338  
 
The EPA permits the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing measures 
in accordance with the relevant WTO agreements.339 Countervailing duties 
are used to prevent unfair competition between subsidized imports and 
unsubsidized competing domestic products of the importing country. 
 
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties can be levied on exporters who 
engage in ‘unfair’ trading practices that cause material injury to domestic 
producers. These unfair trading practices can take the form of selling products 
below their ‘normal’ price or of benefiting from government-provided 
subsidies. Safeguard actions can be taken even if there is no unfair trade 
practice so long as imports have increased to an extent that serious injury has 
been suffered by domestic producers.340 
 
The EAC partner states and the EC party are permitted to invoke the WTO 
safeguard clause subject to the terms and conditions of the Article XIX of the 
GATT 1994, the Agreement on Safeguards and Article 5 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.341 Multilateral (WTO) safeguards have not been useful at all for 
most African countries, in contrast to the multilateral safeguards for the EC.  
 
African countries can in theory utilize the General Agreement on Safeguards 
of the WTO. However, doing so requires countries to provide proof of a causal 
linkage between an import surge or price decline and the injury caused to the 
local industry. Proving this causal linkage has not been easy for developing 
countries, and as such, this general safeguard agreement has been little 
used.342 
                                                 
338 ‘The EPA at a Glance: An overview of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement’, 
(2008) Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery Information Unit at 16 http://www.crnm.org 
[accessed on 8 October 2008] 
339 Article 19 of the EPA 
340 Teh R. Prusa J.T. and Budetta M., ‘Trade remedy provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’, 
(2007)03(ER50) WTO Economic Research and Statistics Division at 3 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200703_e.htm [accessed on 30 August 2008] 
341 Article 19 of the EPA 
342 (n 331 above) at 1 
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The Agreement on Agriculture, adopted during the Uruguay Round, provided 
for an automatic safeguard for agriculture. However, it was only provided to 
those countries which converted non tariff barriers to tariffs in that Round. As 
such, only 16 developed countries and 22 developing countries can avail of 
this Special Safeguard Provision (SSG). In Africa, only a small number of 
countries have access to the SSG these include; Botswana, Morocco, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tunisia.343 
 
 The EC also has access to the SSG. In fact, the SSG covers 31 percent of 
EC’s agricultural tariff lines (i.e. should prices drop or a volume surge take 
place) on the selected 31 percent of products, the EC can slap on much 
higher tariffs. Since 1995, the EC has used the SSG frequently up to 61 times 
in 1996, 60 times in 1997, and 44 times in 2001.344 
 
The EAC partner states and EC have resort to certain other safeguards not 
disciplined by the rules of the GATT for a limited period of time in the event 
that importation of goods causes or threatens to cause serious injury to 
domestic industries; sectoral disturbances that cause major social problems; 
and disturbances to agricultural markets or mechanisms that regulate those 
markets.345 
 
Article 21 of the EPA provides for Bilateral safeguards, which are more 
constraining than the SSG, further it is puzzling that the EPA bilateral 
safeguard for African countries is much more restrictive than the SSG the EC 
has thus far enjoyed through the WTO. The differences include: first the SSG 
allows for countries to invoke a safeguard if there is a volume increase, but 
also price declines. The latter is not included in the EPA bilateral safeguard. 
Yet, safeguards to counter price declines are important.346  
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Secondly the EPA bilateral safeguard is not ‘automatic’ in the way the WTO’s 
SSG has been. For the SSG, there is no requirement on the part of the EC to 
provide information about the situation that might be causing injury. Yet this is 
required under Article 21(2) of EAC EPA and they are more or less subject to 
a decision by the joint Committee or Council. Clearly, this provides EAC ACP 
countries with much less flexibility. 
 
The EC continues to heavily subsidise the agricultural sector therefore the 
playing field is not level between the EC and African countries. The subsidies 
provided by the EC to its farmers act as a form of ‘natural safeguard’. By 
providing these supports, the EC is lowering prices domestically, and this has 
the same effect as raising tariff levels.  
 
According to agricultural expert Jacques Berthelot, reducing domestic 
agricultural prices by 50 percent has the same impact as an increased duty of 
40 - 50 percent. EC agricultural supports on the whole are trade distorting, 
even if the EU is increasingly classifying them under the WTO’s Green Box.347 
 
Yet reciprocal liberalisation will force ACP companies  most of which are small 
or medium sized, lack access to advanced technologies and are unable to 
exploit large scale economies to compete with well equipped and sometimes 
subsidised EC companies. Such an increase in competition could affect 
relations between local EAC ACP producers and importers, and once again 
threaten food security.348 
 
3.7 Trade-related Issues 
The trade related issues cover trade facilitation, government procurement, 
investment, and competition policy. Under the WTO negotiations, they are 
also known as the ‘Singapore issues’ or the ‘new issues’.  
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348 Rodriguez A.L., ‘Agricultural safe guards measures in the EPAs’, (2007)6(7) Trade Negotiation 
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The ‘Singapore issues’ are now off the WTO negotiating agenda, at least for 
the duration of the Doha work programme.   With the exception of trade 
facilitation, developing countries have successfully excluded these issues 
from the remit of WTO negotiations. ACP countries have collectively stated 
that they do not want to include the ‘Singapore issues’ in the EPA negotiations 
and described their disagreement with the EC on these issues as of a 
‘fundamental nature’.349 
 
According to Joseph Stiglitz (a former chief economic adviser at the World 
Bank) the imposition of the ‘Singapore issues’ on developing countries would 
‘almost certainly impede development’.350 On the contrary, according to 
Emmanuel Mutahunga (a Senior Commercial Officer, External Trade 
Department, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry in Uganda) there is no 
evidence that any negotiation on trade-related issues would negatively affect 
Uganda’s economy. Mutahunga further states that there is evidence as to the 
importance of trade-related issues, especially regarding creating a predictable 
environment in which the private sector can operate and be more 
competitive351 
 
3.7.2 Investment 
 
Investment is the obvious example of the problematic nature of the ‘Singapore 
issues’. As Cambridge Economist Ha-Joon Chang has observed, it was 
Korea’s ability to set its own domestic policy on investment insisting on 
upstream and downstream benefits, or spill over that allowed the country to 
develop a world class economy.352 
 
Many developing countries opposed the introduction of an investment 
agreement in the WTO, as they were concerned this would prevent or reduce 
their policy space to determine their own investment policies, such as choice 
                                                 
349 (n 323 above) at 6 
350 (n 239 above) at 2 
351 Mutahunga E., ‘Negotiations of the EAC – EC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); where we 
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of and conditions for foreign investment, including entry requirements, equity 
requirements, performance requirements, regulation on funds transfer, etc. 353  
 
The African Union’s trade ministers’ conference in Cairo in June 2005 
adopted a Declaration on EPA (that they are negotiating with the EC) that the 
three ‘Singapore issues’ (investment, competition and government 
procurement) should remain outside the scope of the EPA agenda and 
negotiations.  This is despite the fact that these issues had been listed as 
agenda topics.  The reason put forward is that these issues were recently 
rejected as negotiation topics by the members of the WTO.   
 
The EC argues that by entering a binding investment agreement, EAC ACP 
countries would benefit from an influx of foreign direct investment, which 
would stimulate economic growth.354 According to Karl F. Falkenberg 
(Director, Trade Directory General, the EC), the ‘Singapore issues’ are all 
essential subjects of development so are the EPAs.355  
 
To date, this appears to be little more than conjecture. There is a large body 
of evidence which led the World Bank to conclude that countries that have 
investment agreements are no more likely to receive additional investment 
flows than countries without such a pact. Surveys suggest that the primary 
disincentives for investors in sub-Saharan Africa are concerns surrounding 
political stability, security, and unreliable electricity supply, rather than a lack 
of binding investment agreements.356 
 
At the African Union Ministerial, ministers re-iterated their earlier concerns 
raised at the WTO which led to the removal of ‘Singapore issues’ from the 
Doha Work Programme and called for these issues to stay ‘outside the ambit 
                                                 
353 Khor M., ‘ Bilateral and Regional FTA: Some critical elements and development implications’,  
(2007), UNDP Regional Trade Workshop Penang - Malaysia at 18 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/par/Bilateral.and.regional.free.trade.agreements.doc%20- [accessed on 
31 October 2008] 
354 (n 323 above) at 6 
355 Falkenberg K.F., ‘EPAs and Doha Development Agenda: Parallelism or Crossroads?’, (2004)3(4) 
Trade Negotiation Insight at 3 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 15 August 2008] 
356 (n 323 above) at 6  
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of EPAs’.357 On the other hand the EC continues to insist that there will be ‘no 
EPA without investment rules’.358 
 
At present, many developing countries would argue that giving favourable 
treatment to locals is in fact pro-competitive, in that the smaller local firms are 
given some advantages to withstand the might of foreign giants, which 
otherwise would monopolise the local market.  Providing the giant 
international firms equal rights would overwhelm the local enterprises which 
are small- and medium-sized in global terms. 
 
However, such arguments will not be accepted by the developed countries, 
which will insist that their giant firms be provided a ‘level playing field’ to 
compete ‘equally’ with the smaller local firms.  They would like their 
interpretation of ‘competition’ (which, ironically, would likely lead to foreign 
monopolisation of developing-country markets) to be enshrined in WTO law or 
in the FTAs.359    
 
In case investment is to be negotiated as part of an EPA on a ‘non 
discriminatory’ basis as currently proposed by the EC, EAC ACP countries 
would lose any similar right not only to protect their industries, but also more 
broadly to set their own industrial policy. While it is vitally important to 
encourage investment in sub-Saharan Africa, this must be done in a manner 
which allows regulation that maximises host-country benefits.360 
 
3.7.3 Government Procurement 
 
Government procurement covers all purchasing activities of government 
authorities for everything from pencils and paper clips to computer systems, 
telecommunications equipment, consulting services and so on. Typically this 
                                                 
357 (n 308 above) at paragraph 14  
358 (n 323 above) at 3 
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accounts for significant share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (10 – 15%) 
for developed countries and up to 20% in some developing countries.361 
 
As procurement is a trillion-dollar business, the developed countries are 
determined to break into this business for their companies.  They are thus 
now including a full-fledged procurement chapter (dealing with market access 
and national treatment) in their FTAs.362 
 
Government procurement has been excluded from the rules of the WTO, such 
as market access and national treatment.  There is only a plurilateral 
agreement on government procurement in the WTO, which is not compulsory 
for WTO members to join, and almost no developing country has signed up to 
it.363 
 
Government procurement and policies related to it have very important 
economic, social and even political roles. First, the level of expenditure and 
efforts to direct it to locally-produced materials is a key macroeconomic 
instrument especially during recessions to counter economic downturns.364 
Governments often change the level of expenditure as the major tool of 
fiscal policy to steer the level of demand and growth in the economy.365 
 
Secondly, there are national policies to give preference to local firms, 
suppliers and contractors in order to boost the economy and participation of 
locals in economic development. Thirdly, it allows government to identify 
certain groups or communities, especially those that are under-represented in 
economic development.366 In this way, procurement is a major policy tool for 
attaining greater balance in the participation shares among various 
communities within a nation. 
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 Finally, where foreign firms are involved in a bid, government can give 
preference to firms from particular countries (for example other developing 
countries, or particular developed countries, with which there is a special 
commercial or political relationship).367 
 
The inclusion of government procurement in an EAC EC EPA has therefore 
very serious implications. Uganda for example as a matter of policy has been 
encouraging indigenous firms and companies to bid for infrastructure projects, 
such as roads in order to develop local capacity. However, now it means 
Uganda (and the other EAC partner states) will not be able to give preference 
to local companies for the supply of goods and service or to grant any 
concessions for implementing projects.368   
 
3.7.4 Competition Policy 
 
There is no common understanding or agreement among countries on the 
meaning of the concept of competition in the context of the WTO especially in 
terms of its interaction with trade and its relationship with development. The 
whole set of issues of competition, competition law and competition policy is 
quite complex.369  
 
At first glance competition policy is taken to mean restricting the power and 
scope of activities of the large corporations, especially transnational 
companies. However, competition is usually taken to mean something 
different by trade officials of developed countries.  They have been trying to 
make use of competition policy as a concept linked to market access, in which 
foreign firms and their products and services should have the right to ‘free 
competition’ vis-à-vis local firms in markets of developing countries.  ’Free 
competition’ would, in their approach, mean that the preferences given to local 
                                                 
367 (n 10 above) at 37 
368 (n 10 above) at 38 
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firms, and any advantages or assistance they enjoy, should be curtailed or 
eliminated, so that the foreign firms can compete on a level playing field.370 
 
There is no doubt that in appropriate forms, competition law and policy can be 
beneficial to the EAC partner states in general. From the EAC’s perspective, it 
is important to curb the mega-mergers and acquisitions which would threaten 
the competitive position of local firms in the region. From the EC perspective, 
competition is about providing EU firms national treatment and a free 
competition environment in the host country. However, each country should 
have the flexibility to choose the pattern of competition and competition policy 
(law) that is suitable to their level of development and priorities.371 
 
Having an appropriate model is especially important in the context of 
globalisation and liberalisation where local firms are already facing intense 
foreign competition. Along the same lines, from a development perspective, a 
competition and development framework requires that local firms and farms 
must build up the capacity to become more and more capable of competing 
successfully, starting with the local market, and then if possible 
internationally.372    
 
At the moment in Uganda there no competition laws nor anti competition 
regulatory agency, any regulation being carried out is done in piecemeal. This 
makes it difficult to prove any anti competitive behaviour let alone taking 
action against multi national corporations exploiting consumers. In addition, 
most of EAC ACP countries have such small private sectors that the costs of 
implementing new competition laws would often not be commensurate with 
any potential benefits. 
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3.7.5 Trade Facilitation 
Trade facilitation essentially refers to simplification, harmonisation and 
automation of import and export procedures, reduced documentation, and 
increased transparency.373 The EC argues that a WTO agreement on trade 
facilitation is needed because inefficient and unnecessary procedures impede 
trade flows.  
 
Therefore the less red tape developing countries maintain, the lower the cost. 
But beyond that, if the EC and the EAC ACP countries successfully reduce 
red tape, it increases dramatically the potential of the existing infrastructure 
for international trade. If ships can be customs cleared faster in ports, it 
increases the available port capacity, for instance.374 According to article 
37(a) of the EPA, the parties agreed to continue negotiations in the area of 
customs and trade facilitation. 
 
It is clear that EC is pushing offensive interests in the EPA negotiations, 
against the explicit wishes of the EAC partner states (ACP) and with no clear 
developmental benefits. There are other areas besides the ‘Singapore issues’ 
where the EC is seeking to gain more ground at the bilateral level than has 
been achieved at the WTO. The first of these is services375.  
 
The United Kingdom has now stated that it believes that Europe should not 
pursue its short-term commercial interests at the expense of development, 
and hopefully other member states will take a similar attitude. In any case the 
EAC partner states have little capacity to analyse and negotiate on these 
issues.376 
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3.8 Services 
In the EAC partner states, the services sector has become an increasingly 
important contributor to economic growth and, specifically, to poverty 
eradication programmes through employment generation, remittances from 
abroad, and internal linkages with other sectors. In Kenya, the tourist sector 
contributes more than 64 percent of the GDP, subject to occasional 
fluctuations caused by security alerts and the recent political instability.377 
 
Services cover a wide range of economic and social activities that is 
communications (postal, courier, telecommunications and audio-visual), 
transport, finance, health, education, tourism and travel related services, 
recreation, and environmental services. These services are key drivers of 
economic growth and they influence greatly the capacity of countries to 
trade.378 
 
Trade in services was first brought into the GATT for the first time in the 
Uruguay Round although developing countries had their misgivings on this 
matter. They failed to block the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and finally agreed to a compromise that is a ‘bottom-up’ approach so 
that each member would have the right to decide which sectors if any they 
would open, the pace and  extent of the market opening and the limitations to 
liberalisations in each sector.379 
                                                 
377 (n 52 above) at 10.The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector has had considerable results. 
In Uganda for instance, according to the Uganda Communications Commission, the mobile telephone 
lines increased from 3,000 in 1996 to 5,163,414 by December 2007, fixed telephone lines rose from 
45,145 in 1996 to 165,788 by December 2007. 
378 (n 10 above) at 33. Due to higher poverty levels in rural communities, some commercial key 
services are less available; poverty eradication initiatives must squarely target these areas for example 
information and telecommunication to assist e-commerce for instance, financial services to provide 
reasonably prices and adequate credit, transportation to assist national and regional trade and 
interconnectivity, and energy to assist efficiency and modernisation, all must benefit rural areas as well. 
379 (n 10 above) at 34. The WTO has a positive list approach that is to say a country commits only what 
it puts on the schedule as against the more drastic negative list approach in which everything is 
committed to be opened unless specified in the schedule.  The positive list approach was insisted on by 
the developing countries to enable them to have more flexibility and policy space as to what and when 
to commit.  It is also less risky than the negative list approach as a country may not be aware of the full 
range of sectors, nor on what it should select to exclude. 
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Under article 37(d) of the EPA, the EAC and the EC agreed to continue 
negotiations of trade in services. In light of the discussion above, the EAC 
partner states have been subjected to enormous pressure to liberalise in 
many sectors even where they can not compete. Liberalisation of trade in 
services will involve making market access commitments and removing 
restrictions that discriminate against foreign suppliers.380 
 
On the other hand currently, there are significant barriers to entry in the EC 
services market. This is particularly true in respect of modes 3(where a 
foreign firm establishes commercial presence in the export market) and mode 
4(where the natural persons selling services move to the market). EC 
liberalisation under mode 4 has been limited in the context of the GATS and is 
biased towards skilled personnel.381 
 
Yet the main trade objective of EAC partner states has been to secure 
enhanced access to the EC market for natural persons (mode 4 in GATS), 
covering both professional and non-professional persons. In this regard, an 
appropriate relaxation of the extensive restrictions in the EC has been 
sought.382 
 
The other modes of interest for the EAC partner states include the 
establishment of commercial presence (mode 3 of the GATS) particularly in 
the tourism sub-sector for operators and agents, as well as cross border 
supply (mode 1 of the GATS) in the information and telecommunications and 
business services sub-sectors. Priority sub-sectors for exportation to the EC 
include tourism, information and telecommunications, professional services, 
construction, and health-related and social services.383 
 
In my view the EAC partner states stand to enormously benefit if trade 
barriers to the movement of natural persons were to be relaxed by the EC this 
is due to the abundance of both skilled and unskilled labour personnel. In the 
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same vain the EAC partner states should advocate for the establishment of 
predictable and substantial quotas and a special user-friendly business visa 
system in order to facilitate the ease of movement of personnel from the EAC 
partner states to EC. 
 
3.8.2 Intellectual Property Rights 
The introduction of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) as an issue with binding 
rules within a trade agreement was very controversial, and remains so, after 
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 
was incorporated within the WTO.  There is also an attempt by the developed 
countries to seek the forum of the FTA to remove or reduce the flexibilities in 
the TRIPS agreement and to establish even higher standards of IPRs in 
developing countries therefore intellectual Property is thus a major item in 
bilateral FTAs.384 
 
Since then, many economists ranging from Joseph Stiglitz to Jagdish 
Bhagwati have decried the inclusion of IPRs and TRIPS in the WTO.  There is 
also a growing realisation that high IPR standards, promoted by TRIPS to 
developing countries, are inappropriate to the development needs of 
developing countries.385  
 
The African Union trade ministers have called upon the EC not to introduce in 
the EPA negotiations any TRIPs plus proposals (which go beyond existing 
TRIPs obligations) which would compromise these flexibilities. If such 
proposals are advanced, they should be rejected.386 The TRIPS has little to 
do with trade. In fact, it stymies trade by allowing the patent holder to maintain 
their monopoly over potential competitors. It widens the divide between those 
that have the technology and those that do not.387 
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Whilst the rationale for TRIPS is that there should be a proper balance 
between the right of the investor and public interests, the 20 year patents 
stipulated by the WTO Agreement on TRIPS give all the power to the patent 
holders.388  There is now a movement by developing countries to clarify some 
aspects of TRIPS or to amend them, to reduce the more developmentally 
negative aspects.    
 
Article 37(e) (IV) of the EPA provides that the EAC and the EC will continue 
negotiations in the area IPR. Given the concerns above about the impact of 
stronger intellectual property protection on development, including access to 
knowledge, developing countries should be very cautious about entering any 
treaties that require stronger intellectual property protection and cross-
sectoral consultations and detailed cost-benefit analyses should be conducted 
before any decision is made.389  
 
In light of the above discussion and an analysis of article 37 of the EPA 
providing the ‘rendez vous clause’, it is clear that the EAC EC EPA covers a 
few topics in comparison with other EPA configurations and consequently, 
with a bulkier built-in agenda. Major issues related to customs and trade 
facilitation, TBT, SPS, ‘Singapore Issues’ and development cooperation are 
supposed to be negotiated, to reach a comprehensive EPA before July 2009. 
However, given the divergent positions and the pace of the negotiations it is 
unlikely that a comprehensive EPA will be signed within the agreed 
timeframe. 
 
3.9 The likely impact of the EAC EC EPA on development  
In Africa, 340 million people, or half the population, live on less than US $1 
per day. The mortality rate of children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1000, 
and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years. Only 58 per cent of the 
population have access to safe water. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 
is 41 per cent. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in 
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Africa, compared with 146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high-income 
countries.390  
 
For poor nations, the subject is permanently and continually development, 
and thus these nations enter the trade construct through their encounters with 
the development paradigm. These states are members of the WTO because 
they have been convinced, or forced to believe, that trade will be the answer 
to their development constraints and that being outside of this regime will be 
economically fatal. Hence, for the poorest nations, the issue is how trade 
policy will assist in the modernization quest.391 
 
By definition, development supposes some deficiency that must be corrected, 
and presumes inferiority and being substandard to the other that is developed. 
It also assumes that a particular kind of modernization is the inevitable course 
that all nations and peoples must pursue, for there is no question that it is 
preferable, superior and indeed the only path; no other way of life or being is 
even worthy of discussion.392 
 
 All those who cannot reach given development benchmarks, must somehow 
be inept, undeveloped, inadequate, and in need of betterment by the West, 
now termed the international community which comes in the guise of 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and now the WTO.393 
 
The WTO is now an integral part of this project. Indeed, the preamble to the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO recognizes the need for: 
 
                                                 
390 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001) Abuja http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/ 
[accessed on 8 March 2009] 
391 Gordon R., ‘Contemplating the WTO from the margins’, (2006)17, Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 
95-117 at 99 
392 (n 391 above) at 107 
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development. This right refers not only to economic development but also to human welfare, including 
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‘…positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their 
economic development’.394  
 
The WTO and global trade have become integral components of the 
development paradigm and it is development theory that rules the collective 
existence of poor Southern tier nations.395 WTO agreements also include 
special provisions for Developing and Least Developed Nations, and the WTO 
has entered into agreements with the World Bank and the IMF.396  
 
It is not surprising that a correlation between trade and development also 
happens to be the paradigm emanating from the development community, for 
it is the developers that decide the current development thesis, not the 
countries that are its objects. With the Washington Consensus, development 
has now been explicitly and firmly linked to trade, and to becoming part of the 
global economy.397  
 
Poor countries are to liberalize their economies by making tariff concessions 
that open their markets to imported goods, and to undertake measures that 
will make their economies friendly to international capital. Foreign entities will 
then be more inclined to invest in their economies and help them build and 
                                                 
394 Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO  in the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M 1125, 1145 
395 (n 391 above) at 99 
396 Article III (5) of Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO  in the Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1125, 1145 
(See Also: Agreement between the WTO, IMF and the WB of 18 November 1996, WT/L/194, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wtl194.doc [accessed on 30 December 2008] 
397 (n 391 above) at 99. Also according to the WTO Secretariat globalization has increased the need for 
closer cooperation between the multilateral institutions with key roles in the formulation and 
implementation of different elements of the framework for global economic policy, in particular the 
IMF, the WB and the WTO. Each of these organizations has a mandate for such cooperation in the 
agreements under which they have been established. They also have signed agreements among 
themselves, for mutual cooperation and regular consultation, which identify mechanisms designed to 
foster greater coherence in global economic policy-
making.http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/coher_e.htm.) 
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expand upon their comparative advantage, which is currently agricultural 
products, exhaustible natural resources and pools of very cheap labour.398 
 
African nations have become part of the international trade regime because 
they believe, or have been forced to believe, that it will assist in achieving 
their perpetual objective of development. The more explicit aspiration is the 
eradication of poverty, certainly, a worthy goal that is now to be achieved by 
becoming part of the global economy and being fully engaged in the 
international trade regime that the WTO personifies.399 
 
Therefore, economic development is the primary conduit through which sub 
Saharan Africa (SSA) intersects with the international economy and trade 
ideology, and these nations now consider trade to be a central consideration 
in their economic development.400 
 
Africa is endowed with plenty of natural resources, a pleasant climate, cultural 
diversity, and a rich historical past, yet it remains marginalized in the 
economic development process and global political scene. Although Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) to developing countries has been increasing in the 
last decade, Africa accounted for only about one percent of that investment in 
1998.401 
 
Trade within the sub-Saharan region of Africa is meagre, unable to develop, 
and hampered by foreign market obstacles, thereby causing substantial 
stagnation and eventual decline. Currently, Africa predominately trades 
primary products, has economies burdened by exchange rate fluctuations that 
have profound effects on the developing countries' trade flows, and continues 
to experience difficulties in foreign competitive markets because of 
industrialized countries' influential trade policies.402 
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A true partnership in trade could radically transform the lives of one-third of all 
people living in poverty. But, far from restructuring economic relationships to 
stimulate development, the current trade deals kick away the development 
ladder that countries around the globe have used to build their own 
economies. They risk locking EAC ACP countries into current patterns of 
inequality and marginalisation and away from the increasing opportunities 
global trade is already offering.403 
 
One of the key challenges for Uganda (and the EAC partner states in general) 
relates to how to finance the adjustment costs and accompanying reforms to 
implement the EPA. The main funding options available are; EDF financing, 
other parallel or complementary sources from the EC funding, EU member 
states and other donors.404 The adjustment costs and trade related reforms 
are required to address terms of market opening, erosion of preferences, tariff 
revenue losses, supply side constraints and so forth.   
 
3.9.2 Positive Developments 
The EPA is likely to have a positive impact on the development of the region, 
initially it will lead to a closer economic integration between EAC partners 
states, and the EC and thereby further enlarge the market of these countries. 
This enlarged market, governed by a stable, transparent and predictable 
framework for trade, will allow for economies of scale, will improve the level of 
specialisation, will reduce production and transaction costs and will, 
altogether, help to increase competitiveness. This, in turn, will lead to an 
increase in trade flows, technology and investment in the countries and hence 
promote sustainable development and contribute to poverty reduction.405  
 
The loss of government revenue is taken as a short term and static 
consequences of EPA since long term more dynamic consequences are more 
important. These long term dynamic effects are improvement in the 
economies of scale, increased efficiency and productivity changes as a result 
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of greater competition, enhanced possibilities of absorbing technologies from 
the EC, and increases in domestic and foreign investments. 
 
Trade creation is envisaged to generate associated benefits of lower prices of 
products for consumers and intermediate goods for producers in East African 
countries. This fall in prices is a result of more competition whereby high cost 
produced goods and services will be replaced by efficiently produced goods 
and services. This could result in the welfare gains as a result of an increase 
in consumer's surplus to the extent that the domestic price paid by consumers 
in the country falls commensurate to the fall in the import prices.406 
 
Despite the expectation on both the EU and ACP sides that in some sectors 
liberalisation will have dramatic consequences, impact assessments to date 
have been superficial and of variable quality, failing to quantify the effects on 
levels of production, employment, or the future competitiveness of productive 
sectors in ACP countries.407 Increase in competition among domestic 
producers and other suppliers on the domestic ACP markets, is likely to 
trigger lower prices due to either trade creation or trade diversion.408  
 
3.9.3 Negative Developments  
It is argued that the EPA might have sounded good in theory reforming EAC 
ACP economies to create the right conditions for development, with 
appropriate aid from the EC.409 However in a study by Oxfam analysed from a 
development perspective the goods, services, investment, and intellectual 
property chapters of the ‘initialled’ EPA deals concluded at the end of 2007.410  
 
                                                 
406 (n 333 above) at 3 
407 (n 325 above) at 5 
408 (n 333 above) at 2. Trade creation refers to the extra trade generated by the reduction or complete 
removal of the tariffs on goods imported. This means once tariffs are reduced or removed, traders will 
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suppliers from the rest of the world to those from the EU. These suppliers from the rest of the world 
could have been more efficient but blocked by the existence of tariffs against their products) see rules 
of origin footnote 
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The assessment is clear these initialled deals fail any objective test of 
development. It seems that, for its trade deals with the EAC ACP countries, 
Europe has chosen power politics over partnership. EC aims are closer to the 
‘global Europe’ strategy than to the ‘Cotonou spirit’.411 
 
The most obvious cost is the unfavourable shifts in revenue structures, 
heralded by losses in government revenues due to foregone customs 
revenues and the economic restructuring. Therefore there are costs such as 
fiscal costs, adjustment costs, and losses due to negative dynamic effects (of 
shifts) in the domestic production and investment base.412 Significant decline 
in government revenues will result in less budget funding for social and 
human development and would result into higher tax burden for citizens (as a 
way of adjustment). 
 
Research conducted in Kenya by Action Aid suggests that reciprocity 
represents a major threat to development and poverty reduction in Africa 
because EPAs are propelled mainly by EC market access interests. Much of 
the threat will come from processed imported products from the EC because 
agriculture, industrial and service sectors in African economies are so inter-
twined and inter-dependant that the 10% ‘protective window’ proposed under 
EPAs is highly unlikely to protect these countries’ long-term development 
needs.413 
 
While consumers in ACP countries may benefit from a wider variety of 
cheaper goods and services entering ACP markets under import liberalisation, 
an EPA would threaten livelihoods in key agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors. The removal of tariffs on EC imports will put products (often highly 
subsidised) from one of the world’s most economically advanced regions in 
direct competition with producers in some of the world’s poorest countries.414  
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The EPA also fails to help tackle food insecurity though EAC ACP products 
are offered lower tariffs into the EU market, but fail to provide significant 
services opening. However, tariff gains are undermined by restrictive rules of 
origin, and they are also temporary, as Europe is set to open up to the ACP’s 
competitors.415 
 
The EPA fails to support economic diversification away from low value 
agricultural production by restricting the choices of EAC ACP governments to 
support the development of new industries, through the inclusion of ambitious 
tariff liberalisation schedules, and of a standstill clause that prohibits the ACP 
countries to ever raise tariffs. (While the texts include ‘infant industry’ 
safeguards, these may be difficult to trigger and are ill-suited to supporting the 
development of new industries.) 
 
The EPA is unlikely to attract quality new investment but it will tie ACP 
governments’ hands investors interests are placed above those of the 
public.416  
 
Investment measures that prohibit restrictions on repatriation of profits will 
result in continued capital flight from Tanzania. Due to WTO rules for which as 
a rule EPA must be compatible, would block the governments to give special 
treatments to local entrepreneurs as a means of supporting them to survive 
competition. European companies will definitely dominate the economy and 
hence conflicts could results.417 
 
EAC ACP countries face a major problem of capacity not only to supply 
services domestically and for export, but also to effectively regulate the 
operation of liberalised sectors.418 
 
While the texts include ‘infant industry’ safeguards, these may be difficult to 
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trigger and are ill-suited to supporting the development of new industries. The 
closing of local manufacturing ventures, especially SMEs as a result of 
competition from cheap products from EC. This will result into job losses, 
unemployment poverty and hence loss of livelihoods. 
 
Local retail sector will collapse due to establishments of supermarkets from 
Europe. The small and medium sized business, where the majority of formal 
sector workers are employed, will be the most vulnerable because it is easy to 
undercut them. Local economic actors, particularly SMEs and women will be 
put to the margins as informal sector operators. 
 
Opening up to European competition for all Government tenders is another 
worrying consequence of the EPA in Tanzania (and the EAC partner states in 
general). Local companies who derive their income from government 
contracts (supplies, services etc) will have to compete with EU companies in 
bids and profits from these transactions will be repatriated as a result of 
investment protection deals. 
 
The effect of trade liberalisation on poverty reduction depends on: how much 
poor people produce exported goods and consume imports, the degree of 
labour mobility, the state of domestic industries and the state of income 
distribution. Depending on these factors, trade liberalisation can create 
winners and losers, aggravating or reducing gender, income or regional 
disparities.419  
 
A successful or pro-poor trade liberalisation strategy is one that ensures that 
the winners’ gains outweigh the losers’ losses (i.e. the winners can 
compensate the losers). The experience of the East Asian ‘tigers’ 
demonstrates that successful trade policies must be aligned with, rather than 
pursued in isolation from, development strategies.420 
                                                 
419 (n 233 above) at 9. Also see UNECA, ‘Africa economic report’, (2004) New York and Winters A., 
‘Trade policies of poverty alleviation’, (2002), in Hoekman B. and Matoo A., ‘Trade, Development and 
the WTO’, (2002) World Bank Washington D.C http://www.worldbank.org  
420 (n 233 above) at 9. Also see Amsden A., ‘Asia’s next giant OUP’, (1989) Oxford; Chang H.J., ‘The 
political economy of industrial policy in Korea’, (1993)16(2) Cambridge Journal of Economics. 
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Despite of the several concessions made by the EC to EAC partner states 
within the EPA for example asymmetrical liberalisation, DFQF access to the 
European market, excluding 18% of sensitive products, the EC has made 
reciprocity its most prominent ultimate goal. 
 
Lastly, while it is logical to argue that the principle of reciprocity is acceptable 
indeed encouraged in an economic relationship between parties of equal 
strengths and means, it is an aberration in a partnership among unequal 
parties. However this may be a blessing in disguise for EAC ACP countries to 
improve their competitiveness. This is on the premise that the non reciprocal 
trade arrangements between EAC ACP countries and the EC failed to yield 
the much desired development in the latter. 
 
The conclusion of FTAs between EC and groups of ACP member countries 
will bring a dramatic change in the trade relationship between north and 
south. This is due to the fact that the relationship will now be reciprocal. 
These regionalised FTAs will act as a stepping stone towards the integration 
of the economies of the ACP into the world economy. Proponents of this 
scheme argue on the conventional gains of market integration, where 
liberalization brings gains of static welfare nature and dynamic nature. Static 
welfare gains are due to the price advantages. That means the consumers will 
benefit from the reduction of the prices of goods and services following the 
opening of markets and due competition among firms.  
 
In conclusion the EAC EC EPA presents EAC partner states with immense 
trade opportunities with the EC (the biggest trading bloc in the world), and to 
consolidate the EAC integration into the world economy. However, deliberate 
efforts must be expended in order to exploit and benefit from these 
opportunities. The efforts should be directed at increasing production and 
trade capacity to address supply side constraints, compliance with and 
enforcement standards, energy (efficiency and reliability), Infrastructure 
improvement and development (road, rail, air, telecommunication and cold 
storage facilities among others).  
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Annex I illustrating major categories of NTBs  
 Category of NTB Non-tariff measure 
1 Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
Health and sanitary regulations, quality 
standards, safety, industrial standards 
and regulations 
2 Technical barriers to trade Packaging and labelling, including 
trademarks, advertising and media 
regulation 
3 Government participation in 
trade, restrictive practises and 
more general policies 
Subsidies and other aids, government 
procurement policies, state trading, 
government monopolies and exclusive 
franchises, government industrial policy 
and regional development measure, 
government financed research, 
development and other technological 
policies, national systems of taxation and 
insurance, macroeconomic policies, 
competition policies, foreign corruption 
policies, immigration policies, rules of 
origin and domestic content requirement 
4 Customs procedures and 
administrative practises 
Customs valuation procedures, customs 
classification procedures, customs 
clearance procedures, consular 
formalities and sample requirement 
5 Quantitative restrictions and 
similar specific limitations 
Import quotas, export limitations, 
licensing (import and exports), voluntary 
export restrains, prohibitions (import and 
export), exchange and other financial 
controls, domestic content and mixing 
requirement 
6 Non-tariff charges and related 
policies affecting imports 
Variable levies, advance deposit 
requirements, anti-dumping levies, 
countervailing duties and border tax 
adjustment.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Most Favoured Nation principle in the EAC EC Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
 
4.1 Introduction and Background to the MFN principle 
 
The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle has been a central pillar of trade 
policy for centuries.421 At first, MFN provisions were used in commercial 
treaties on a limited basis as a link between specialised groups of states. After 
the demise of mercantilism, MFN provisions were broadly applied to 
concessions granted to all countries.422 The MFN principle is also often 
referred to as the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system (the MFN 
status is sometimes referred to as non discrimination).423  
 
The MFN obligation calls for a country to grant to every other country with 
which it has signed an MFN treaty the most favourable treatment that it grants 
to any other country with respect to imports, exports and related 
regulations.424 The MFN treatment means essentially an obligation to treat 
activities of a particular foreign country or its citizens at least as favourably as 
it treats the activities of any other country.425 It is a legal obligation to accord 
equal treatment to all nations accorded the benefit.426  
 
For example, if country X has granted MFN treatment to country Y, and then it 
grants a low tariff to country Z on imports from Z to X, country X is obliged to 
accord the same low-tariff treatment also to country Y and its citizens.  
 
                                                 
421 Jackson H.J., The World Trading System, Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd 
edition, (1997) at 157. In this chapter the wording MFN principle and MFN clause are used 
interchangeably to illustrate the application of the MFN principle. 
422 Matsushita M, Schoenbaum J.T, and Mavroidis C.P., The World Trade Organisation: Law, Practise 
and Policy, 1st edition (2003) at 144 
423 Trebilcock J.M, Regulation of International Trade, 3rd edition, (2005) at 49 
424 (n 245 above) at 49 
425 (n 421 above) at 157 
426 (n 422 above) at 143 
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MFN clauses can be conditional or unconditional, under conditional MFN, 
when a country A grants a privilege to country C while owing MFN to country 
B, then country A must grant the equivalent privilege to B but only after B has 
given A some reciprocal privilege to ‘pay for it’.427 Under unconditional MFN, 
in the case above, A must grant the equivalent privilege to country B without 
receiving anything in return from B.428 
 
The phrase MFN appeared for the first time in the eighteenth century, and the 
clause begun to develop into its modern form during this period. At this stage, 
the MFN clause was unconditional, which meant that the generalisation of 
concessions was not contingent upon the receipt of concessions equal to 
those exchanged by the original parties to a commercial treaty.429   
 
In the 1800s and 1900s, the MFN clause, either conditional or unconditional, 
was included frequently in a variety of treaties, particularly in the friendship, 
commerce, and navigation treaties.430 The conditional MFN policy was 
virtually abandoned as the wave of liberal economic sentiment carried the 
unconditional MFN clause to the height of effectiveness.431 
 
After the Second World War, the MFN clause resumed its importance and 
contributed to the beginning of a new era of trade liberalisation. It was widely 
agreed that the pre-war economic nationalism and protectionist policies which 
led to uneconomic diversions of world trade had strongly contributed to the 
outbreak of the war. The Allied Nations sought to establish institutions that 
would liberalise trade and limit restrictive practises.432 
 
The GATT secretariat was established in order to proscribe the discriminatory 
trade treatment which had caused international trade to develop into 
economic blocs. The GATT secretariat, therefore, emphasized the principle of 
                                                 
427 (n 421 above) at 161 
428 (n 421 above) at 161 
429 (n 245 above) at 50. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, MFN provisions were in general 
use among European and American trading nations. 
430 (n 421 above) at 158 
431 (n 245 above) at 50 
432 (n 245 above) at 51 
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non-discrimination in trade.433 The MFN principle went through several stages 
of development until its introduction in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1947.434 This principle was further divided into two parts that is external 
non-discrimination prescribed in Article I and internal non-discrimination 
prescribed in Article III of the GATT.435 
 
On the other hand, as the GATT superseded a series of reciprocal bilateral 
trade agreements, it was inevitably based on the principle of reciprocity. Even 
though most such trade agreements, especially those concluded between 
European states, contained a conditional MFN clause, these clauses were not 
incorporated into the GATT agreement.436 
 
The MFN principle, in its current usage (Article 1 of the GATT),437 is 
unchanged from its articulation in the GATT 1947 and states that: 
 
‘…any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties’. 
 
The MFN obligation under the GATT is unconditional and quite broad. It 
includes not only tariffs and associated customs measures, but also, through 
the incorporation of Article III:2 and Article III:4 of the GATT, internal taxes, 
                                                 
433 Yanai A., ‘The function of the MFN clause in the Global Trading System’, (2002)01/02(3) APEC 
Study Centre Economics Cooperation Studies Department Institute of Developing Economies JETRO at 
14 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Apec/1863ra0000006alg-att.pdf [accessed on 11 
March 2009] 
434 (n 245 above) at 49 
435 Article III of the GATT deals with the regulation of foreign products, indicating that, once they are 
imported and tariffs are paid, they should be treated on equal terms with domestic products in respect 
to taxes and other requirements. In other words, Article III enforces the National Treatment rule. 
436 (n 433 above) at 15 
437 Article1:1 of the GATT covers duties and charges levied on goods or on international transfer of 
payments related to those goods; the methods of levying such duties and charges; all rules and 
formalities related to importation and exportation; internal taxation; and internal regulations of the type 
covered by Article 
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charges and regulations affecting the sale, distribution, and use of 
products.438  
 
In conclusion a historical examination of MFN clauses suggests that their birth 
was the product of necessity – the need to avoid troublesome and repetitive 
procedures by applying the same conditions to all trade partners. Early MFN 
clauses functioned as instruments to generalize concessions, while present-
day clauses work as means to actualize non-discrimination.439 
 
4.2. Interpretation and Application of the MFN Principle 
Davey and Pauwelyn also identify several interpretive issues with respect to 
Article 1 of the GATT. These include: the scope of coverage of Article 1:1, the 
meaning of ‘any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity’, the meaning of 
‘accorded…unconditionally’ and the interpretation of like products.440 
 
4.2.2 Like Products 
It is not always easy to determine the way the MFN obligation applies. First, in 
the GATT and many other agreements, the language of the obligation speaks 
of MFN treatment for ‘like products’. Therefore the question often arises as to 
what ‘like products’ are.441  
 
The issue of ‘like products’ relates frequently to classification of goods for tariff 
purposes. One of the main problems with the concept of ‘like product’ is to 
establish rules on the basis of which products may be differentiated. When 
determining whether products are like, WTO dispute settlement panels have 
taken into account factors such as tariff classification, physical characteristics, 
end-uses, consumers’ tastes and habits.442  
 
                                                 
438 (n 422 above) at 147 
439 (n 433 above) at 20      
440 Davey J.W and Pauwelyn J.,‘MFN unconditionality: A legal analysis of the concept in view of its 
Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with particular reference to the issue of ‘Like Product’, in 
Cottier T. and Mavroidis C.P., (eds) Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-discrimination in 
World Trade Law(2000) Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press at 17    
441 (n 421 above) at 162 
442 (n 245 above) at 65 
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For example if country A, wishes to differentiate its treatment of countries B 
and C, regarding tariffs on radios, one way to do this is to analyse the imports 
from country B and C so as to discern any distinguishing characteristics. If its 
discovered that B ships FM radios while C ships AM radios, then A will be 
tempted to charge a higher tariff on FM radios, if it intends to favour C or 
disfavour B.443  
 
In EC – Bananas, the Appellate Body stated that ‘the essence of the non-
discrimination obligations is that like products should be treated equally, 
irrespective of their origin. As no participant disputes that all bananas are like 
products, the non-discrimination provisions apply to all imports of bananas 
irrespective of whether and how a member categorizes or subdivides these 
imports for administrative or other reasons’.444 
 
In Canada – Autos the Appellate Body (AB) asserted that the object and 
purpose of Article 1 of the GATT is to prohibit discrimination among ‘like 
products’ originating in or destined for different countries. According to the AB, 
the prohibition of discrimination in Article 1 also serves as an incentive for 
concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended to all other members on 
an MFN basis.445  
 
In conclusion the MFN principle bans discrimination between countries in 
respect to ‘like products’. Therefore ‘unlike’ products may be treated 
differently by countries. 
 
4.2.3 Advantage, Favour, Privilege or Immunity 
Article 1:1 of the GATT covers any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted to both members and non-members of the WTO. The interpretation of 
‘advantage’ has been briefly discussed in several cases.446 A key application 
                                                 
443 (n 421 above) at 162 
444 Paragraph 191 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the importation, sale 
and distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas), WT/DS 27/AB/R/ DSR 1997: II; 589 adopted on 25 
September 1997  
445 Paragraph 84 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry (Canada – Autos), WT/DS 139/AB/R, WT/DS 142/R, adopted 19 June 2000: VI, 2995. 
446 (n 245 above) at 56 
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of the MFN rule is the interpretation given to the term ‘advantage’ in GATT 
Article I:I. First, the term ‘advantage’ applies to cases of explicit discrimination 
between products on the basis of their country of origin. Thus, different tariff 
rates, quotas, and taxation rates for ‘like products’ from different countries 
would be prohibited because the difference would afford some an 
‘advantage’.447  
 
Second, an ‘advantage’ can also take the form of a procedural requirement or 
practise. For example, in United States – Denial of Most Favoured Nation 
Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, the GATT panel held that 
countervailing duty order was accorded by the United States to certain 
countries, while other countries were required to request an injury review for 
such back-dating.448 It made no difference whether the products covered by 
the (antidumping or) countervailing duty were ‘like’. 
 
Third, the term ‘advantage’ also covers indirect discrimination where the 
distinction is not expressly on the basis of countries but is drawn on the basis 
of conditions that obtain within countries. The leading case is the Belgian 
Family Allowances case;449 In this case different levies were made with 
respect to products purchased by public bodies, based upon whether the 
products originated in countries with family allowance taxation systems similar 
to Belgium’s. The panel held this to be a violation of Article I:I 450. 
 
4.2.4 Unconditionally  
Article I:I  of the GATT also provides for an unconditional MFN obligation, that 
is any concession accorded to one country must be unconditionally and 
                                                 
447 (n 422 above) at 149 
448 Paragraph 3 Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales), 7 November 1952, GATT 
B.IS.D. (1st supp.) 1953 at 59. Denmark and Norway submitted a complaint regarding the application 
of a Belgian law imposing a charge on foreign goods purchased by public bodies when those goods 
originated in a country whose system of family allowances did not meet specific requirements. 
449 (n 448 above) at 59 
450 (n 422 above) at 149. The panel held that ‘the Belgian legislation would have to be amended insofar 
as it introduced a discrimination between countries having a given system of family allowances and 
those which had a different system or no system at all, and made the granting of the exemption 
dependant on certain conditions 
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without payment be extended to all WTO members.451 ‘Unconditionality’ was 
one of the main issues in Belgium – Family Allowances, the panel ruled that 
Article I:I of the GATT prohibits the imposition of discriminatory internal taxes. 
This ruling could be interpreted to mean that that pursuant to Article I, 
members can not impose a condition on the granting of an advantage that 
results in discrimination between countries.452   
 
4.3 Exceptions to the MFN principle 
Despite the policies and legal obligations that support MFN, it is widely 
recognised that substantial departures from MFN in international trade 
practise are evident. Indeed, it has been estimated that 25 percent of all world 
trade moves under some form of discriminatory regime that is a departure 
from MFN principles.453 
 
Some of these departures were anticipated by the original drafters of the MFN 
clauses, such as in GATT.454 For example, it has been recognised for 
centuries that although a tariff may be established on an MFN basis, 
classifications of tariff items can to some extent operate effectively to 
discriminate among goods of various countries.455 
 
As an illustration within the EAC customs union there are at least three levels 
of tariffs that may apply to goods imported into any one of the partner states, 
the GATT bound-tariff level for GATT parties that are not in the customs 
union; tariff-free treatment for customs union goods, and tariffs on goods from 
other countries that are not GATT parties. 
 
Further, at the time of coming into effect of the GATT historical preferences in 
force at the time were ‘grandfathered’ under paragraph 2 and 4 of Article 1 of 
the GATT. This was subject to the requirement that the margin of preference 
can not be subsequently be altered in such a way as to exceed the difference 
                                                 
451 (n 245 above) at 59 
452 (n 245 above ) at 60 
453 (n 421 above) at 163 
454 (n 421 above) at 163 
455 (n 421 above) at 163 
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between the MFN rate and preferential rates existing as of 10 April 1947. 
These provisions complete that the absolute, not proportional, difference 
between MFN and preferential rates must be maintained when MFN rates are 
reduced or raised.456 
 
For example, if the MFN rate is 20% and the preferential rate 10% on 
imported widgets, and the MFN rate is subsequently reduced to 15% (a 25% 
reduction), the preferential rate can be reduced to 5% and not 7.5% (which 
would be a 25% reduction). This exception has become less important over 
time as MFN rates have been negotiated down and differences between the 
preferential rates and MFN rates progressively reduced. In addition, many of 
the preferences referred to in paragraph 2 have been subsequently changed 
or terminated.457  
 
One of the most prominent  and difficult problems engendering exceptions to 
MFN and GATT is found in GATT Article XXIV, which provides exceptions for 
customs unions, FTAs and interim agreements leading to either. Article XXIV 
of the GATT has furnished an extremely large loophole for a wide variety of 
preferential agreements.458  
 
Provided that two basic conditions are met, that is trade restrictions are 
eliminated with respect to ‘substantially all trade’ between the constituent 
territories, and customs duties shall not be higher thereafter than the duties 
prevailing on average throughout the constituent territories prior to the 
formation of a customs union or FTA.459    Subject to these two conditions, 
constituent territories are permitted to establish more favourable duty and 
                                                 
456 (n 245 above) at 54 
457 (n 245 above) at 54. GATT Article XXIV is based partly on the historical precedent of special 
regimes of frontier traffic between adjacent countries, and partly on the policy that total world welfare 
can be enhanced by regimes of trade that totally eliminate restrictions to trade among several countries. 
458 (n 421 above ) at 165. In a customs union, customs duties between the parties are eliminated and a 
common tariff with regard to third countries is adopted by all parties to the union. In a FTA, the parties 
eliminate tariffs as between themselves but do not adopt a Common External Tariff. FTAs are therefore 
prone to a type of trade diversion where goods from third countries enter the FTA at the point of the 
lowest tariff and then move to their ultimate destination within the FTA duty free. This is dealt with by 
differential and stricter RoO. 
459 (n 245 above) at 55 
 
 
 
 
 112
other arrangements among themselves than pertain to trade with non-
member countries.460 
 
The customs laws of many nations require identification of the country of 
origin for imported goods. If true MFN were followed for all goods and all 
origins, then presumably no need would exist for such rules. In fact, however, 
there is considerable differentiation of treatment of imports, depending on 
there origin.461  
 
Furthermore, waivers can sometimes authorise departures from MFN. The 
Generalised System of Preference program to favour trade of LDCs operated 
under the benefit of a waiver from GATT MFN from 1971 to 1981.462 Later it 
was presumed to be authorised by the Tokyo Round Understanding, called 
the enabling clause, but officially entitled the understanding on Differential and 
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries.463 
 
In my view the foundation of the multilateral trading system is built on the 
MFN principle that has evolved overtime however the exceptions discussed 
above highlight some of the challenges faced in the enforcement of the 
principle. However depending on how the parties to an agreement draft the 
MFN clause it has numerous implications. In case of the EAC EC EPA, the 
implications are discussed in detail below.  
 
4.4 The Economic Implications of the MFN principle  
The success of the MFN principle and its continued application are due to the 
perceived economic and political benefits of its use.464 
 
Arguably, one of the main virtues of the MFN clause is its multiplier effect that 
is MFN treatment causes generalisation of liberalising trade policies, so that 
                                                 
460 (n 245 above) at 55 
461 (n 421 above) at  167 
462 (n 421 above) at 164 
463 (n 421 above) at 164 
464 (n 422 above) at 144 
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overall more trade liberalisation occurs. However, if, on one hand, the 
automatic extension of concessions caused by the MFN clause contributes to 
the generalisation of liberalising trade policies, on the other hand the 
opportunities for free-riding generated by the clause may result in less trade 
liberalisation.465 
 
The disadvantage of MFN treatment is that ‘free riders’ may be encouraged to 
take advantage of the system by claiming the benefits of liberalisation forged 
by states while keeping their own markets closed.466 In the past, the possibility 
of ‘free riding’ has led some states to make MFN treatment conditional on 
other states granting concessions in return.467 
 
Unconditional MFN treatment is especially useful in a multilateral system. This 
is because concessions which one country makes to another becomes 
generalised in favour of all countries to which the countries to which the 
country making the concession was obligated by treaty to extend MFN 
treatment.468 
 
Unconditional MFN treatment reduces the transaction costs of entering and 
maintaining the multilateral trading system. It avoids the enormous difficulty 
involved in negotiating a multitude of interlocking bilateral agreements.469  
Unconditional MFN treatment has been found to be the simplest system to 
administer and the most effective way of extending trade. Therefore, while 
details of the multilateral trading system are not reciprocal, the system as a 
whole is maintained and operated under broad principles of reciprocity and 
conditionality.470 
                                                 
465 (n 245 above) at 52 
466 (n 422 above) at 144 
467 Although conditional MFN treatment has now been largely abandoned, it still reappears from time 
to time. There two main reasons that conditional MFN treatment has largely been abandoned. First, it 
proved unworkable as ascertaining of what constituted equivalent compensation in application of the 
conditional MFN principle was found to be difficult or impracticable. Second, conditional MFN 
treatment was counterproductive because instead of securing concessions, it merely provided the 
opportunity to bargain for equity of treatment.  
468 (n 422 above) at 145 
469 It also counteracts the ‘prisoners’ dilemma namely the temptation to cheat the system because the 
putative cheater knows that the fruits of his bargain would immediately be claimed by all states.  
470 (n 422 above) at 145 
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The MFN obligation also impacts on the bargaining game by protecting the 
value of concessions against future erosion, and eliminating the threat of 
discriminatory arrangements. Schwartz and Sykes note that: 
 
‘…a trading regime without a MFN obligation creates an opportunity for 
a subset of trading nations to threaten to create a discriminatory 
arrangement even one that was not genuinely in their joint interests 
unless other nations make concessions to stop it…With the MFN 
obligation in place, by contrast, nations are disabled from making 
threats to discriminate.471 
 
In addition, the presence of the MFN clause in a treaty for example between 
countries A, B and C protects the value of concessions by preventing country 
B from making a concession to the same goods to country C without 
extending this concession to A. 
 
Implementing an MFN clause in an FTA, in an unconditional form, would 
oblige any party to the FTA, should they provide more favourable concessions 
to a third party, to provide those same concessions to the original members of 
the FTA. Concessions therefore do not remain internal to the FTA but can 
seep into the multilateral system.472 
 
For example if country A receives a concession from country B and is not 
entitled to MFN treatment from B, then the value of the concession can be 
undermined if country B later makes an even better concession to country C 
on the same goods (or close substitutes). Faced with this uncertainty, country 
                                                 
471 (n 245 above) at 52. See also Schwartz F.W, and Sykes O.A., ‘The Economics of the Most Favoured 
Nation Clause’, in Bandari S.J, and Sykes O.A., (eds) Economic Dimensions in International Law: 
Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, (1997), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
472 Haynes - Prempeh M., ‘The MFN clause in the EPA supporting Multilateralism of Making Foes of 
Nations?’ (2008) A Paper presented at the 6th Garnet PhD School: Global Governance & 
Regionalism: The Institutional Dimension at  5 
http://www.garneteu.org/fileadmin/documents/phd_school/6th_phd_school/Students_papers/Haynes_P
rempeh.pdf [accessed on 18 October 2008] 
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A would offer less for the concession in the first place (as would country B for 
the reciprocal concession), and fewer valuable deals would be struck.’473 
 
The MFN clause also finds support in the classical theory of international 
trade. According to this theory, discrimination between foreign suppliers 
distorts the working of the price mechanism. When governments apply trade 
restrictions uniformly without regard for the origin of goods, the market system 
of goods allocation and production will have maximum effect. On the other 
hand, when governments discriminate between exporters, they cause a 
misallocation of resources by inducing a shift of resources toward those 
relatively less efficient producers who are favoured and away from those more 
efficient producers who are disfavoured.474 
  
The MFN principle ensures the removal of distortions that otherwise would 
hinder the operation of comparative advantage.475 For example, if country K 
does not produce product X, and if country U can supply product X at a lower 
price than country T, country K can increase its economic efficiency by 
importing it from country U. If, however, country K applies higher tariff rates to 
product Xs from country U than to product Xs from country T, country K may 
end up importing product Xs from country T, even though country T is not as 
efficient a supplier.  
 
In light of the example above, this distorts trade and, as a result, reduces the 
welfare of country K and the economic efficiency of the entire world. If, 
however, the MFN principle is applied between the three countries, then 
country K will apply its tariffs equally to all exporting countries and will 
therefore necessarily import product X from country U because it is cheaper to 
do so. Therefore the most efficient result is attained. 
 
                                                 
473 Schwartz W.F. and Sykes A.O., ‘The economics of the most favoured nation clause’, In Bhandani 
J.S. and Sykes A.O., (eds.), Economic Dimensions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical 
Perspectives.(1997) Cambridge University Press, pp. 43–79 at 62 
474 (n 245 above) at 51 
475 (n 422 above) at 144 
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The MFN helps to minimise transaction costs, because customs officials at 
the border may not need to ascertain the ‘origin of goods’ to carry out their 
tasks with respect to goods controlled by MFN.476 In my opinion since all 
countries are treated equally, this will lead to enhanced economic efficiency 
because countries will not incur monitoring and negotiation costs.  
 
According to the classical theory of international trade, discrimination between 
foreign suppliers distorts the working of the price mechanism. Therefore the 
political rationale for the MFN principle is based on the belief that the MFN 
promotes better international relations since it avoids the bitterness and 
tensions that may result from discriminatory policies.477  
 
When governments apply trade restrictions uniformly without regard for the 
origin of goods, the market system of goods allocation and production will 
have maximum effect. On the other hand, when governments discriminate 
between exporters, they cause a misallocation of resources by inducing a shift 
of resources towards those relatively less efficient producers who are 
favoured and away from those more efficient producers who are 
disfavoured.478 
 
In conclusion the widespread and continued use of the MFN clause in bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreements is clearly due to the advantages associated 
with the clause. By applying an MFN clause in an agreement any concessions 
and accrued benefits resulting from trade negotiations are more likely to be 
applied equally to all other WTO members, even though they may be 
excluded from the negotiations. 
 
4.5 Implications of the MFN principle in the EAC EC EPA. 
The MFN clause is the cornerstone of the principle of non-discrimination that 
underlies the entire international trading system (this is clear in light of the 
discussion above): it is also accepted by WTO members that the MFN clause 
                                                 
476 (n 421 above) at 159 
477 (n 440 above) at 15 
478 (n 245 above) at 51 
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makes sense within the WTO context. However, the MFN clause has stirred 
up controversy in the EPAs, this is probably because the MFN clause has no 
place as part of EPAs.479  
 
The twenty five years of the EC’s trade relationship with ACP countries was 
marked by the signing of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 
2000.480 The Lomé Convention, buttressed with generous non-reciprocal 
preferential market access into the European market for ACP exports but 
having failed to achieve these goals, hare now been replaced with new 
reciprocal regional FTAs.481 
 
These FTAs were deliberately called EPAs since they go beyond liberalisation 
of markets known of standard FTAs to include some of the development 
dimensions that characterised the Lomé agreements, albeit now, within the 
rubric of trade liberalisation. For that reason, EPAs have been understood to 
be development oriented, and not classical hard nosed, FTAs.482 
 
There key economic reasons why the Lomé Convention were overhauled; 
however, political and legal challenges were the main reasons. The non-
reciprocal trade preferences granted to ACP countries under the Lomé 
Convention and, in the interim period, under the CPA, had been accused of 
contravening a fundamental principle of the WTO ‘enabling clause’483 
 
After the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the EC managed to secure a 
waiver allowing it to continue contravening the WTO stipulations. The waiver 
was extended for 7 years during the WTO’s Doha Round in 2001 to allow both 
                                                 
479 Dièye C.T and Hanson V., ‘MFN provisions in EPAs: a threat to South – South trade? (2008)7(2) 
Trade Negotiations Insights at 3 www.acp-eu-trade.org [accessed on 30 December 2008] 
480 The CPA, though replete with several objectives and principles, has the contribution to sustainable 
development, poverty eradication and gradual integration of ACP countries into the global economy 
(Article 1:2 of the CPA) as its salient end goals.  
481 (n 49 above) at 6  
482 (n 49above) at 6 
483 The ‘enabling clause’ allows industrial countries to give unilateral non-reciprocal preferential 
treatment to either all WTO least developed countries (LDCs), or, all developing country members but 
not to the two categories of countries in the same region. Therefore, since ACP countries cover both 
categories, the non-reciprocal Lomé preferences granted to the ACP countries contravened the current 
WTO rules. 
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parties ample time to find a way out of the WTO’s rule. The EPAs which come 
into force beginning January 2008 have been claimed to provide the 
solution.484  
 
It is provided under the EAC EC EPA that the EC party shall accord to the 
EAC party any more favourable treatment applicable as a result of the EC 
party becoming party to an economic integration agreement with third parties 
after the signature of the agreement. In return, the EAC party shall accord to 
the EC party any more favourable treatment applicable as a result of EAC 
party becoming party to an economic integration agreement with any major 
trading country after the signature of the agreement.485 
 
In situations of trade agreements between the EAC party with countries of the 
ACP group, or other African Countries and regions, the EAC party shall not be 
required to accord any resulting MFN treatment to the EC party.486 
Furthermore, it is provided that the provisions above shall not be construed as 
to oblige the parties to extend reciprocally any preferential treatment 
applicable as a result of the one of them being party to an economic 
integration agreement with third parties on the date of signature of the EPA.487 
 
Therefore, under MFN treatment, first if EC gives better treatment to a third 
country, they have to give it to the EAC partner states as well; secondly, if 
EAC partner states gives better treatment to a developed country or any 
country accounting for more than 1% of world merchandise trade, EAC 
partner states have to extend the same treatment to EC; and lastly, Members 
                                                 
484 (n 49 above) at 7.  Interestingly, under the EPAs ACP-EC trade relationship is governed under 
article XXIV of the GATT rather than the ‘enabling clause’. 
485 Article 16(6) of the EPA defines a major trading economy to mean any developed country, or any 
country accounting for a share of world merchandise exports above 1% in the year before the entry into 
force of the economic integration agreement that is the EPA, or any group of countries acting 
individually, collectively or through an economic integration agreement accounting collectively for a 
share of world merchandise exports above 1.5% in the year before the entry into force of the EPA. 
According to WTO data, Brazil accounted for 1.5% in 2006, compared to 16.4% for the EU and 11.5% 
for the US. Other developing countries affected would include China; accounting for 10.7% of world 
exports that year, as well as Mexico, Malaysia, India and Indonesia (which cross the threshold with 
between 2.8% and 1.1%). It should be noted the ‘MFN’ clause is included in all the EPAs between the 
ACP countries and the EC however there are slight differences in the circumstances under which the 
clause may be triggered into application by the different ACP regions/countries. 
486 Article 16(4) of the EPA 
487 Article 16(3) of the EPA 
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of the ACP group and other African countries are not covered by the MFN 
provision with respect to the EAC EC EPA. 
 
A few southern countries meet this criterion of major trading economies. They 
should be concerned by this only if they were to grant ACP countries better 
conditions than the EC in future trade negotiations. If that happened, then 
ACP countries (in this case EAC partner states) would be in a position to 
grant such countries better treatment than we gave the EC. The EC, in turn, 
would then be in a position to request implementation of the MFN clause in its 
favour.488 
 
However, the MFN clause has stirred up controversy in EPAs, it has no place 
as part of them according to Dièye C.Tidiane and Hanson Victoria.489 The EC 
was within its rights to demand trading preferences from ACP countries on the 
same basis as those it grants to them (reciprocal trade preferences). But the 
EC goes too far when it asks that the ACP countries gives in return all that 
they might ‘one day’ grant other countries, regardless of what those others 
might give them. This is certainly a ‘pre-emptive’ injustice for ACP countries 
and Brazil was justified to point it out.490 
 
Therefore it is not surprising that MFN clauses in EPAs were denounced by a 
number of WTO members who saw it as putting in place a European strategy 
aimed at maintaining and increasing its share of a regional and continent-wide 
market that it had not yet been able to tap. Even before Brazil’s sensational 
intervention at a WTO session where it warned of the dangers of including the 
MFN clause in EPAs not only for the ACP countries but for all developing 
countries 491 
 
This is mainly because the MFN clause in an EPA ‘multilateralises’ any new 
FTA concessions that a country may receive to all other partners with which it 
                                                 
488 Camilo F.A.C., ‘MFN in the Cariforum EPA is no treat to South-South trade’, (2008)7(4), Trade 
Negotiation Insight, at 10 http://www.ictsd.org/tni [accessed on 15 August 2008] 
489 (n 479 above) at 3 
490 (n 479 above) at 3 
491 (n 479 above) at 2  
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shares an FTA. Though ‘Multilateralising’ the obligations in regional 
agreements is one avenue through which harmony can be achieved between 
the regional and multilateral trading system.492 
 
In light of the above, the inclusion of the MFN clause in the EAC EC EPA will 
have two major effects. First, the EAC partner states will be permanently 
opened to all goods, service-providers and investors from the EC through the 
provisions on free entry, national treatment, non-discrimination and 
permanency of this opening would be locked-in by treaty. 
 
Secondly, by liberalising the EAC market the EC will have succeeded in 
ensuring a competitive environment is created for all its goods, service 
providers and services. Therefore given a minimal regulatory framework in 
place within the EAC market, constraints will be eased creating a likelihood of 
increased private investments from the EC. However there is need for the 
EAC partner states to put in place some measures to promote local 
production capacity. 
 
Brazil has raised serious concerns that the MFN clause in the EPAs between 
the EC and ACP countries could pose a serious threat to improving trade 
between developing nations. The Latin American country, which voiced its 
fears during the WTO General Council in Geneva on 5 February 2008, 
pointed to the negative effects of the so-called MFN clause included in both 
the Caribbean and interim EPAs.493 
 
According to Brazil by including MFN clauses in EPAs, the EC would be 
turning the ‘Enabling Clause’ upside down.494 When the ‘Enabling Clause’ 
was negotiated in the 1970s, one of its main objectives was to increase trade 
among developing countries, on a preferential basis. This possibility is clearly 
                                                 
492 (n 472 above) at 12 
493 (n 479 above) at 1; In this instance an interim EPA also includes the EAC EC EPA. 
494 The ‘Enabling Clause’ was adopted under the GATT IN 1979, allows developed members of the 
WTO to give preferential and more favourable treatment to developing members while not doing so to 
wealthy ones. In addition to North – South trade preference schemes, it also specifically refers to 
regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for the mutual 
reduction or elimination of tariffs. 
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mentioned in indent C of paragraph 2 of the ‘Enabling Clause’, which 
determines that the provisions of the clause apply to ‘regional or global 
arrangements entered into amongst less-developed Contracting Parties for 
the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs …’495 
 
According to Brazil, including the MFN clauses would discourage any 
developing country from entering into agreements aimed at securing mutual 
concessions with EPA countries, on the grounds that the existing access to 
markets granted to EC by the ACP would equal the maximum access possible 
to other developing countries because in effect anything above would 
automatically have to be offered back to EC.496  
 
Brazil further argues that the inclusion of MFN clauses in the EPAs, if 
confirmed, will discourage or even prevent third countries from negotiating 
FTAs with EPA parties and this will create major constraints to South-South 
trade. This comes at a moment when we are witnessing a major expansion of 
that trade and the prospects for promoting further growth through initiatives 
like the extension by some developing countries of duty-free, quota-free 
market access to LDCs and the current round of global system of trade 
negotiations.497  
 
The inclusion of MFN clauses in the EPAs has the potential to undermine 
these initiatives and to create constraints to the development of South-South 
trade. This will not help the integration of developing countries into the world 
trading system, one of the central objectives of the Doha round (also a key 
objective of the EPAs).498 
 
According to Carmen Pont-Vierira Dos Santos, a former WTO official in 
charge of regional trade agreements ‘Brazil would be reluctant to make 
concessions in exchange for concessions that will be extended to the EC,’ 
                                                 
495 General Council meeting-Item 6 ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreement statement by Brazil 5 
February 2008  Paragraph 4 http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/Brazil_EN_050208_Statement-
WTO-General-Council.pdf [accessed on 10 January 2009] 
496 (n 479 above) at 2 
497 (n 495 above) Paragraph 9  
498 (n 495 above) Paragraph 9  
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India would also be wary of giving up anything in exchange for far reaching, 
prompt access to an ACP country’s automobile market, if it knew it had to 
compete on identical terms with European cars, she said. The MFN clauses 
do introduce a ‘real problem’ and a disincentive to South-South commerce.499 
 
This suggests that the MFN clauses curtail negotiated rights for developing 
countries and in effect ‘unable’ the ‘Enabling Clause’ in some cases. Pont-
Vieira Dos Santos said that if such clauses become a practice ‘it could 
contribute to fewer South-South agreements, and maybe more North-South 
agreements.’500 
 
According to Rob Davies, (South African Deputy Minister for Trade and 
Industry), the MFN clause suggests that tariffs on EC products cannot be 
higher than the levies imposed on goods from developing countries. EPAs 
thus prevent other developing countries from having an advantage in bringing 
their goods on the markets of developing nations.501 
 
‘This would lock us (ACP countries) into a primary relationship with the 
EC for ever more. It would be an unacceptable limit on our 
sovereignty’.502 
 
Brazil raised this issue because they thought the conditions that were 
presumably being asked from the ACP countries were unfair, especially within 
the context of the Doha Development Round. As a developing country that 
has seen its trade with other developing countries grow significantly in the 
past ten years to the point that South-South trade now represents 55% of 
Brazilian total trade, Brazil has not only systemic and legal concerns with the 
MFN clauses but also very concrete objections to those clauses.503  
                                                 
499 (n 59 above) at 2 
500 (n 479 above) at 2 
501 (n 479 above) at 2 
502 (n 479 above) at 2; see also: Africa: EPAs signed after EU’s threats, Africa News, 21 December 
2007, www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/14101) 
503 Brazil further contends that they would like to hear from the EC the rationale for devising these 
agreements in this format and, particularly, would seek confirmation of the existence of a MFN clause 
in these agreements, something that will affect third parties in their negotiations with the ACP 
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Brazil’s reservations are widely shared, as the EC proposal seems to run 
counter to a strong and almost irreversible tendency towards increasing trade 
between developing countries particularly India, Brazil, China and the African 
nations. Even though EC is undeniably Africa’s main trading partner, and will 
probably remain so for years to come, its share of trade with Africa continues 
to decline, whereas Africa’s share with countries such as China is showing a 
stratospheric rise.504 
 
Brazil, which was supported by several developing countries including South 
Africa, China, India, Paraguay and Argentina, said it was raising the issue 
partly out of systemic and legal concerns that would affect all WTO members, 
but also due to ‘very concrete objections’ arising from the implications for its 
own trade with other developing countries.505 
 
In my view, much as the inclusion the MFN clause in the EPA is not 
contradictory to ‘Enabling Clause’ on the face of it, however the application of 
the MFN clause is likely to negatively affect South-South trade. This is 
because if developing countries classified as major trading economies in the 
EPA extend better concession to the EAC partner states then the same 
concessions will be extended EC. This places the EC in an advantageous and 
secure bargaining position for its goods and services as compared to 
countries classified as major trading economies. 
 
The EC argues that in expressing concerns about the inclusion of the MFN 
clause within the EPAs, Brazil was also inaudibly pursuing its medium term 
economic interests. Indeed, some point out that the Latin American giant is 
not driven solely by systemic concerns but rather by an appreciation that its 
offensive interest could be thwarted by an EPA MFN clause as 55% of Brazil’s 
total trade is with developing countries. Moreover, it is important to be aware 
that the EC is currently negotiating FTAs with Central America and the 
                                                                                                                                            
countries and that will bring a series of challenges and difficulties to developing countries in particular 
and to the WTO Membership as a whole. 
504 (n 479 above) at 2 
505 (n 479 above) at 2 
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Andean Pact – Brazil’s natural market - with the strong likelihood that these 
will contain similar MFN provisions.506 
 
The EC also defended the inclusion of the MFN clause in EPAs. The first line 
of defence is on legal grounds. One EC official told Trade Negotiation Insights 
that:  
‘the MFN clause does not contradict the Enabling Clause in any legal 
aspect’. 
 
The EC official further explained that ‘the Enabling Clause permits trade 
preferences among developing countries, but it contains nothing that prohibits 
the extension of such preferences to other WTO members’.507 The official 
concluded by stating that because the ‘Enabling Clause’ does not cover FTAs 
therefore there is no connection between the MFN clause, which applies only 
to FTAs and preferences granted under the Enabling Clause.508 
 
Therefore it has no effect on regional integration between ACP countries or 
agreements between ACP and other small or poor developing economies, the 
official underlined. But the EC position is driven by more pragmatic 
considerations. The EC claimed that the MFN clauses, which was negotiated 
jointly by the EC and the ACP countries, is a question of basic fairness and 
covers the so-called ‘competitive new players’ Brazil, India, Russia and 
China.509 
 
Louis Michel, EC Commissioner for Development, has recently stated that 
Europe’s generosity in terms of aid for development did not mean that it would 
                                                 
506 (n 479 above) at 2 
507 (n 479 above) at 2 
508 (n 479 above) at 2; The matter of the relationship between the EPA MFN Clause and the Enabling 
Clause remains on the agenda of the General Council and will no doubt be aired when the EPA is 
notified to the WTO and reviewed in the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. 
509 (n 479 above) at 3; for the moment, the ‘legal limbo’ surrounding the EPAs, none of which have 
been officially notified, would make it difficult to conduct a thorough examination of their provisions. 
If the EC chooses to maintain its position on MFN, it will find it very difficult to claim that its only 
goal in the EPA is to seek compatibility with the WTO and to encourage integration within ACP 
regions. Brazil is now expected to ask for the issue to be placed on the agenda for the next WTO 
General Council’s meeting. Concerns related to bilateral trade arrangements are then usually discussed 
at the WTO committee on Regional Trade Agreements. However, formal discussions can only happen 
once the EPAs have actually been notified to the WTO 
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allow its partner countries to grant more favourable treatment to its 
commercial rivals; ‘we are generous, but not naïve’, he said.510 
 
A number of actors in Africa believe that the EC’s demand is intended merely 
to quash any desire to diversify among trading partners a process that the 
African countries have been engaged in for several years and that is 
beginning to bear fruit. Europe is therefore eyeing the increasing importance 
of trade between Africa and China and with good reason.511 
 
The best-informed experts stress that the decline in trade between EC and 
Africa on traditional postcolonial terms is structural in nature.512 Lulled by the 
comfort of its existing trade positions, its monopoly situations and its almost 
total stranglehold on the means of production and distribution in most African 
countries, EC has had a brutal awakening and has realised that the world of 
trade has changed drastically, and in future it must pay a fair price for its 
consumption, and it must do this in competition with others.513 
 
Also, an attempt was made in creating a balance in North-South trade 
agreement which combines the need to promote and support the necessary 
development objectives of the South states, thereby addressing global 
security issues associated with underdevelopment, while at the same time 
adhering to the underlying principles of non-discrimination, that promote 
stability in the multilateral system, is arguably one of the most essential 
undertakings for parties in such arrangements.514 
 
In my view after finding CPA trade provisions incompatible with WTO legal 
framework the EC pressured many ACP countries to sign EPAs including 
LDCs which have benefited from EBA initiative.  A modified EBA initiative 
                                                 
510 (n 479 above) at 3. See also Q&A ‘We are generous but not naïve’. Interview with Louis Michel, 
EU Development Commissioner, IPS, Bruxelles, 11 February 2008, www.ipsnews.net   
511 (n 479 above) at 3 
512 (n 479 above ) at 3  
513 (n 479 above) at 3. China is now the third biggest trading partner on the African continent. Even 
though Africa remains a minor partner for China, representing only 3% of Chinese global exports and 
3.7% of its imports, the Asian giant replaced Germany as the continent’s biggest supplier in 2005. 
514 (n 472 above) at 5 
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would have easily fulfilled the requirements of the ‘Enabling Clause’ 
incorporated in WTO legal framework following the decision of 25 June 1971 
(BISD 18S/24. By enacting an EPA with a MFN clause the relevancy of the 
‘Enabling Clause’ is minimised. 
 
In conclusion developed countries are increasingly applying the MFN principle 
in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements which suggests the importance 
attached to the principle in facilitating trade cooperation at the international 
level. A FTA as envisaged under Article XXIV of the GATT is no longer 
necessarily an exception to the non discrimination principle in the multi lateral 
trade system. The inclusion of the MFN clause in the EPA does not 
necessarily contravene WTO legal framework however its impact on the 
‘Enabling Clause’ ought to be further analysed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
This paper sets out to examine whether development will be enhanced in the 
East African Community (EAC) partner states in light of the conflicting aspects 
within EAC - EC EPA and also how the inclusion of the MFN clause in the 
EPA will impact on the development prospects of the EAC partner states. 
 
This paper found that; 
1. Due to the unilateral trade preferences granted under the CPA to EAC 
partner states they were held to be incompatible to WTO rules as a 
result the EAC EC negotiated and enacted a reciprocal WTO 
compatible EPA. The EAC EU EPA is a legally binding agreement, 
locking in tariff elimination schedules for the EAC partner states with 
respect to EC goods. 
 
The EAC EC EPA is compatible with the requirements Article XXIV of the 
GATT which regulates the formation of FTAs however the EAC partner states 
are required to reciprocate and also liberalise their economies under the new 
trade arrangement with the EC whereas this was not the case under the Lomé 
Conventions. As a result the EAC partner states policy space will be eroded 
on the account of constraints imposed by the new rules thereby limiting these 
countries from following the most effective development policies.  
 
2. The majority of the population in the EAC partner states relay on 
agriculture for livelihood and sustenance. However there is a possibility 
that agricultural producers will be adversely affected by cheaper and 
heavily subsidised agricultural EC exports.  
 
This possibility is justified despite the exclusion of many agricultural 
products from liberation in the EAC EC EPA.  The major obstacles 
identified in this paper include supply side constraints faced by the 
EAC partner states and EC market entry requirements which indirectly 
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affect the EAC partner states capacity to export agricultural produce to 
the lucrative European markets.  
 
Whereas the EAC EC EPA contains trade defence measures designed to 
address agricultural constraints. It would be imperative for the parties to 
ensure that the use of these measures does not arise in the first place. This is 
due to the difficulty of proving the prerequisite prior to imposing trade defence 
measures.  
 
There is great need for the EAC partner states to be vigilant in preparations 
and during the negotiations for a comprehensive EPA so as to ensure that the 
agricultural sector is further protected given its importance to the partner 
states economies and people’s livelihood. 
 
3 The inclusion of MFN clauses within the EAC EC EPA is likely to 
undermine the development initiatives that were envisaged at the 
inception of the EPA negotiation process. Much as the MFN clause in 
the EAC EC EPA does not apply to ACP countries, it specifically 
targets emerging economies like Brazil whose trade volume with EAC 
partner states (as well as ACP countries) is on the increase.  
 
The MFN clause is likely to have a negative impact on trade between the EAC 
partner states and the so called emerging economies because many of the 
southern countries classified as emerging economies will be hesitant to 
extend better trade concessions to EAC partner states since they will 
automatically extend to EC. 
 
According to Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, there is no convincing evidence 
that trade liberalisation is always correlated with subsequent economic 
growth. If market opening occurs, it should not be dictated by arbitrarily 
devised timetables, but according to the developmental priorities of the 
country concerned. Liberalised markets can bring economic benefits, but as 
the experience of China and India shows, domestic policies that foster 
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economic growth are of overriding importance. Without these the benefits of 
liberalisation are debatable.515 
 
Like anything, the EAC EC EPA has its likely advantages and disadvantages, 
and it is the duty of EAC partner states to mitigate the bad and benefit from 
the good.516 Therefore, it is the theory of this paper that the EAC EC EPA was 
not a bad agreement altogether because it was logical to strengthen the EAC 
CET. However there are a number of issues which remain of concern to the 
EAC partner states. 
 
It is the notion of this paper that EAC partner states should have put in place 
measures to address supply side constraints and other related development 
challenges faced prior to the introduction and implementation of reciprocity in 
their trade relations with the EC.  
 
With such measures in place to address the inherent domestic constraints in 
EAC partner states perhaps subsequently development would be enhanced in 
these countries hence the possibility of substantially benefiting from 
consequent multilateral trade engagements.  
 
However in the absence of substantial progress in addressing the physical 
constraints on competitive production, the productive base of EAC partner 
states economies is likely to be undermined by moves towards WTO 
compatible EPA arrangements.517  This in a way explains why EPAs have 
generated a lot of debate at national, regional and the international forum.  
 
The EAC EC EPA was negotiated under Article XXIV of the GATT. However 
there is evident lack of SDT provisions in this WTO provision that regulates 
North-South RTAs. Further a historical analysis of the origins of Article XXIV 
                                                 
515 (n 239 above) at 3 
516 Katende E., ‘Economic Partnership Agreements and African Countries: A totally bad deal; what are 
the real issue?’, (2008)2 Uganda Trade Review at 3 
517 Awaiting the grim REPA? ‘A review of the outcome of the first phase of ACP-EU trade 
negotiations’, (2003) at 54. A publication of the European Research Office & 11.11.11.-coalition of the 
Flemish north-south movement. 
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of the GATT and permissive past practices within the GATT/WTO does not 
suggest that it was designed for North-- South FTA518  
The ban on export taxes and duties under the EPA 519is unacceptable for two 
reasons. First, the WTO allows countries to impose export taxes and duties; in 
addition export taxes are important to encourage diversification and value 
addition for African economies. Therefore this EPA provision goes beyond the 
requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT and could prevent EAC partner 
states from industrializing and increasing their domestic agricultural 
production.520 
Secondly, the EAC partner states will have signed away their policy space yet 
the value of preferences granted to them by the EC will be nil in about 5 to 10 
years. This is because the EC is already negotiating FTAs with Central 
America, Andean countries, ASEAN, India and others.521 
 
The EAC partner states are faced with a key challenge of inherent supply side 
constraints which inhibit private sector entities from competing in the lucrative 
international markets like the EC.522 Yet much as the EC agrees to the 
development matrix it does not want a detailed one that identifies the costs 
and exact projects. Therefore this indicates a possibility that EAC partner 
states have a better understanding of their problems now.  
 
In Uganda the agricultural sector engages almost 70 percent of the population 
(including fisheries and forestry) and is also important in terms of household 
incomes, export revenues, and food security.523 Therefore the EPA 
agricultural commitments are likely to have a major effect not only on the 
                                                 
518 (n 39 above) at 372  
519 Under the EAC EC EPA a standstill clause was introduced that disallows new customs duties to be 
applied, or existing ones to be raised, even for sensitive products after the entry into force of the 
agreement and also a provision that freezes export taxes and duties 
520 Kwa A., ‘South Centre cautions African when approaching Economic Partnership Agreements’ 
(2009) at 1 http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=14448 [accessed on 30 December 2008] 
521 (n 520 above) at 1 
522 The supply side constraints are cross cutting issues in all the EPA negotiation clusters but more so 
components of the development cluster. 
523 Ensuring food security involves providing support for the agricultural sector, controlling the 
liberalisation of the market in agricultural products, ensuring proper management of the resources 
allocated to the agricultural sector and promoting consumption of local products. 
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economy of Uganda but also on the EAC partner states economies as a 
whole.524  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
For the EAC partner states to meaningfully take advantage of the EPA, they 
will have to advocate for the EC Common Agricultural Policy reforms to be 
taken expeditiously. With agricultural trade liberalisation in the EC, it may 
impact world prices thereby enhancing the ability of EAC partner states to 
benefit from a more open trading system.525 
 
Further, the EC is also pushing hard for countries to liberalise services, 
intellectual property, investment, competition, and government procurement, 
these issues are more suited when EAC partner states’ economies have 
grown and can negotiate from a stronger position, rather than from weakness, 
as it is at the moment. These issues are beyond the requirements of WTO 
compatibility for RTAs as enshrined in Article XXIV of the GATT. 
 
In terms of regulation and sequencing, effective regulatory authorities should 
be in place before liberalisation of the sub-sectors is effected for example in 
Uganda there is neither competition legislation nor a regulatory body. In terms 
of pace, the liberalisation should be gradual and have appropriate safeguards 
so that adverse consequences can be addressed through adjustment and 
corrective measures.526  
 
The inclusion of the MFN clause makes it mandatory for EAC partner states to 
offer the EC what they offer to another major economy after the entry into 
force of the EPA. This works against regional integration and the promotion of 
                                                 
524 (n 306 above) at 73 
525 (n 10 above) at 73 
526 (n 52 above) at 11. The identification of offensive interests should be based on past experiences with 
liberalisation, export performance and returns, credible positive impact and inflows, and the likelihood 
of promotion of regional development objectives. The privatisation experience has demonstrated the 
possibility of some serious adverse consequences for the public. In Tanzania, unscrupulous dealings 
were discovered in the provision of electricity and water by foreign companies that were either ‘brief 
case’ companies or that charged exorbitant and unjustified fees and fines from a developing country 
government.  
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south-south trade. It also goes beyond the requirements of the WTO’s Article 
XXIV of the GATT on RTAs.527 
 
In my view much as there development initiatives included in the EPA, a lot 
more has to be done by the EAC partner states in order to attain their 
envisaged development objectives in the medium and long-term. This is due 
the fact that well as Article XXIV of the GATT requires liberalisation in goods 
only, the EC has insisted on the inclusion of services and Singapore issues 
among others.  
 
For example if the EAC partner states are to benefit from the EPA, they ought 
to streamline their domestic policies with both their international trade 
agenda.528 This essentially means EAC partner states need to effectively and 
comprehensively address all production and trade related bottlenecks 
(commonly referred to as ‘supply-side constraints’) which are currently and 
persistently inhibiting economic growth, trade and development.529 
 
In the negotiations leading to a comprehensive EPA the EAC partner states 
should advocate for the inclusion of development benchmarks pegged to their 
liberalisation schedules.530 This would assist to measure the implementation 
and contribution of the EPA from a development perspective.  
 
The indicators could cover all the major areas of the EPA, including 
implementation of tariff reductions in sensitive sectors, implementation of the 
development chapter, resource disbursement, role of other donors, changes 
in social economic indicators, export performance, use of flexibilities, 
effectiveness of EPA and EAC institutions, and use of the dispute settlement 
system.531 
 
                                                 
527 (n 520 above) at 1 
528 Article 37 of the EPA provides a rendez-vous clause under which the parties agree to negotiations in 
a number of areas leading to a comprehensive EPA. 
529 (n 306 above) at 250 
530 SEATINI ‘The EAC-EU EPA key improvements for promoting social economic development and 
regional integration’ (2008) SEATINI at 5 
531 (n 530 above) at 5 
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For example, if after 20 years the EAC partner states have attained 70 
percent the size of the EC (in per capita terms) and fulfilled the diversification 
and regional integration criteria, they would eliminate 70 percent of their tariff 
lines over 5 years. This will ensure that upon the EAC partner states having 
attained a certain level of development then would they undertake reforms of 
their trade regimes vis-à-vis the EC. 
 
There is need for EAC partner states to devise ways of replacing lost revenue 
due to tariff liberalisation under the EAC EC EPA. The EAC partner states 
could be forced to reform their indirect tax systems so that revenues from the 
VAT and other non-discriminatory excise taxes are levied at equal rates on 
imports and domestic products replacing the forgone tariff revenues.532  
 
The EAC partner states should advocate that WTO rules on RTAs must be 
reviewed so that future agreements do not insist on substantial reciprocity, 
avoiding the need for alternatives to be thrashed out each time. ‘By 
demanding reciprocal liberalisation, EPAs contravene the long-fought-for 
concepts of SDT and non-reciprocity, which have been embedded at the 
WTO since the Punta del Este ministerial declaration’.533  
 
To this effect a proposal was submitted by the ACP Group of states which 
aims at formally incorporating SDT in the application of conditions set out in 
the paragraphs 5-8 of GATT Article XXIV when they are applied to RTAs 
formed between developed and developing countries (that is North-South 
RTAs).534 
In a bid to increase the EAC partner states net trade benefits from the EPA, it 
is also imperative to enhance domestic value addition through processing of 
                                                 
532 Though in the recent years EAC partner states were directed to reform their tax systems by donor 
partners more efforts are needed in this area to ensure maximum efficiency and effectiveness in 
revenue administration.  
533 (n 239 above) at 2. Article XXIV of the GATT provides the rules on Regional Trade Agreements, it 
should be amended to include development flexibility, and EPAs should then be compatible with such 
flexibility. 
534 With the recognition that the ‘less-than-full’ reciprocity principle in tariff negotiations (thus a form 
of SDT) is being overridden by the reciprocity requirement of GATT Article XXIV, the ACP proposal 
calls for SDT in the application of GATT Article XXIV requirements, such as the ‘substantially all the 
trade’ requirements, when it applies to the North-South RTAs (also see: WTO document 
TN/RL/W/155, 28 April 2004) 
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agricultural produce to benefit from the resultant market price of processed 
goods as opposed to exportation of agricultural raw materials. 
 
In this regard EAC partner states should seek a commitment on the part of the 
EC to increase joint venture investments in value addition for agricultural 
products. Well as on their part, EAC partner states should purse vigorously 
policies to modernise agriculture, boost agricultural production and 
productivity and increased agro-processing. 
 
Also to ease the movement of agricultural produce and manufactured goods 
within the EAC region and to the more lucrative European market there is a 
need to finance infrastructure projects in the EAC partner states. For example 
the development of water transport on lake Victoria, rail and roads upgrading 
starting with a major highway (rather than a two-lane, broken-down road) 
linking the port of Mombasa in Kenya with Nairobi, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Sudan would go a long 
in enormously expanding trade within the region as well as the rest of the 
world. 
 
The EAC partner states should also utilise their ongoing negotiations towards 
a comprehensive EPA with the EC to enlist further support for their SPS 
capacity building efforts. The EAC partner states, private sector and civil 
society need to work together in a coordinated manner to respond to the 
challenges posed by SPS compliance.535  
 
In this regard the EAC partner states should detail and quantify their technical 
assistance needs so that they can more successfully lobby for support. On the 
other hand the EC needs to show greater will to operationalise the SDT 
measures within the SPS Agreement and to provide the resources to support 
EAC partner states reforms. The EC also needs to provide greater oversight 
                                                 
535 (n 307 above) at 7. On their part EAC partner states need to carry out effective assessments of their SPS 
compliance capacity and to draw up detailed proposals for capacity building support that relate to all aspects 
of the compliance process. This will enable them to make their case to donors in a more effective and 
coordinated fashion 
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to the setting of governmental and private SPS standards so as to make sure 
they uphold the principles of the SPS Agreement.536 
 
The inclusion of agricultural safeguards in the EAC EC EPA is a justified 
review provision as a protective measure to remedy any unforeseen 
consequences arising out of the EPA. The vulnerability of the agricultural 
sector in the EAC partner states, lack of resilience in the rural population 
where small farmers’ livelihoods depend on production and the significant 
financial support given to EC farmers make it a necessary tool for the EAC 
partner states.537 
 
The EAC partner states should advocate for an agricultural safeguard 
mechanism that is easy to implement and responds to individual country 
circumstances. Such a safeguard should include automatic triggers for price 
and volume fluctuations to respond to import surges on a timely basis, before 
any damage is done to the local markets or farmers’ incomes deteriorate.538 
 
The safeguard should be asymmetrical in that it is only available to EAC 
partner states, consider quantitative restrictions as possible trade remedies, 
include transparency provisions that take into account the administrative and 
institutional capabilities of the EAC importing country, allow individual 
countries within the regional scheme to trigger the safeguard measures and 
impose trade remedies on imports from the EC and also be available 
throughout the implementation period of EPA and beyond.539 
 
However it should be noted that having an agricultural safeguard is not 
enough to reap the benefits from EPA market liberalisation. In order to reduce 
poverty and boost development, it is necessary to contemplate the inclusion 
                                                 
536 The EC have an important role to play in mobilising the resources to build capacity through encouraging 
private sector investment in standards compliant infrastructure and developing the institutions required to 
coordinate standards compliance. 
537 (n 348 above) at 7. Modeling the safeguard on the G33 group of developing countries’ proposal for 
an SSM would make it WTO compliant and could minimise some of the potentially damaging effects 
of liberalisation). 
538 (n 348 above) at 7 
539 (n 348 above) at 7 
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of support measures geared towards increasing investment, improving 
infrastructure and productivity, adopting measures to address safety and 
quality standards and promoting integration of regional markets in the 
EPAs.540 
 
Historically, the demanding Rules of Origin (RoO) under Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP) and to a lesser extent, the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement (CPA), have hindered more dynamic export growth in ACP 
countries. There is need for EAC partner states to negotiate a more 
favourable RoO framework for their exports into the EC under the EPA. 
Allowing global cumulation from all other developing countries, including 
between countries from different ACP EPA Groupings, could also provide 
greater export opportunities.541 
 
The internal problems of the EC fisheries have important consequences for 
the development of fisheries in the EAC partner states. This is particularly true 
in the areas of resource management, food security and the development of 
value-added activities. The most important aspects in this regard are the need 
for sustainable development and exploitation of the fisheries resources as well 
as issues related to market access in general.542 
 
In this regard the EAC EC EPA is likely to address some of the shortcomings 
that EAC partner states face in accessing the EC fish market. The standards 
and accreditation issues involving technical barriers to trade and SPS 
measures are of significance.543 Therefore the EPA promises to address the 
shortcomings that EAC partner states face in developing their fish export 
capacity.544  
                                                 
540 (n 348 above) at 7 
541 South Centre, ‘The value of EU preferences for the ACP and EPA contribution to market access’ 
(2007), SC/AN/TDP/EPA/2, at 16, http://www.southcentre.org [accessed on 6 October 2008]. 
However, whatever the alternative if EAC partner states are allowed to source their inputs to goods 
from anywhere in the world their duty-free exporter status should not be affected. 
542 (n 259 above) at 37  
543 (n 259 above) at 37 
544 It is important to note that small-scale value-adding activities do help in increasing the shelf life of 
fish products, making them more transportable and therefore accessible. Improving the returns from 
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The EC should not aggressively push EAC ACP countries to open their 
services sector, and all flexibility sectors, and all flexibility in Article 5 of the 
WTO Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) should be maintained; on the 
other hand, on the basis of asymmetry, the EC should satisfactorily liberalise 
its services sectors in favour of EAC ACP countries.545  
 
In any case, if EAC partner states want to include negotiations of trade in 
services in their EPA, this may potentially provide ‘new preferences’ to EAC 
countries in the services sector. In particular, the temporary migration of 
people (Mode 4) could be an important part of EPA service negotiations since 
the EAC region should have a comparative advantage in its supply as it is by 
definition labour intensive as a region. It has been estimated that Africa would 
gain around US$14 billion from increased developed country quotas for both 
skilled and unskilled temporary workers.546 
 
Further liberalisation and commitments under the GATS should contribute to 
attracting investment in services, in general, and should improve the efficiency 
of other economic activities and the competitiveness of EAC’s exports, 
especially by reducing costs related to inter alia  telecommunications, 
transport and energy.547   
 
Further, the EAC partner states should advocate importation of EC assistance 
in building physical and social infrastructure, increasing development 
financing, promoting health, eradicating poverty, and addressing key 
constraints to achieving their development goals. These infrastructural 
                                                                                                                                            
value-adding, fish processing will require understanding of the markets and how they operate at both 
regional and international levels. 
545 (n 530 above) at 15. ACP governments should not be pressed to make commitments on trade in 
services in the context of negotiating a comprehensive EPA which they are not willing to make as 
commitments in a WTO context.  
546 (n 541 above) at 17. Although the potential gains are large, it is unclear how Mode 4 could be 
incorporated into the EAC EC EPA framework, and whether it would require the reciprocal 
liberalisation of services in ACP countries. 
547 (n 52 above) at 10 
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services would assist in social economic development to ensure social justice 
and sustainable development.548 
 
The MFN clause should not have been included in the EPA and if possible it 
should be eliminated due its conceptual difficulties. The MFN clause is of 
limited importance to the EAC partner states better still its inclusion should be 
on the basis that the EC should match any better treatment that the third 
country give to the EAC; or (as a fall back position) introduction of an 
exception to the MFN clause that where the EAC gives a third country better 
treatment than it gives the EC under the EPA, there may be consultations in 
the Development Council whether to extend this to the EC.549 
 
The EAC partner states will continue to negotiate a comprehensive EPA in 
2009, the inclusion of the MFN clause in the EAC EC EPA remains highly 
sensitive. Ultimately, it is up to the EAC partner states to convince their EC 
partner that it is inappropriate to include this clause in the EPA.550  
 
This must be done through a vast campaign at the WTO and in other forums 
to rally remaining countries to this cause. But the experience of the Caribbean 
and other ACP regions, where the MFN clause was strongly resisted yet 
imposed by the EC, is not encouraging.551 
As a result of the issues discussed above the EAC partner states face an 
uphill task if they are to benefit from EPA. One of the primary reasons for this 
is the requirement of reciprocal market opening between the unequal EPA 
parties. This in a way is likely to affect the faith of EAC partner states in using 
their multilateral trade commitments as an instrument of development. 
In conclusion a better deal for the EAC partner states would have enabled 
them to make giant strides in achieving their envisioned development 
prospects as a result of their interaction with the global economy. However, 
since EC trading capacity is not comparable to the EAC partner states the 
                                                 
548 (n 52 above) at 11 
549 (n 530 above) at 6 
550 (n 479 above) at 3  
551 (n 479 above) at 3 
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application of reciprocity in the EAC EC EPA does not help matters. At the 
moment the exact impact of the EPA on development can not be ascertained 
since the agreement was only signed in November 2008 and a 
comprehensive EAC EC EPA is due to be finalised later in 2009.  
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